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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [xen-4.6-testing test] 114488: regressions - FAIL
flight 114488 xen-4.6-testing real [real] http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/114488/ Regressions :-( Tests which did not succeed and are blocking, including tests which could not be run: test-xtf-amd64-amd64-4 48 xtf/test-hvm64-lbr-tsx-vmentry fail REGR. vs. 114097 Tests which are failing intermittently (not blocking): test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2 16 guest-start/debian.repeat fail in 114422 pass in 114488 test-xtf-amd64-amd64-1 48 xtf/test-hvm64-lbr-tsx-vmentry fail pass in 114422 test-xtf-amd64-amd64-2 48 xtf/test-hvm64-lbr-tsx-vmentry fail pass in 114422 test-armhf-armhf-xl-cubietruck 16 guest-start/debian.repeat fail pass in 114422 Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking: test-armhf-armhf-xl-rtds 16 guest-start/debian.repeat fail blocked in 114097 test-xtf-amd64-amd64-3 48 xtf/test-hvm64-lbr-tsx-vmentry fail in 114422 like 114097 test-armhf-armhf-libvirt 14 saverestore-support-check fail like 114097 test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-xsm 14 saverestore-support-check fail like 114097 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 17 guest-stop fail like 114097 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 17 guest-stop fail like 114097 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 17 guest-stop fail like 114097 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 17 guest-stop fail like 114097 test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-raw 13 saverestore-support-check fail like 114097 test-xtf-amd64-amd64-4 72 xtf/test-pv32pae-xsa-194 fail never pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-5 72 xtf/test-pv32pae-xsa-194 fail never pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-1 72 xtf/test-pv32pae-xsa-194 fail never pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-2 72 xtf/test-pv32pae-xsa-194 fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-xsm 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-3 72 xtf/test-pv32pae-xsa-194 fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-ws16-amd64 10 windows-install fail never pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-xsm 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-ws16-amd64 10 windows-install fail never pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-qcow2 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm 11 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm 11 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-vhd 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-arndale 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-arndale 14 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-qemuu-nested-amd 17 debian-hvm-install/l1/l2 fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-rtds 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-rtds 14 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-ws16-amd64 13 guest-saverestore fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-xsm 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-cubietruck 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-cubietruck 14 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2 14 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu 14 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl 14 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ws16-amd64 13 guest-saverestore fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-raw 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-vhd 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-vhd 13 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win10-i386 10 windows-install fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win10-i386 10 windows-install fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win10-i386 10 windows-install fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win10-i386 10 windows-install fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-xsm 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-xsm 14 saverestore-support-check fail never pass version targeted for testing: xen aad5a67587b493e2478e1e46f71404c3dd41a937 baseline version: xen 78fd0c3765cf89befb2338ac342a0c8a3e29ba3d Last test of basis 114097 2017-10-07 12:28:11 Z 7 days Testing same since 114422 2017-10-12 14:11:19 Z 2 days 2 attempts ------------------------------------------------------------ People who touched revisions under test: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx> Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@xxxxxxxxxx> jobs: build-amd64-xsm pass build-armhf-xsm pass build-i386-xsm pass build-amd64-xtf pass build-amd64 pass build-armhf pass build-i386 pass build-amd64-libvirt pass build-armhf-libvirt pass build-i386-libvirt pass build-amd64-prev pass build-i386-prev pass build-amd64-pvops pass build-armhf-pvops pass build-i386-pvops pass build-amd64-rumprun pass build-i386-rumprun pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-1 pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-2 pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-3 pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-4 pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-5 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl pass test-armhf-armhf-xl pass test-amd64-i386-xl pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-stubdom-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-stubdom-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-xsm pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-xsm pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-xl-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-qemuu-nested-amd fail test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-amd pass test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-amd pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64 pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64 pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64 pass test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-amd64 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 pass test-amd64-amd64-rumprun-amd64 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-ws16-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-ws16-amd64 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-ws16-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ws16-amd64 fail test-armhf-armhf-xl-arndale pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-credit2 pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2 pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-cubietruck fail test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-i386 pass test-amd64-i386-rumprun-i386 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win10-i386 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win10-i386 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win10-i386 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win10-i386 fail test-amd64-amd64-qemuu-nested-intel pass test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-intel pass test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-intel pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt pass test-amd64-amd64-migrupgrade pass test-amd64-i386-migrupgrade pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-multivcpu pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu pass test-amd64-amd64-pair pass test-amd64-i386-pair pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-pair pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-pair pass test-amd64-amd64-amd64-pvgrub pass test-amd64-amd64-i386-pvgrub pass test-amd64-amd64-pygrub pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-qcow2 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qcow2 pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-raw pass test-amd64-i386-xl-raw pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-rtds pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-rtds fail test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-vhd pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-vhd pass ------------------------------------------------------------ sg-report-flight on osstest.test-lab.xenproject.org logs: /home/logs/logs images: /home/logs/images Logs, config files, etc. are available at http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs Explanation of these reports, and of osstest in general, is at http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=osstest.git;a=blob;f=README.email;hb=master http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=osstest.git;a=blob;f=README;hb=master Test harness code can be found at http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb?p=osstest.git;a=summary Not pushing. ------------------------------------------------------------ commit aad5a67587b493e2478e1e46f71404c3dd41a937 Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:41:57 2017 +0200 x86/cpu: Fix IST handling during PCPU bringup Clear IST references in newly allocated IDTs. Nothing good will come of having them set before the TSS is suitably constructed (although the chances of the CPU surviving such an IST interrupt/exception is extremely slim). Uniformly set the IST references after the TSS is in place. This fixes an issue on AMD hardware, where onlining a PCPU while PCPU0 is in HVM context will cause IST_NONE to be copied into the new IDT, making that PCPU vulnerable to privilege escalation from PV guests until it subsequently schedules an HVM guest. This is XSA-244. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> master commit: cc08c73c8c1f5ba5ed0f8274548db6725e1c3157 master date: 2017-10-12 14:50:31 +0200 commit d8b0ebfc1d1e9f59393cc3c11584c01712d6024b Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:41:31 2017 +0200 x86/shadow: Don't create self-linear shadow mappings for 4-level translated guests When initially creating a monitor table for 4-level translated guests, don't install a shadow-linear mapping. This mapping is actually self-linear, and trips up the writeable heuristic logic into following Xen's mappings, not the guests' shadows it was expecting to follow. A consequence of this is that sh_guess_wrmap() needs to cope with there being no shadow-linear mapping present, which in practice occurs once each time a vcpu switches to 4-level paging from a different paging mode. An appropriate shadow-linear slot will be inserted into the monitor table either while constructing lower level monitor tables, or by sh_update_cr3(). While fixing this, clarify the safety of the other mappings. Despite appearing unsafe, it is correct to create a guest-linear mapping for translated domains; this is self-linear and doesn't point into the translated domain. Drop a dead clause for translate != external guests. This is XSA-243. