[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86: make more use of wr{f,g}sbase()
With suitable canonical address checks added these can also be used in do_set_segment_base(). Also with a canonical address check now in place, there's no need for priv_op_write_msr() to use wrmsr_safe() anymore. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> --- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c @@ -2613,9 +2613,9 @@ static int priv_op_write_msr(unsigned in return X86EMUL_OKAY; case MSR_SHADOW_GS_BASE: - if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) || !is_canonical_address(val) || - wrmsr_safe(MSR_SHADOW_GS_BASE, val) ) + if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) || !is_canonical_address(val) ) break; + wrmsrl(MSR_SHADOW_GS_BASE, val); curr->arch.pv_vcpu.gs_base_user = val; return X86EMUL_OKAY; --- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.c @@ -1037,24 +1037,33 @@ long do_set_segment_base(unsigned int wh switch ( which ) { case SEGBASE_FS: - if ( wrmsr_safe(MSR_FS_BASE, base) ) - ret = -EFAULT; - else + if ( is_canonical_address(base) ) + { + wrfsbase(base); v->arch.pv_vcpu.fs_base = base; + } + else + ret = -EINVAL; break; case SEGBASE_GS_USER: - if ( wrmsr_safe(MSR_SHADOW_GS_BASE, base) ) - ret = -EFAULT; - else + if ( is_canonical_address(base) ) + { + wrmsrl(MSR_SHADOW_GS_BASE, base); v->arch.pv_vcpu.gs_base_user = base; + } + else + ret = -EINVAL; break; case SEGBASE_GS_KERNEL: - if ( wrmsr_safe(MSR_GS_BASE, base) ) - ret = -EFAULT; - else + if ( is_canonical_address(base) ) + { + wrgsbase(base); v->arch.pv_vcpu.gs_base_kernel = base; + } + else + ret = -EINVAL; break; case SEGBASE_GS_USER_SEL: Attachment:
x86-PV-use-wrXsbase.patch _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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