Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 5/8] x86/vm-event/monitor: don't compromise monitor_write_data on domain cleanup

[Corneliu ZUZU <czuzu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On 7/4/2016 6:07 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
> > > > On 04.07.16 at 16:21, <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > On 07/04/16 17:17, Jan Beulich wrote:
> > > > > > On 04.07.16 at 15:50, <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > > On 07/04/16 16:11, Jan Beulich wrote:
> > > > > > > > On 04.07.16 at 15:03, <czuzu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > > > > On 7/4/2016 3:47 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > On 30.06.16 at 20:45, <czuzu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > > > > > > The arch_vm_event structure is dynamically allocated and freed @
> > > > > > > > vm_event_cleanup_domain. This cleanup is triggered e.g. when the toolstack
> > > > user
> > > > > > > > disables domain monitoring (xc_monitor_disable), which in turn effectively
> > > > > > > > discards any information that was in arch_vm_event.write_data.
> > > > > > > Isn't that rather a toolstack user bug, not warranting a relatively
> > > > > > > extensive (even if mostly mechanical) hypervisor change like this
> > > > > > > one? Sane monitor behavior, after all, is required anyway for the
> > > > > > > monitored guest to survive.
> > > > > > Sorry but could you please rephrase this, I don't quite understand what
> > > > > > you're saying.
> > > > > > The write_data field in arch_vm_event should _not ever_ be invalidated
> > > > > > as a direct result of a toolstack user's action.
> > > > > The monitoring app can cause all kinds of problems to the guest it
> > > > > monitors. Why would this specific one need taking care of in the
> > > > > hypervisor, instead of demanding that the app not disable monitoring
> > > > > at the wrong time?
> > > > I'm not sure there's a right time here. The problem is that, if I
> > > > understand this correctly, a race is possible between the moment the
> > > > userspace application responds to the vm_event _and_ call
> > > > xc_monitor_disable() and the time hvm_do_resume() gets called.
> > > It's that _and_ in your reply that I put under question, but I admit
> > > that questioning may be due to my limited (or should I say non-
> > > existent) knowledge on the user space parts here: Why would the
> > > app be _required_ to "responds to the vm_event _and_ call
> > > xc_monitor_disable()", rather than delaying the latter for long
> > > enough?
> > It's not required to do that, it's just that we don't really know what
> > "long enough means". I suppose a second should do be more than enough,
> > but obviously we'd prefer a fool-proof solution with better guarantees
> > and no lag - I thought that the hypervisor change is trivial enough to
> > not make the tradeoff into much of an issue.
> It's mostly mechanical indeed, but iirc it grows struct vcpu (or was
> it struct domain?), which is never really desirable (but admittedly
> often unavoidable). I'm therefore simply trying to understand what
> alternatives there are.
>
> Jan
The change adds 20 bytes to the structure, that's less than 3 
uint64_t's, not that much if you ask me.
But given the discussion we're having over patch 4/8, monitor_write_data 
would indeed get larger if I revert that, so what I propose instead is 
going for something in-between what was before and what I did after, 
i.e. don't dynamically allocate arch_vm_event entirely, but don't 
statically allocate monitor_write_data either. I propose turning 
arch_vm_event into:
struct arch_vm_event {
    uint32_t emulate_flags;
    struct vm_event_emul_read_data *emul_read_data;
    struct monitor_write_data *write_data;
};

This way we can still selectively invalidate write_data from arch_vm_event.
Sounds good?

Corneliu.

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