Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 3/8] xen: defer call to xen_restrict until after os_setup_post

[Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

(My resend has crossed with your review.  Sorry about that.)

Anthony PERARD writes ("Re: [PATCH 3/8] xen: defer call to xen_restrict until 
after os_setup_post"):
> On Wed, Oct 04, 2017 at 05:18:06PM +0100, Ian Jackson wrote:

> > +void xen_setup_post(void)
> > +{
> > +    int rc;
> 
> We probably want to check here if Xen is enable (via xen_enabled()).
> xen_domid_restrict could be true when Xen is not used, even if it does
> not make sense to use -xen-domid-restrict in that case.

Should -xen-domid-restrict without xen_enabled() not fail ?  IMO it is
normally better for an option which requests enhanced security to fail
when it can't do its job, rather than just hoping that its
inapplicability is intentional.

OTOH I suppose there is an argument that without xen_enabled() the
function of -xen-domid-restrict is achieved, in that without
xen_enabled() qemu is unable (after dropping privileges) to act on
Xen domains at all...

Thanks,
Ian.

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