Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] vm_event: Implement ARM SMC events

[Corneliu ZUZU <czuzu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On 4/11/2016 10:47 PM, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
> From: Tamas K Lengyel <tklengyel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>
> The ARM SMC instructions are already configured to trap to Xen by default. In
> this patch we allow a user-space process in a privileged domain to receive
> notification of when such event happens through the vm_event subsystem.
>
> This patch will likely needs to be broken up into several smaller patches.
> Right now what this patch adds (and could be broken into smaller patches
> accordingly):
>      - Implement monitor_op domctl handler for SOFTWARE_BREAKPOINTs on ARM
>      - Implement vm_event register fill/set routines for ARM. This required
>          removing the function from common as the function prototype now
>          differs on the two archs.
>      - Sending notification as SOFTWARE_BREAKPOINT vm_event from the SMC trap
>          handlers.
>      - Extend the xen-access test tool to receive SMC notification and step
>          the PC manually in the reply.
>
> I'm sending it as an RFC to gather feedback on what has been overlooked in this
> revision. This patch has been tested on a Cubietruck board and works fine,
> but would probably not work on 64-bit boards.
Hi Tamas,

If I may, I'm still unable to work at the moment, being ill, but I'm 
checking the xen-devel lists from time to time.
Your patch caught my attention, reminding me of the conversation we had 
some time ago on this matter.
The only real reason I don't see SMC (secure-monitor-call) as being an 
ideal candidate for this is that, according to the ARM manuals, SMC 
should directly cause undefined exception if executed from user-mode 
(EL0), instead of a hypervisor trap - isn't that the case on the machine 
you tested this on or is this really only for the EL1 of domains?
Also:
- SMC, by definition, is a call to the secure side, it doesn't relate to 
debugging directly (it's a syscall to the 'secure' side). There is a 
viable INT3 equivalent on ARM, that being the BKPT/BRK instruction, 
using that instead would require a bit more effort (but would, 
conceptually, be more correct) and might be less performant, I suppose 
that's why you didn't go for that?
- SMC can be disabled by the secure side (over which Xen doesn't have 
control) - not really a problem on though, since the hypervisor trap 
happens before that check
But these 2 are conceptual problems, they don't impede usage of SMC as 
you intend in practice.
Cheers,
Corneliu.

_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel