[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] crash on boot with 4.6.1 on fedora 24
>>> On 11.05.16 at 12:10, <JGross@xxxxxxxx> wrote: > On 11/05/16 12:03, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>>> On 11.05.16 at 11:57, <JGross@xxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> On 11/05/16 09:15, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>>>>> On 11.05.16 at 09:00, <JGross@xxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>> Having a Xen specific pte flag seems to be much more intrusive than >>>>> having an early boot page fault handler consisting of just one line >>>>> being capable to mimic the default handler in just one aspect (see >>>>> attached patch - only compile tested). >>>> >>>> Well, this simple handler may serve the purpose here, but what's >>>> the effect of having it in place on actual #PF (resulting e.g. from >>>> a bug somewhere)? I.e. what diagnostic information will be >>>> available to the developer in that case, now that the hypervisor >>>> won't help out anymore? >>> >>> Good point. As fixup_exception() is returning 0 in this case we can >>> set the #PF handler to NULL again and retry the failing instruction. >>> This will then lead to the same hypervisor handled case as today. >> >> And how would you mean to set the #PF handler to this tiny one >> again for the next M2P access? You simply can't have both, I'm afraid. > > Why would I need another #PF handler after a crash? I meant something > like: > > +dotraplinkage void notrace > +xen_do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code) > +{ > + if (!fixup_exception(regs, X86_TRAP_PF)) > + set_intr_gate_notrace(X86_TRAP_PF, NULL); > +} Ah, right, that should work (albeit looks a bit, well, odd). Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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