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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/2] x86/altp2m: Add a hvmop for setting the suppress #VE bit
On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 06:13:22AM -0600, Jan Beulich wrote:
> >>> On 22.06.17 at 14:04, <apop@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > On Fri, Jun 16, 2017 at 02:39:10AM -0600, Jan Beulich wrote:
> >> >>> On 15.06.17 at 21:01, <tamas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >> > On Fri, Jun 9, 2017 at 10:51 AM, Adrian Pop <apop@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >> >> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c
> >> >> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c
> >> >> @@ -466,6 +466,58 @@ int p2m_get_mem_access(struct domain *d, gfn_t
> >> >> gfn,
> > xenmem_access_t *access)
> >> >> }
> >> >>
> >> >> /*
> >> >> + * Set/clear the #VE suppress bit for a page. Only available on VMX.
> >> >> + */
> >> >> +int p2m_set_suppress_ve(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, bool suppress_ve,
> >> >> + unsigned int altp2m_idx)
> >> >> +{
> >> >> + struct p2m_domain *host_p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
> >> >> + struct p2m_domain *ap2m = NULL;
> >> >> + struct p2m_domain *p2m;
> >> >> + mfn_t mfn;
> >> >> + p2m_access_t a;
> >> >> + p2m_type_t t;
> >> >> + int rc;
> >> >> +
> >> >> + if ( !cpu_has_vmx_virt_exceptions )
> >> >> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> >> >> +
> >> >> + /* This subop should only be used from a privileged domain. */
> >> >> + if ( !current->domain->is_privileged )
> >> >> + return -EINVAL;
> >> >
> >> > This check looks wrong to me. If this subop should only be used by an
> >> > external (privileged) domain then I don't think this should be
> >> > implemented as an HVMOP, looks more like a domctl to me.
> >>
> >> I think this wants to be an XSM_DM_PRIV check instead.
> >
> > I'm not sure, but I expect that to not behave as intended security-wise
> > if Xen is compiled without XSM. Would it? It would be great if this
> > feature worked well without XSM too.
>
> Well, without you explaining why you think this wouldn't work
> without XSM, I don't really know what to answer. I suppose
> you've grep-ed for other uses of this and/or other XSM_* values,
> finding that these exist in various places where all is fine without
> XSM?
OK; it indeed does what it should without XSM as well.
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