[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/5] flask/policy: split into modules
On Mon, May 23, 2016 at 11:05:29AM -0400, Daniel De Graaf wrote: > This makes it easier to enable or disable parts of the XSM policy. > Hey Daniel, I am no expert on this so please take it with a grain of salt. .. snip.. > diff --git a/tools/flask/policy/modules/default_role.te > b/tools/flask/policy/modules/default_role.te > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000..74f870f > --- /dev/null > +++ b/tools/flask/policy/modules/default_role.te > @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ > +# Allow all domains to use system_r so that systems that are not using the > +# user/role separation feature will work properly. > +role system_r types domain_type; In the 'original' code it also had : xen_type : 266 role system_r types { xen_type domain_type }; Is this change done on purpose? Reading the xen.te it describes the 'system_r' as: "The system role is used for utility domains and pseudo-domains " which is .. confusing. What is an utility domain? Pseudo-domain? [Looking in the new xen.te I see that it has the same syntax] > + > +# The vm role is used as part of user separation. Allow all domain types to > use > +# this role except dom0. > +role vm_r; > +role vm_r types { domain_type -dom0_t }; > diff --git a/tools/flask/policy/modules/dom0.te > b/tools/flask/policy/modules/dom0.te > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000..dd4d7dd > --- /dev/null > +++ b/tools/flask/policy/modules/dom0.te > @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ > +################################################################################ > +# > +# Allow dom0 access to all sysctls, devices, and the security server. > +# > +# While this could be written more briefly using wildcards, the permissions > are > +# listed out to make removing specific permissions simpler. > +# > +################################################################################ > +allow dom0_t xen_t:xen { > + settime tbufcontrol readconsole clearconsole perfcontrol mtrr_add > + mtrr_del mtrr_read microcode physinfo quirk writeconsole readapic > + writeapic privprofile nonprivprofile kexec firmware sleep frequency > + getidle debug getcpuinfo heap pm_op mca_op lockprof cpupool_op tmem_op > + tmem_control getscheduler setscheduler > +}; > +allow dom0_t xen_t:xen2 { > + resource_op psr_cmt_op psr_cat_op pmu_ctrl get_symbol > + get_cpu_levelling_caps get_cpu_featureset xsplice_op Hehe. livepatch_op now :-) .. giant snip... > diff --git a/tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.te > b/tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.te > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000..f374dc5 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.te .. snip.. > +################################################################################ > +# > +# Roles > +# > +################################################################################ > + > +# The object role (object_r) is used for devices, resources, and event > channels; > +# it does not need to be defined here and should not be used for domains. > + > +# The system role is used for utility domains and pseudo-domains. If roles > are > +# not being used for separation, all domains can use the system role. > +role system_r; > +role system_r types { xen_type dom0_t }; Right here it is back again. Is the 'default_role' neccessary then? I've looked at the original xen.te and them splitting out to individual and there were no missing copy-n-paste (except the above 'default_role.te' which I am not clear about). Thanks! _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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