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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [xen-4.9-testing test] 114448: regressions - FAIL
flight 114448 xen-4.9-testing real [real] http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/114448/ Regressions :-( Tests which did not succeed and are blocking, including tests which could not be run: build-amd64 6 xen-build fail REGR. vs. 114118 build-amd64-pvops 6 kernel-build fail REGR. vs. 114118 Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking: test-amd64-i386-libvirt-qcow2 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-i386 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-qemuu-nested-intel 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-xtf-amd64-amd64-1 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-migrupgrade 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win10-i386 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-stubdom-debianhvm-amd64-xsm 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win10-i386 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-xl-multivcpu 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-libvirt 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-ws16-amd64 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win10-i386 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-intel 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-amd64 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-pair 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win10-i386 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-pygrub 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ws16-amd64 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-xl-qcow2 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-amd64-pvgrub 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-xtf-amd64-amd64-2 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a build-amd64-rumprun 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-xl 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-libvirt-pair 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-livepatch 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-xtf-amd64-amd64-4 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-vhd 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-xl-credit2 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a build-amd64-libvirt 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-rumprun-amd64 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-xtf-amd64-amd64-3 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-xl-raw 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-i386-pvgrub 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-amd 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-ws16-amd64 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-xtf-amd64-amd64-5 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-ws16-amd64 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-pair 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-libvirt 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-xsm 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-xl-xsm 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-intel 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-migrupgrade 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-xl 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-pair 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-rumprun-i386 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-qemuu-nested-amd 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-amd 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-livepatch 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64-xsm 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-xl-rtds 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-libvirt-xsm 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-arndale 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-arndale 14 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm 11 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl 14 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-xsm 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-xsm 14 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-cubietruck 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-cubietruck 14 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt 14 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-xsm 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-xsm 14 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2 14 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu 14 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-raw 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-raw 13 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-rtds 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-rtds 14 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-vhd 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-vhd 13 saverestore-support-check fail never pass version targeted for testing: xen de38e28cc2cc62e6e9e4741403e4a8f6c07d8cfd baseline version: xen 9cde7a833db53c9c3a88b767af8c7cb07053a6fd Last test of basis 114118 2017-10-08 03:30:54 Z 6 days Failing since 114312 2017-10-11 00:44:07 Z 3 days 3 attempts Testing same since 114448 2017-10-13 03:26:47 Z 1 days 1 attempts ------------------------------------------------------------ People who touched revisions under test: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx> Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@xxxxxxxxxx> jobs: build-amd64-xsm pass build-armhf-xsm pass build-i386-xsm pass build-amd64-xtf pass build-amd64 fail build-armhf pass build-i386 pass build-amd64-libvirt blocked build-armhf-libvirt pass build-i386-libvirt pass build-amd64-prev pass build-i386-prev pass build-amd64-pvops fail build-armhf-pvops pass build-i386-pvops pass build-amd64-rumprun blocked build-i386-rumprun pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-1 blocked test-xtf-amd64-amd64-2 blocked test-xtf-amd64-amd64-3 blocked test-xtf-amd64-amd64-4 blocked test-xtf-amd64-amd64-5 blocked test-amd64-amd64-xl blocked test-armhf-armhf-xl pass test-amd64-i386-xl blocked test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64-xsm blocked test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm blocked test-amd64-i386-libvirt-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm blocked test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-stubdom-debianhvm-amd64-xsm blocked test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-stubdom-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-xsm blocked test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-xsm blocked test-armhf-armhf-xl-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-xl-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-qemuu-nested-amd blocked test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-amd blocked test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-amd