[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
On 6/7/2017 5:06 PM, Boris Ostrovsky wrote: On 06/07/2017 03:14 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:The cr3 register entry can contain the SME encryption bit that indicates the PGD is encrypted. The encryption bit should not be used when creating a virtual address for the PGD table. Create a new function, read_cr3_pa(), that will extract the physical address from the cr3 register. This function is then used where a virtual address of the PGD needs to be created/used from the cr3 register. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx> --- arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h | 9 +++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 10 +++++----- arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 2 +- arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-pm.c | 2 +- arch/x86/power/hibernate_64.c | 2 +- arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c | 6 +++--- 7 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) ... diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c index 1f386d7..2dc5243 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c @@ -2022,7 +2022,7 @@ static phys_addr_t __init xen_early_virt_to_phys(unsigned long vaddr) pmd_t pmd; pte_t pte;- pa = read_cr3();+ pa = read_cr3_pa(); pgd = native_make_pgd(xen_read_phys_ulong(pa + pgd_index(vaddr) * sizeof(pgd))); if (!pgd_present(pgd)) @@ -2102,7 +2102,7 @@ void __init xen_relocate_p2m(void) pt_phys = pmd_phys + PFN_PHYS(n_pmd); p2m_pfn = PFN_DOWN(pt_phys) + n_pt;- pgd = __va(read_cr3());+ pgd = __va(read_cr3_pa()); new_p2m = (unsigned long *)(2 * PGDIR_SIZE); idx_p4d = 0; save_pud = n_pud; @@ -2209,7 +2209,7 @@ static void __init xen_write_cr3_init(unsigned long cr3) { unsigned long pfn = PFN_DOWN(__pa(swapper_pg_dir));- BUG_ON(read_cr3() != __pa(initial_page_table));+ BUG_ON(read_cr3_pa() != __pa(initial_page_table)); BUG_ON(cr3 != __pa(swapper_pg_dir));/*(Please copy Xen maintainers when modifying xen-related files.) Sorry about that, missed adding the Xen maintainers when I added this change. Given that page tables for Xen PV guests are controlled by the hypervisor I don't think this change (although harmless) is necessary. I can back this change out if the Xen maintainers think that's best. What may be needed is making sure X86_FEATURE_SME is not set for PV guests. And that may be something that Xen will need to control through either CPUID or MSR support for the PV guests. Thanks, Tom -boris _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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