[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] Xen Security Advisory 239 - hypervisor stack leak in x86 I/O intercept code
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Xen Security Advisory XSA-239 version 2 hypervisor stack leak in x86 I/O intercept code UPDATES IN VERSION 2 ==================== Public release. ISSUE DESCRIPTION ================= Intercepted I/O operations may deal with less than a full machine word's worth of data. While read paths had been the subject of earlier XSAs (and hence have been fixed), at least one write path was found where the data stored into an internal structure could contain bits from an uninitialized hypervisor stack slot. A subsequent emulated read would then be able to retrieve these bits. IMPACT ====== A malicious unprivileged x86 HVM guest may be able to obtain sensitive information from the host or other guests. VULNERABLE SYSTEMS ================== All Xen versions are vulnerable. Only x86 systems are affected. ARM systems are not affected. Only HVM guests can leverage this vulnerability. PV guests cannot leverage this vulnerability. MITIGATION ========== Running only PV guests will avoid this issue. CREDITS ======= This issue was discovered by Roger Pau Monné of Citrix. RESOLUTION ========== Applying the appropriate attached patch resolves this issue. xsa239.patch xen-unstable, Xen 4.9.x, Xen 4.8.x, Xen 4.7.x, Xen 4.6.x xsa239-4.5.patch Xen 4.5.x $ sha256sum xsa239* eb7971be89199eb3ff510f4f5650fd5a8ec588b9fcb8f89230216fac4214ef21 xsa239.meta 087a8b3cf7ecbdbde593033c127cbcf6c37f532bf33d90f72c19e493970a799c xsa239.patch b91a68fe67240f2a5bb9460c5b650e9595364afa180f8702aef783815e3d7dcd xsa239-4.5.patch $ DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO ========================= Deployment of the patches and/or mitigations described above (or others which are substantially similar) is permitted during the embargo, even on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and administrators. But: Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other members of the predisclosure list). Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security Team. (Note: this during-embargo deployment notice is retained in post-embargo publicly released Xen Project advisories, even though it is then no longer applicable. This is to enable the community to have oversight of the Xen Project Security Team's decisionmaking.) For more information about permissible uses of embargoed information, consult the Xen Project community's agreed Security Policy: http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJZ31v8AAoJEIP+FMlX6CvZ1AQIAMmN4FghnJvlec7xsPQBgPBs nlOItkaXMYZnIajohG2/U5zfFU02oj0GmCz4CDODaKiaZem2p69LzVeVOkqAqQ4p osYMy918GROxrvfHo+36gCBDfwlB7TWr6dQzM50nHh+6O1l1+QlpCw3k+gb5CnNT Rkn/V1ZZGVy7ycwGiMK1mP0C9hsGyuC5xxwCR9XxK01X0x+NTEXZWAS+GbPHBJAS HyopB9W+PkQ0qL/j7VjfGdUWTGquBPffnDGQFBN7CqQ+Pt6Mpv4RvkHiS3NTP5qd 8rp5M0xjVBnpCC/JAQXL9oLK+LZf99oIal1zbQ1FrECYFXIIyf/hUMxguBbsON4= =8UQF -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Attachment:
xsa239.meta Attachment:
xsa239.patch Attachment:
xsa239-4.5.patch _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |