[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/2] x86/vmx: Introduce a bitfield structure for EPT_VIOLATION EXIT_QUALIFICATIONs
This results in rather more readable code. No functional change. All fields currently specified are included, but commented out as no support for their use is present. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> --- CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> CC: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@xxxxxxxxx> CC: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx> --- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++--------------------- xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h | 27 +++++++++++--------------- 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c index 8177401..eca4f7d 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -2986,7 +2986,7 @@ static void vmx_wbinvd_intercept(void) wbinvd(); } -static void ept_handle_violation(unsigned long qualification, paddr_t gpa) +static void ept_handle_violation(ept_qual_t q, paddr_t gpa) { unsigned long gla, gfn = gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT; mfn_t mfn; @@ -3006,13 +3006,10 @@ static void ept_handle_violation(unsigned long qualification, paddr_t gpa) * Volume 3C: System Programming Guide, Part 3 */ struct npfec npfec = { - .read_access = !!(qualification & EPT_READ_VIOLATION) || - !!(qualification & EPT_WRITE_VIOLATION), - .write_access = !!(qualification & EPT_WRITE_VIOLATION), - .insn_fetch = !!(qualification & EPT_EXEC_VIOLATION), - .present = !!(qualification & (EPT_EFFECTIVE_READ | - EPT_EFFECTIVE_WRITE | - EPT_EFFECTIVE_EXEC)) + .read_access = q.read || q.write, + .write_access = q.write, + .insn_fetch = q.fetch, + .present = q.eff_read || q.eff_write || q.eff_exec, }; if ( tb_init_done ) @@ -3025,17 +3022,17 @@ static void ept_handle_violation(unsigned long qualification, paddr_t gpa) } _d; _d.gpa = gpa; - _d.qualification = qualification; + _d.qualification = q.raw; _d.mfn = mfn_x(get_gfn_query_unlocked(d, gfn, &_d.p2mt)); __trace_var(TRC_HVM_NPF, 0, sizeof(_d), &_d); } - if ( qualification & EPT_GLA_VALID ) + if ( q.gla_valid ) { __vmread(GUEST_LINEAR_ADDRESS, &gla); npfec.gla_valid = 1; - if( qualification & EPT_GLA_FAULT ) + if( q.gla_fault ) npfec.kind = npfec_kind_with_gla; else npfec.kind = npfec_kind_in_gpt; @@ -3065,18 +3062,18 @@ static void ept_handle_violation(unsigned long qualification, paddr_t gpa) mfn = get_gfn_query_unlocked(d, gfn, &p2mt); gprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "EPT violation %#lx (%c%c%c/%c%c%c) gpa %#"PRIpaddr" mfn %#lx type %i\n", - qualification, - (qualification & EPT_READ_VIOLATION) ? 'r' : '-', - (qualification & EPT_WRITE_VIOLATION) ? 'w' : '-', - (qualification & EPT_EXEC_VIOLATION) ? 'x' : '-', - (qualification & EPT_EFFECTIVE_READ) ? 'r' : '-', - (qualification & EPT_EFFECTIVE_WRITE) ? 'w' : '-', - (qualification & EPT_EFFECTIVE_EXEC) ? 'x' : '-', + q.raw, + q.read ? 'r' : '-', + q.write ? 'w' : '-', + q.fetch ? 'x' : '-', + q.eff_read ? 'r' : '-', + q.eff_write ? 'w' : '-', + q.eff_exec ? 'x' : '-', gpa, mfn_x(mfn), p2mt); ept_walk_table(d, gfn); - if ( qualification & EPT_GLA_VALID ) + if ( q.gla_valid ) gprintk(XENLOG_ERR, " --- GLA %#lx\n", gla); domain_crash(d); @@ -3792,11 +3789,11 @@ void vmx_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_regs *regs) case EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION: { - paddr_t gpa; + paddr_t gpa; ept_qual_t q; __vmread(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS, &gpa); - __vmread(EXIT_QUALIFICATION, &exit_qualification); - ept_handle_violation(exit_qualification, gpa); + __vmread(EXIT_QUALIFICATION, &q.raw); + ept_handle_violation(q, gpa); break; } diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h index 4bf4d50..00e6172 100644 --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h @@ -578,22 +578,17 @@ void vmx_pi_hooks_assign(struct domain *d); void vmx_pi_hooks_deassign(struct domain *d); /* EPT violation qualifications definitions */ -#define _EPT_READ_VIOLATION 0 -#define EPT_READ_VIOLATION (1UL<<_EPT_READ_VIOLATION) -#define _EPT_WRITE_VIOLATION 1 -#define EPT_WRITE_VIOLATION (1UL<<_EPT_WRITE_VIOLATION) -#define _EPT_EXEC_VIOLATION 2 -#define EPT_EXEC_VIOLATION (1UL<<_EPT_EXEC_VIOLATION) -#define _EPT_EFFECTIVE_READ 3 -#define EPT_EFFECTIVE_READ (1UL<<_EPT_EFFECTIVE_READ) -#define _EPT_EFFECTIVE_WRITE 4 -#define EPT_EFFECTIVE_WRITE (1UL<<_EPT_EFFECTIVE_WRITE) -#define _EPT_EFFECTIVE_EXEC 5 -#define EPT_EFFECTIVE_EXEC (1UL<<_EPT_EFFECTIVE_EXEC) -#define _EPT_GLA_VALID 7 -#define EPT_GLA_VALID (1UL<<_EPT_GLA_VALID) -#define _EPT_GLA_FAULT 8 -#define EPT_GLA_FAULT (1UL<<_EPT_GLA_FAULT) +typedef union ept_qual { + unsigned long raw; + struct { + bool read:1, write:1, fetch:1, + eff_read:1, eff_write:1, eff_exec:1, /* eff_user_exec */:1, + gla_valid:1, + gla_fault:1, /* Valid iff gla_valid. */ + /* gla_user */:1, /* gla_rw */:1, /* gla_nx */:1, + /* nmi_unblock */:1; + }; +} ept_qual_t; #define EPT_L4_PAGETABLE_SHIFT 39 #define EPT_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES 512 -- 2.1.4 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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