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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 01/11] x86emul: catch exceptions occurring in stubs

On 13/02/17 16:20, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 13.02.17 at 14:58, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> On 13/02/17 11:40, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>>> On 10.02.17 at 17:38, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>> On 01/02/17 11:12, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> Before adding more use of stubs cloned from decoded guest insns, guard
>>>>> ourselves against mistakes there: Should an exception (with the
>>>>> noteworthy exception of #PF) occur inside the stub, forward it to the
>>>>> guest.
>>>> Why exclude #PF ? Nothing in a stub should be hitting a pagefault in the
>>>> first place.
>>> To be honest, I've been considering to limit this to just #UD. We
>>> clearly shouldn't hide memory addressing issues, as them going
>>> by silently means information leaks. Nevertheless including #PF
>>> here would be a trivial change to the patch.
>> When I considered this first, my plan was to catch the fault and crash
>> the domain, rather than allow it to continue (FPU exceptions being the
>> exception).
>> One way or another, by the time we encounter a fault in the stubs,
>> something has gone wrong, and crashing the domain is better than
>> crashing the host.  (In fact, I am looking to extend this principle
>> further, e.g. with vmread/vmwrite failures.)
>> I don't see #PF being meaningfully different to #GP or #SS here.  If we
>> get a fault, an action was stopped, but we can never catch the issues
>> which don't fault in the first place.
>> #UD is a little more tricky.  It either means that we created a
>> malformed stub, or we didn't have sufficient feature checking, both of
>> which are emulation bugs.  This could be passed back to the domain, but
>> I'd err on the side of making it more obvious by crashing the domain. 
> Generally yes, but I think here we really should forward at least
> #UD. I can agree with other faults being terminal to the domain,
> which will the also allow #PF to be handled uniformly (as there
> won't be a need to propagate some CR2 value).
>> (Perhaps changing behaviour based on debug?)
> Not here, I would say - this logic should be tested the way it is
> meant to be run in production.

Ok.  Could we at least get a printk() in the case of handing a fault
like this back to the guest, so we stand a chance of noticing the
emulation bug and fixing it?

>>>>> ---
>>>>> There's one possible caveat here: A stub invocation immediately
>>>>> followed by another instruction having fault revovery attached to it
>>>>> would not work properly, as the table lookup can only ever find one of
>>>>> the two entries. Such CALL instructions would then need to be followed
>>>>> by a NOP for disambiguation (even if only a slim chance exists for the
>>>>> compiler to emit things that way).
>>>> Why key on return address at all?  %rip being in the stubs should be
>>>> good enough.
>>> Well, we need unique (key-address, recovery-address) tuples,
>>> and key-address can't possibly be an address inside the stub
>>> (for both the address varying between CPUs and said uniqueness
>>> requirement).
>> We don't necessarily need to use the extable infrastructure, and you
>> don't appear to be using a unique key at all.
> How am I not? How would both the self test and the emulator
> uses work without unique addresses to key off of?

I'd not followed how you were hooking the information up.  Sorry for the

>>>>> @@ -85,15 +86,88 @@ search_one_extable(const struct exceptio
>>>>>  }
>>>>>  unsigned long
>>>>> -search_exception_table(unsigned long addr)
>>>>> +search_exception_table(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs, bool check_stub)
>>>>>  {
>>>>> -    const struct virtual_region *region = find_text_region(addr);
>>>>> +    const struct virtual_region *region = find_text_region(regs->rip);
>>>>> +    unsigned long stub = this_cpu(stubs.addr);
>>>>>      if ( region && region->ex )
>>>>> -        return search_one_extable(region->ex, region->ex_end - 1, addr);
>>>>> +        return search_one_extable(region->ex, region->ex_end - 1, 
>>>>> regs->rip);
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    if ( check_stub &&
>>>>> +         regs->rip >= stub + STUB_BUF_SIZE / 2 &&
>>>>> +         regs->rip < stub + STUB_BUF_SIZE &&
>>>>> +         regs->rsp > (unsigned long)&check_stub &&
>>>>> +         regs->rsp < (unsigned long)get_cpu_info() )
>>>> How much do we care about accidentally clobbering %rsp in a stub?
>>> I think we can't guard against everything, but we should do the
>>> best we reasonably can. I.e. in the case here, rather than
>>> reading the return (key) address from somewhere outside the
>>> stack (easing a possible attacker's job), don't handle the fault
>>> at all, and instead accept the crash.
>> As before, it would be better overall to result in a domain_crash() than
>> a host crash.
> Yes (see above), but in no case should we do the crashing here
> (or else, even if it may seem marginal, the self test won't work
> anymore). To provide best functionality to current and possible
> future uses, we should leave the decision for which exceptions
> to crash the guest to the recovery code.

Yes - we should leave the action up to the recovery code.

>>> Plus what would you intend to do with the RIP to return to and/or
>>> the extra item on the stack? I'd like the generic mechanism here
>>> to impose as little restrictions on its potential use cases as
>>> possible, just like the pre-existing mechanism does. The fiddling
>>> with stack and return address is already more than I really feel
>>> happy with, but I can't see a way to do without.
>> An alternative might be have a per_cpu() variable filled in by the
>> exception handler.  This would avoid any need to play with the return
>> address and stack under the feet of the stub.
> But we need to fiddle with the return address anyway, as we can't
> return to that address.

Ah yes, of course.  I have no idea why this point managed to escape me.

> Leaving the stack as is (i.e. only reading
> the address) won't make things any less awkward for the
> recovery code, as it'll still run on a one-off stack. It is for that
> reason that I preferred to use this stack slot to communicate the
> information, instead of going the per-CPU variable route (which I
> did consider).

Hmm ok.


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