[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 1/4] x86/dom0: prevent access to MMCFG areas for PVH Dom0
>>> On 11.08.17 at 18:43, <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > They are emulated by Xen, so they must not be mapped into Dom0 p2m. > Introduce a helper function to add the MMCFG areas to the list of > denied iomem regions for PVH Dom0. "They are" or "They are going to be"? > --- a/xen/arch/x86/dom0_build.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/dom0_build.c > @@ -440,6 +440,10 @@ int __init dom0_setup_permissions(struct domain *d) > rc |= rangeset_add_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn); > } > > + /* For PVH prevent access to the MMCFG areas. */ > + if ( dom0_pvh ) > + rc |= pci_mmcfg_set_domain_permissions(d); What about ones reported by Dom0 later on? Which then raises the question whether ... > @@ -175,6 +177,25 @@ void pci_mmcfg_arch_disable(unsigned int idx) > cfg->pci_segment, cfg->start_bus_number, cfg->end_bus_number); > } > > +int pci_mmcfg_set_domain_permissions(struct domain *d) > +{ > + unsigned int idx; > + int rc = 0; > + > + for ( idx = 0; idx < pci_mmcfg_config_num; idx++ ) > + { > + const struct acpi_mcfg_allocation *cfg = pci_mmcfg_virt[idx].cfg; > + unsigned long start = PFN_DOWN(cfg->address) + > + PCI_BDF(cfg->start_bus_number, 0, 0); > + unsigned long end = PFN_DOWN(cfg->address) + > + PCI_BDF(cfg->end_bus_number, ~0, ~0); > + > + rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, start, end); ... this shouldn't be unnecessary by, other than PV Dom0, starting out with no I/O memory being made accessible (i.e. white listing just like we decided we would do for other properties for PVH). Additionally while in the code that dom0_setup_permissions() was broken out from using |= was fine, there and here it's not really appropriate unless we want to continue to bake in the assumption that either iomem_deny_access() can only ever return a single error indicator or (b) the callers only care about the value being (non-)zero. Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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