[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/2] arm: smccc: handle SMCs/HVCs according to SMCCC
On Tue, 1 Aug 2017, Julien Grall wrote: > Hi Edgar, > > On 01/08/2017 22:22, Edgar E. Iglesias wrote: > > On Tue, Aug 01, 2017 at 10:02:45PM +0100, Julien Grall wrote: > > > Hi, > > > > > > On 01/08/2017 21:40, Stefano Stabellini wrote: > > > > On Tue, 1 Aug 2017, Edgar E. Iglesias wrote: > > > > > On Tue, Aug 01, 2017 at 11:59:00AM +0100, Julien Grall wrote: > > > > > > (+ Edgar, Mark, Dave) > > > > > > > > > > > > Hi, > > > > > > > > > > Hi Julien, > > > > > > > > > > I'll share some thoughts based on our platforms. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 14/06/17 15:10, Volodymyr Babchuk wrote: > > > > > > > SMCCC (SMC Call Convention) describes how to handle both HVCs and > > > > > > > SMCs. > > > > > > > SMCCC states that both HVC and SMC are valid conduits to call to a > > > > > > > different > > > > > > > firmware functions. Thus, for example PSCI calls can be made both > > > > > > > by > > > > > > > SMC or HVC. Also SMCCC defines function number coding for such > > > > > > > calls. > > > > > > > Besides functional calls there are query calls, which allows > > > > > > > underling > > > > > > > OS determine version, UID and number of functions provided by > > > > > > > service > > > > > > > provider. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > This patch adds new file `smccc.c`, which handles both generic > > > > > > > SMCs > > > > > > > and HVC according to SMC. At this moment it implements only one > > > > > > > service: Standard Hypervisor Service. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Standard Hypervisor Service only supports query calls, so caller > > > > > > > can > > > > > > > ask about hypervisor UID and determine that it is XEN running. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > This change allows more generic handling for SMCs and HVCs and it > > > > > > > can > > > > > > > be easily extended to support new services and functions. > > > > > > > > > > > > I have already reviewed the code and one thing I missed is how a > > > > > > domain will > > > > > > know that Xen supports SMCCC. > > > > > > > > > > > > Currently, Xen will: > > > > > > - inject an undefined instruction for any SMC issued by a > > > > > > guest > > > > > > - crash the guest (quite bad) for any unknown HCV #0 > > > > > > > > > > > > So a guest needs to be aware whether Xen supports SMCCC convention > > > > > > or not. I > > > > > > am not aware of any bindings in the device-tree for doing that. > > > > > > > > > > On our platforms, SW probes the DT for specific service classes and > > > > > then > > > > > probes for specific versions via SMC calls using the standard Version > > > > > FIDs. > > > > > If the DT does not specify the firmware node, I don't think any SMCs > > > > > will be > > > > > issued but the guest may not be functional (as the firmware interface > > > > > is > > > > > mandatory). > > > > > > > > > > I don't know of a generic DT node/compat that tells guests if SMCC > > > > > probing > > > > > is allowed or not. Perhaps there should be one, or there should be yet > > > > > another service specific one for Hypervisors. I don't know. > > > > > > > > > > For example, these are the nodes we've got (PSCI and EEMI/SIP): > > > > > psci { > > > > > compatible = "arm,psci-0.2"; > > > > > method = "smc"; > > > > > }; > > > > > > > > > > pmufw: firmware { > > > > > compatible = "xlnx,zynqmp-pm"; > > > > > method = "smc"; > > > > > interrupt-parent = <&gic>; > > > > > interrupts = <0 35 4>; > > > > > }; > > > > > > > > > > SW that does not have DT support, will either directly probe the SMC > > > > > interface or in some cases just assume it's there and use it. > > > > > > > > > > ZynqMP-wise, Xen is in a little bit of an akward position by messing > > > > > guests up if they probe for non-existing SMC services but I don't > > > > > think > > > > > it's that bad. Mainly because there's really very little ZynqMP guests > > > > > that need the firmware would be able todo without it. > > > > > > > > > > For other platforms and services, I guess FW may very well be optional > > > > > and probing makes more sence. So getting support for gracefully > > > > > returning > > > > > Unknown FID still important... > > > > > > > > Indeed, but unfortunately older versions of Xen don't do that. That's > > > > why I think we'll have to introduce a feature flag under the Xen > > > > hypervisor node on device tree. The presence of the flag could mean "it > > > > is safe to probe via SMC/HVC". I think it makes sense for the flag to be > > > > Xen specific, because we are talking about Xen behavior. Applications > > > > that know they are running on a new enough Xen can skip the check (this > > > > is going to be the case in most embedded scenarios). > > > > > > This is not Xen specific behavior. Per ARM ARM, SMC will be undefined when > > > EL3 is not present. Today Xen is behaving the same way as EL3 was not > > > existing on the platform. > > > > > > So we need a generic way to say "SMC is supported and is SMCCC capable". > > > > Would it be unthinkable to treat the lack of "Unknown FID" returns as a bug > > and backport the "fix" and leave it at that? > > At the moment, this is not an option for me. New Linux should work on any Xen > we shipped in the past. We should really avoid to break that unless there are > a strong reason too. > > Plus that will not solve the problem that we may want support other convention > in the future. > > I think the way forward is to define a binding that will advertise this > feature. +1 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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