Re: [Xen-devel] Possible to prevent dom0 accessing guest memory?

[Andy Smith <andy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Hi Andrew,

On Mon, Nov 14, 2016 at 03:06:12PM +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> You have misunderstood a step.
> 
> Dom0 can map all of guest memory.  This is how `xl dump-core` is
> implemented, as well as how Qemu emulates devices for the guest.

Ah, okay, thanks. That is what I feared.

Due to details of the legal jurisdiction in which I operate, it
would actually be useful to me to disable xl dump-core and be able
to truthfully state that I do not know how to obtain a dump of a
guest's memory. As it stands I do know that xl dump-core exists and
I can be compelled to run it. I do not personally know how to write
a program to do what xl dump-core does and would have no interest in
finding out.

But I appreciate that the more general concern would be an attacker
who gains root access, and they could just run such a program, so I
guess Xen developers would see little point in offering a way to
disable dump-core.

Cheers,
Andy

_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel