[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

[Xen-devel] [PATCH v3] xen: support enabling SMEP/SMAP for HVM only



SMEP/SMAP is a security feature to prevent kernel executing/accessing
user address involuntarily, any such behavior will lead to a page fault.

SMEP/SMAP is open (in CR4) for both Xen and HVM guest in earlier code.
A 32-bit PV guest will suffer unknown SMEP/SMAP page fault when guest
kernel attempt to access user address although SMEP/SMAP is close for
PV guests already.

This patch is going to support enabling SMEP/SMAP for HVM but disabling
them for Xen hypervisor. Users can choose whether opening them for Xen,
especially when they are going to run 32-bit PV guests.

Signed-off-by: He Chen <he.chen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

---
Changes in v3:
* Fix boot options.
* Fix CR4 & mmu_cr4_features operations.
* Disable SMEP/SMAP for Dom0.
* Commit message refinement.

Changes in v2:
* Allow "hvm" as a value to "smep" and "smap" command line options.
* Clear SMEP/SMAP CPUID bits for pv guests if they are set to hvm only.
* Refine docs.
* Rewrite commit message.
---
 docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown |  2 ++
 xen/arch/x86/setup.c                | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 xen/arch/x86/traps.c                |  7 +++++
 xen/include/asm-x86/setup.h         |  6 ++++
 4 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown 
b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
index 3a250cb..b15f3e7 100644
--- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
@@ -1433,6 +1433,7 @@ Set the serial transmit buffer size.
 > Default: `true`
 
 Flag to enable Supervisor Mode Execution Protection
+Use `smep=hvm` to enable SMEP for HVM guests only.
 
 ### smap
 > `= <boolean>`
@@ -1440,6 +1441,7 @@ Flag to enable Supervisor Mode Execution Protection
 > Default: `true`
 
 Flag to enable Supervisor Mode Access Prevention
+Use `smap=hvm` to enable SMAP for HVM guests only.
 
 ### snb\_igd\_quirk
 > `= <boolean> | cap | <integer>`
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
index 217c775..a428558 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
@@ -62,12 +62,12 @@ static unsigned int __initdata max_cpus;
 integer_param("maxcpus", max_cpus);
 
 /* smep: Enable/disable Supervisor Mode Execution Protection (default on). */
-static bool_t __initdata opt_smep = 1;
-boolean_param("smep", opt_smep);
+static void parse_smep_param(char *s);
+custom_param("smep", parse_smep_param);
 
 /* smap: Enable/disable Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (default on). */
-static bool_t __initdata opt_smap = 1;
-boolean_param("smap", opt_smap);
+static void parse_smap_param(char *s);
+custom_param("smap", parse_smap_param);
 
 unsigned long __read_mostly cr4_pv32_mask;
 
@@ -111,6 +111,40 @@ struct cpuinfo_x86 __read_mostly boot_cpu_data = { 0, 0, 
0, 0, -1 };
 
 unsigned long __read_mostly mmu_cr4_features = XEN_MINIMAL_CR4;
 
+int opt_smep = 1;
+static void __init parse_smep_param(char *s)
+{
+    if ( !strcmp(s, "hvm") )
+    {
+        opt_smep = SMEP_HVM_ONLY;
+    }
+    else if ( !parse_bool(s) )
+    {
+        opt_smep = 0;
+    }
+    else if ( parse_bool(s) && opt_smep != SMEP_HVM_ONLY )
+    {
+        opt_smep = 1;
+    }
+}
+
+int opt_smap = 1;
+static void __init parse_smap_param(char *s)
+{
+    if ( !strcmp(s, "hvm") )
+    {
+        opt_smap = SMAP_HVM_ONLY;
+    }
+    else if ( !parse_bool(s) )
+    {
+        opt_smap = 0;
+    }
+    else if ( parse_bool(s) && opt_smap != SMAP_HVM_ONLY )
+    {
+        opt_smap = 1;
+    }
+}
+
 bool_t __read_mostly acpi_disabled;
 bool_t __initdata acpi_force;
 static char __initdata acpi_param[10] = "";
@@ -1403,12 +1437,12 @@ void __init noreturn __start_xen(unsigned long mbi_p)
 
     if ( !opt_smep )
         setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SMEP);
-    if ( cpu_has_smep )
+    if ( cpu_has_smep && opt_smep != SMEP_HVM_ONLY )
         set_in_cr4(X86_CR4_SMEP);
 
     if ( !opt_smap )
         setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SMAP);
-    if ( cpu_has_smap )
+    if ( cpu_has_smap && opt_smap != SMAP_HVM_ONLY )
         set_in_cr4(X86_CR4_SMAP);
 
     cr4_pv32_mask = mmu_cr4_features & XEN_CR4_PV32_BITS;
@@ -1430,8 +1464,19 @@ void __init noreturn __start_xen(unsigned long mbi_p)
 
     arch_init_memory();
 
+    /*
+     * Temporarily clear SMAP in internal feature bitmap to avoid
+     * patching unnecessary SMAP instructions when SMAP is disabled in
+     * Xen hypervisor.
+     */
+    if ( opt_smap == SMAP_HVM_ONLY )
+        __clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_SMAP, boot_cpu_data.x86_capability);
+
     alternative_instructions();
 
+    if ( opt_smap == SMAP_HVM_ONLY )
+        __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_SMAP, boot_cpu_data.x86_capability);
+
     local_irq_enable();
 
     pt_pci_init();
@@ -1550,7 +1595,7 @@ void __init noreturn __start_xen(unsigned long mbi_p)
      * This saves a large number of corner cases interactions with
      * copy_from_user().
      */
-    if ( cpu_has_smap )
+    if ( cpu_has_smap && opt_smap != SMAP_HVM_ONLY )
     {
         cr4_pv32_mask &= ~X86_CR4_SMAP;
         write_cr4(read_cr4() & ~X86_CR4_SMAP);
@@ -1570,7 +1615,7 @@ void __init noreturn __start_xen(unsigned long mbi_p)
                         bootstrap_map, cmdline) != 0)
         panic("Could not set up DOM0 guest OS");
 
-    if ( cpu_has_smap )
+    if ( cpu_has_smap && opt_smap != SMAP_HVM_ONLY )
     {
         write_cr4(read_cr4() | X86_CR4_SMAP);
         cr4_pv32_mask |= X86_CR4_SMAP;
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
index e822719..58989c4 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@
 #include <public/arch-x86/cpuid.h>
 #include <asm/cpuid.h>
 #include <xsm/xsm.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
 
 /*
  * opt_nmi: one of 'ignore', 'dom0', or 'fatal'.
@@ -1098,6 +1099,12 @@ void pv_cpuid(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
             b |= (host_featureset[FEATURESET_7b0] &
                   special_features[FEATURESET_7b0]);
 
+            if ( opt_smep == SMEP_HVM_ONLY )
+                b &= ~cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SMEP);
+
+            if ( opt_smap == SMAP_HVM_ONLY )
+                b &= ~cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SMAP);
+
             c &= pv_featureset[FEATURESET_7c0];
 
             if ( !is_pvh_domain(currd) )
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/setup.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/setup.h
index c65b79c..7102b5c 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/setup.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/setup.h
@@ -51,6 +51,12 @@ void microcode_grab_module(
 
 extern uint8_t kbd_shift_flags;
 
+#define SMEP_HVM_ONLY -1
+extern int opt_smep;
+
+#define SMAP_HVM_ONLY -1
+extern int opt_smap;
+
 #ifdef NDEBUG
 # define highmem_start 0
 #else
-- 
1.9.1


_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel

 


Rackspace

Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our
servers 24x7x365 and backed by RackSpace's Fanatical Support®.