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[Xen-devel] [PATCH v1 3/5] x86: replace arch_vcpu::cpuid_faulting with msr_vcpu_policy



Since each vCPU now has struct msr_vcpu_policy, use cpuid_faulting bit
from there in current logic and remove arch_vcpu::cpuid_faulting.

Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
 xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c       |  3 ++-
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c         |  4 +++-
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c     | 10 ++++++----
 xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-inv-op.c  |  4 +++-
 xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c |  5 +++--
 xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h   |  3 ---
 6 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c
index 2e20327569..487eb06148 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c
@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ static void intel_ctxt_switch_levelling(const struct vcpu 
*next)
        struct cpuidmasks *these_masks = &this_cpu(cpuidmasks);
        const struct domain *nextd = next ? next->domain : NULL;
        const struct cpuidmasks *masks;
+       const struct msr_vcpu_policy *vp = next->arch.msr;
 
        if (cpu_has_cpuid_faulting) {
                /*
@@ -176,7 +177,7 @@ static void intel_ctxt_switch_levelling(const struct vcpu 
*next)
                 */
                set_cpuid_faulting(nextd && !is_control_domain(nextd) &&
                                   (is_pv_domain(nextd) ||
-                                   next->arch.cpuid_faulting));
+                                   vp->misc_features_enables.cpuid_faulting));
                return;
        }
 
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
index 6cb903def5..2ad07d52bc 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -3286,7 +3286,9 @@ unsigned long copy_from_user_hvm(void *to, const void 
*from, unsigned len)
 
 bool hvm_check_cpuid_faulting(struct vcpu *v)
 {
-    if ( !v->arch.cpuid_faulting )
+    const struct msr_vcpu_policy *vp = v->arch.msr;
+
+    if ( !vp->misc_features_enables.cpuid_faulting )
         return false;
 
     return hvm_get_cpl(v) > 0;
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 67fc85b201..155fba9017 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -2902,7 +2902,7 @@ static int vmx_msr_read_intercept(unsigned int msr, 
uint64_t *msr_content)
 
     case MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES:
         *msr_content = 0;
-        if ( current->arch.cpuid_faulting )
+        if ( current->arch.msr->misc_features_enables.cpuid_faulting )
             *msr_content |= MSR_MISC_FEATURES_CPUID_FAULTING;
         break;
 
@@ -3134,15 +3134,17 @@ static int vmx_msr_write_intercept(unsigned int msr, 
uint64_t msr_content)
 
     case MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES:
     {
-        bool old_cpuid_faulting = v->arch.cpuid_faulting;
+        struct msr_vcpu_policy *vp = v->arch.msr;
+        bool old_cpuid_faulting = vp->misc_features_enables.cpuid_faulting;
 
         if ( msr_content & ~MSR_MISC_FEATURES_CPUID_FAULTING )
             goto gp_fault;
 
-        v->arch.cpuid_faulting = msr_content & 
MSR_MISC_FEATURES_CPUID_FAULTING;
+        vp->misc_features_enables.cpuid_faulting =
+            msr_content & MSR_MISC_FEATURES_CPUID_FAULTING;
 
         if ( cpu_has_cpuid_faulting &&
-             (old_cpuid_faulting ^ v->arch.cpuid_faulting) )
+             (old_cpuid_faulting ^ vp->misc_features_enables.cpuid_faulting) )
             ctxt_switch_levelling(v);
         break;
     }
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-inv-op.c b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-inv-op.c
index 415d294c53..f8944170d5 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-inv-op.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-inv-op.c
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ static int emulate_forced_invalid_op(struct cpu_user_regs 
*regs)
     char sig[5], instr[2];
     unsigned long eip, rc;
     struct cpuid_leaf res;
+    const struct msr_vcpu_policy *vp = current->arch.msr;
 
     eip = regs->rip;
 
@@ -89,7 +90,8 @@ static int emulate_forced_invalid_op(struct cpu_user_regs 
*regs)
         return 0;
 
     /* If cpuid faulting is enabled and CPL>0 inject a #GP in place of #UD. */
-    if ( current->arch.cpuid_faulting && !guest_kernel_mode(current, regs) )
+    if ( vp->misc_features_enables.cpuid_faulting &&
+         !guest_kernel_mode(current, regs) )
     {
         regs->rip = eip;
         pv_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_gp_fault, regs->error_code);
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c
index d50f51944f..66cda538fc 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c
@@ -948,7 +948,7 @@ static int priv_op_read_msr(unsigned int reg, uint64_t *val,
              rdmsr_safe(MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES, *val) )
             break;
         *val = 0;
-        if ( curr->arch.cpuid_faulting )
+        if ( curr->arch.msr->misc_features_enables.cpuid_faulting )
             *val |= MSR_MISC_FEATURES_CPUID_FAULTING;
         return X86EMUL_OKAY;
 
@@ -1154,7 +1154,8 @@ static int priv_op_write_msr(unsigned int reg, uint64_t 
val,
         if ( (val & MSR_MISC_FEATURES_CPUID_FAULTING) &&
              !this_cpu(cpuid_faulting_enabled) )
             break;
-        curr->arch.cpuid_faulting = !!(val & MSR_MISC_FEATURES_CPUID_FAULTING);
+        curr->arch.msr->misc_features_enables.cpuid_faulting =
+            !!(val & MSR_MISC_FEATURES_CPUID_FAULTING);
         return X86EMUL_OKAY;
 
     case MSR_P6_PERFCTR(0) ... MSR_P6_PERFCTR(7):
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
index 866a03b508..60c02650d5 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
@@ -555,9 +555,6 @@ struct arch_vcpu
      * and thus should be saved/restored. */
     bool_t nonlazy_xstate_used;
 
-    /* Has the guest enabled CPUID faulting? */
-    bool cpuid_faulting;
-
     /*
      * The SMAP check policy when updating runstate_guest(v) and the
      * secondary system time.
-- 
2.11.0


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