[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 15/15] x86/hvm: Use system-segment relative memory accesses
>>> On 23.11.16 at 16:38, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > --- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c > @@ -1181,20 +1181,38 @@ static int ioport_access_check( > return rc; > > /* Ensure the TSS has an io-bitmap-offset field. */ > - generate_exception_if(tr.attr.fields.type != 0xb || > - tr.limit < 0x67, EXC_GP, 0); > + generate_exception_if(tr.attr.fields.type != 0xb, EXC_GP, 0); > > - if ( (rc = read_ulong(x86_seg_none, tr.base + 0x66, > - &iobmp, 2, ctxt, ops)) ) > + switch ( rc = read_ulong(x86_seg_tr, 0x66, &iobmp, 2, ctxt, ops) ) > + { > + case X86EMUL_OKAY: > + break; > + > + case X86EMUL_EXCEPTION: > + if ( !ctxt->event_pending ) > + generate_exception_if(true, EXC_GP, 0); generate_exception_if(!ctxt->event_pending, EXC_GP, 0) ? > @@ -1471,9 +1490,12 @@ protmode_load_seg( > { > uint32_t new_desc_b = desc.b | a_flag; > > - if ( (rc = ops->cmpxchg(x86_seg_none, desctab.base + (sel & 0xfff8) > + 4, > - &desc.b, &new_desc_b, 4, ctxt)) != 0 ) > + if ( (rc = ops->cmpxchg(sel_seg, (sel & 0xfff8) + 4, &desc.b, > + &new_desc_b, 4, ctxt) != X86EMUL_OKAY) ) > + { > + ASSERT(rc != X86EMUL_EXCEPTION); Hmm, now that I look at this again I don't think it's right: Why did we think there can't be any exception here? What if the descriptor table page is write protected? Or page tables have been changed behind our back after the earlier read? Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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