blocked test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64 blocked test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64 blocked test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64 blocked test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64 blocked test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-amd64 blocked test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 blocked test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 blocked test-amd64-amd64-rumprun-amd64 blocked test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 blocked test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 blocked test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 blocked test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 blocked test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-ws16-amd64 blocked test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-ws16-amd64 blocked test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-ws16-amd64 blocked test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ws16-amd64 blocked test-armhf-armhf-xl-arndale pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-credit2 blocked test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2 pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-cubietruck pass test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-i386 blocked test-amd64-i386-rumprun-i386 blocked test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win10-i386 blocked test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win10-i386 blocked test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win10-i386 blocked test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win10-i386 blocked test-amd64-amd64-qemuu-nested-intel blocked test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-intel blocked test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-intel blocked test-amd64-amd64-libvirt blocked test-armhf-armhf-libvirt pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt blocked test-amd64-amd64-livepatch blocked test-amd64-i386-livepatch blocked test-amd64-amd64-migrupgrade blocked test-amd64-i386-migrupgrade blocked test-amd64-amd64-xl-multivcpu blocked test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu pass test-amd64-amd64-pair blocked test-amd64-i386-pair blocked test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-pair blocked test-amd64-i386-libvirt-pair blocked test-amd64-amd64-amd64-pvgrub blocked test-amd64-amd64-i386-pvgrub blocked test-amd64-amd64-pygrub blocked test-amd64-i386-libvirt-qcow2 blocked test-amd64-amd64-xl-qcow2 blocked test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-raw pass test-amd64-i386-xl-raw blocked test-amd64-amd64-xl-rtds blocked test-armhf-armhf-xl-rtds pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-vhd blocked test-armhf-armhf-xl-vhd pass ------------------------------------------------------------ sg-report-flight on osstest.test-lab.xenproject.org logs: /home/logs/logs images: /home/logs/images Logs, config files, etc. are available at http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs Explanation of these reports, and of osstest in general, is at http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=osstest.git;a=blob;f=README.email;hb=master http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=osstest.git;a=blob;f=README;hb=master Test harness code can be found at http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb?p=osstest.git;a=summary Not pushing. ------------------------------------------------------------ commit de38e28cc2cc62e6e9e4741403e4a8f6c07d8cfd Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:08:34 2017 +0200 x86/cpu: Fix IST handling during PCPU bringup Clear IST references in newly allocated IDTs. Nothing good will come of having them set before the TSS is suitably constructed (although the chances of the CPU surviving such an IST interrupt/exception is extremely slim). Uniformly set the IST references after the TSS is in place. This fixes an issue on AMD hardware, where onlining a PCPU while PCPU0 is in HVM context will cause IST_NONE to be copied into the new IDT, making that PCPU vulnerable to privilege escalation from PV guests until it subsequently schedules an HVM guest. This is XSA-244. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> master commit: cc08c73c8c1f5ba5ed0f8274548db6725e1c3157 master date: 2017-10-12 14:50:31 +0200 commit 7fe0a245286d4c38c5913f5642b0955096dc6135 Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:08:05 2017 +0200 x86/shadow: Don't create self-linear shadow mappings for 4-level translated guests When initially creating a monitor table for 4-level translated guests, don't install a shadow-linear mapping. This mapping is actually self-linear, and trips up the writeable heuristic logic into following Xen's mappings, not the guests' shadows it was expecting to follow. A consequence of this is that sh_guess_wrmap() needs to cope with there being no shadow-linear mapping present, which in practice occurs once each time a vcpu switches to 4-level paging from a different paging mode. An appropriate shadow-linear slot will be inserted into the monitor table either while constructing lower level monitor tables, or by sh_update_cr3(). While fixing this, clarify the safety of the other mappings. Despite appearing unsafe, it is correct to create a guest-linear mapping for translated domains; this is self-linear and doesn't point into the translated domain. Drop a dead clause for translate != external guests. This is XSA-243. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx> master commit: bf2b4eadcf379d0361b38de9725ea5f7a18a5205 master date: 2017-10-12 14:50:07 +0200 commit a2af47d9ebbf3aa0fc80f697b37df878242f36f6 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:07:28 2017 +0200 x86: don't allow page_unlock() to drop the last type reference Only _put_page_type() does the necessary cleanup, and hence not all domain pages can be released during guest cleanup (leaving around zombie domains) if we get this wrong. This is XSA-242. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> master commit: 6410733a8a0dff2fe581338ff631670cf91889db master date: 2017-10-12 14:49:46 +0200 commit 61a2d314813f9c142b5965da2f5f8684b123afb8 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:06:55 2017 +0200 x86: don't store possibly stale TLB flush time stamp While the timing window is extremely narrow, it is theoretically possible for an update to the TLB flush clock and a subsequent flush IPI to happen between the read and write parts of the update of the per-page stamp. Exclude this possibility by disabling interrupts across the update, preventing the IPI to be serviced in the middle. This is XSA-241. Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx> Suggested-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> master commit: 23a183607a427572185fc51c76cc5ab11c00c4cc master date: 2017-10-12 14:48:25 +0200 commit c2b0a92d23a5b884879f8e86a629a297427dd71d Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:06:12 2017 +0200 x86: limit linear page table use to a single level That's the only way that they're meant to be used. Without such a restriction arbitrarily long chains of same-level page tables can be built, tearing down of which may then cause arbitrarily deep recursion, causing a stack overflow. To facilitate this restriction, a counter is being introduced to track both the number of same-level entries in a page table as well as the number of uses of a page table in another same-level one (counting into positive and negative direction respectively, utilizing the fact that both counts can't be non-zero at the same time). Note that the added accounting introduces a restriction on the number of times a page can be used in other same-level page tables - more than 32k of such uses are no longer possible. Note also that some put_page_and_type[_preemptible]() calls are replaced with open-coded equivalents. This seemed preferrable to adding "parent_table" to the matrix of functions. Note further that cross-domain same-level page table references are no longer permitted (they probably never should have been). This is XSA-240. Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> master commit: 6987fc7558bdbab8119eabf026e3cdad1053f0e5 master date: 2017-10-12 14:44:34 +0200 commit d8426300dbdc06ba77f97a60ada018b37aea5ad1 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:05:44 2017 +0200 x86/HVM: prefill partially used variable on emulation paths Certain handlers ignore the access size (vioapic_write() being the example this was found with), perhaps leading to subsequent reads seeing data that wasn't actually written by the guest. For consistency and extra safety also do this on the read path of hvm_process_io_intercept(), even if this doesn't directly affect what guests get to see, as we've supposedly already dealt with read handlers leaving data completely unitialized. This is XSA-239. Reported-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> master commit: 0d4732ac29b63063764c29fa3bd8946daf67d6f3 master date: 2017-10-12 14:43:26 +0200 commit ef61bcff39d907fede18aecc57651bd2beed789a Author: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:04:56 2017 +0200 x86/ioreq server: correctly handle bogus XEN_DMOP_{,un}map_io_range_to_ioreq_server arguments Misbehaving device model can pass incorrect XEN_DMOP_map/ unmap_io_range_to_ioreq_server arguments, namely end < start when specifying address range. When this happens we hit ASSERT(s <= e) in rangeset_contains_range()/rangeset_overlaps_range() with debug builds. Production builds will not trap right away but may misbehave later while handling such bogus ranges. This is XSA-238. Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> master commit: d59e55b018cfb79d0c4f794041aff4fe1cd0d570 master date: 2017-10-12 14:43:02 +0200 commit 44ceb192b50d48398dfd9e3b83870b872f507473 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:04:27 2017 +0200 x86/FLASK: fix unmap-domain-IRQ XSM hook The caller and the FLASK implementation of xsm_unmap_domain_irq() disagreed about what the "data" argument points to in the MSI case: Change both sides to pass/take a PCI device. This is part of XSA-237. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> master commit: 6f17f5c43a3bd28d27ed8133b2bf513e2eab7d59 master date: 2017-10-12 14:37:56 +0200 commit ae454429648edfa2d3c17082fcded405a6cc4dcc Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:03:53 2017 +0200 x86/IRQ: conditionally preserve irq <-> pirq mapping on map error paths Mappings that had been set up before should not be torn down when handling unrelated errors. This is part of XSA-237. Reported-by: HW42 <hw42@xxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> master commit: 573ac7b22aba9e5b8d40d9cdccd744af57cd5928 master date: 2017-10-12 14:37:26 +0200 commit 784afd92e9e8e32e840a88e7571532cba2494ef5 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:03:26 2017 +0200 x86/MSI: disallow redundant enabling At the moment, Xen attempts to allow redundant enabling of MSI by having pci_enable_msi() return 0, and point to the existing MSI descriptor, when the msi already exists. Unfortunately, if subsequent errors are encountered, the cleanup paths assume pci_enable_msi() had done full initialization, and hence undo everything that was assumed to be done by that function without also undoing other setup that would normally occur only after that function was called (in map_domain_pirq() itself). Rather than try to make the redundant enabling case work properly, just forbid it entirely by having pci_enable_msi() return -EEXIST when MSI is already set up. This is part of XSA-237. Reported-by: HW42 <hw42@xxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> master commit: a46126fec20e0cf4f5442352ef45efaea8c89646 master date: 2017-10-12 14:36:58 +0200 commit 22032b2d7e339cf8aecc5302ab49f9d9d15360f3 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:02:54 2017 +0200 x86: enforce proper privilege when (un)mapping pIRQ-s (Un)mapping of IRQs, just like other RESOURCE__ADD* / RESOURCE__REMOVE* actions (in FLASK terms) should be XSM_DM_PRIV rather than XSM_TARGET. This in turn requires bypassing the XSM check in physdev_unmap_pirq() for the HVM emuirq case just like is being done in physdev_map_pirq(). The primary goal security wise, however, is to no longer allow HVM guests, by specifying their own domain ID instead of DOMID_SELF, to enter code paths intended for PV guest and the control domains of HVM guests only. This is part of XSA-237. Reported-by: HW42 <hw42@xxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> master commit: db72faf69c94513e180568006a9d899ed422ff90 master date: 2017-10-12 14:36:30 +0200 commit 58da67fb92b85598e0cd7e88adff14b0d7ffa05a Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:02:08 2017 +0200 x86: don't allow MSI pIRQ mapping on unowned device MSI setup should be permitted only for existing devices owned by the respective guest (the operation may still be carried out by the domain controlling that guest). This is part of XSA-237. Reported-by: HW42 <hw42@xxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> master commit: 3308374b1be7d43e23bd2e9eaf23ec06d7959882 master date: 2017-10-12 14:35:14 +0200 commit d1b64ccd9694c32e6b499d8380507c22dcdef4e1 Author: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> Date: Thu Sep 14 16:39:01 2017 +0100 xen/arm: p2m: Read *_mapped_gfn with the p2m lock taken *_mapped_gfn are currently read before acquiring the lock. However, they may be modified by the p2m code before the lock was acquired. This means we will use the wrong values. Fix it by moving the read inside the section protected by the p2m lock. Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> (cherry picked from commit 2c2ae1976da06283e923d97720c0bdcbebf04515) (qemu changes not included) _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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