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx> master commit: bf2b4eadcf379d0361b38de9725ea5f7a18a5205 master date: 2017-10-12 14:50:07 +0200 commit f0208a4eb33f7a13cf0319e49e6803d03b5b2793 Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:40:59 2017 +0200 x86: Disable the use of auto-translated PV guests This is a minimal backport of c/s 92942fd3d469 "x86/mm: drop guest_{map,get_eff}_l1e() hooks" from Xen 4.7, which stated: Disallow the unmaintained and presumed broken translated-but-not-external paging mode combination ... It turns out that this mode is insecure to run with, as opposed to just simply broken. This is part of XSA-243. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> commit 42b2c82081fa2bc9b7fe37c8ae69687a3f5e91fb Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:40:04 2017 +0200 x86: don't allow page_unlock() to drop the last type reference Only _put_page_type() does the necessary cleanup, and hence not all domain pages can be released during guest cleanup (leaving around zombie domains) if we get this wrong. This is XSA-242. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> master commit: 6410733a8a0dff2fe581338ff631670cf91889db master date: 2017-10-12 14:49:46 +0200 commit 57318e1cf7a9b6c2cfb791b25124451ef493cd01 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:39:31 2017 +0200 x86: don't store possibly stale TLB flush time stamp While the timing window is extremely narrow, it is theoretically possible for an update to the TLB flush clock and a subsequent flush IPI to happen between the read and write parts of the update of the per-page stamp. Exclude this possibility by disabling interrupts across the update, preventing the IPI to be serviced in the middle. This is XSA-241. Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx> Suggested-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> master commit: 23a183607a427572185fc51c76cc5ab11c00c4cc master date: 2017-10-12 14:48:25 +0200 commit 9f22d72cdb1fecdb26dc8bae1c3c97861adf7e57 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:38:27 2017 +0200 x86: limit linear page table use to a single level That's the only way that they're meant to be used. Without such a restriction arbitrarily long chains of same-level page tables can be built, tearing down of which may then cause arbitrarily deep recursion, causing a stack overflow. To facilitate this restriction, a counter is being introduced to track both the number of same-level entries in a page table as well as the number of uses of a page table in another same-level one (counting into positive and negative direction respectively, utilizing the fact that both counts can't be non-zero at the same time). Note that the added accounting introduces a restriction on the number of times a page can be used in other same-level page tables - more than 32k of such uses are no longer possible. Note also that some put_page_and_type[_preemptible]() calls are replaced with open-coded equivalents. This seemed preferrable to adding "parent_table" to the matrix of functions. Note further that cross-domain same-level page table references are no longer permitted (they probably never should have been). This is XSA-240. Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> master commit: 6987fc7558bdbab8119eabf026e3cdad1053f0e5 master date: 2017-10-12 14:44:34 +0200 commit e0353b455ce8af495c8fe379d6c6832cb7f87651 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:37:57 2017 +0200 x86/HVM: prefill partially used variable on emulation paths Certain handlers ignore the access size (vioapic_write() being the example this was found with), perhaps leading to subsequent reads seeing data that wasn't actually written by the guest. For consistency and extra safety also do this on the read path of hvm_process_io_intercept(), even if this doesn't directly affect what guests get to see, as we've supposedly already dealt with read handlers leaving data completely unitialized. This is XSA-239. Reported-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> master commit: 0d4732ac29b63063764c29fa3bd8946daf67d6f3 master date: 2017-10-12 14:43:26 +0200 commit 76f154986f8afa1077478b4681ea82b0bf16896c Author: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:37:21 2017 +0200 x86/ioreq server: correctly handle bogus XEN_DMOP_{,un}map_io_range_to_ioreq_server arguments Misbehaving device model can pass incorrect XEN_DMOP_map/ unmap_io_range_to_ioreq_server arguments, namely end < start when specifying address range. When this happens we hit ASSERT(s <= e) in rangeset_contains_range()/rangeset_overlaps_range() with debug builds. Production builds will not trap right away but may misbehave later while handling such bogus ranges. This is XSA-238. Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> master commit: d59e55b018cfb79d0c4f794041aff4fe1cd0d570 master date: 2017-10-12 14:43:02 +0200 commit 9bac9102304f40cc5ba944d13dbcd05a63d4203f Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:36:54 2017 +0200 x86/FLASK: fix unmap-domain-IRQ XSM hook The caller and the FLASK implementation of xsm_unmap_domain_irq() disagreed about what the "data" argument points to in the MSI case: Change both sides to pass/take a PCI device. This is part of XSA-237. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> master commit: 6f17f5c43a3bd28d27ed8133b2bf513e2eab7d59 master date: 2017-10-12 14:37:56 +0200 commit c7a43e30609b1a791b3d5f682551bd0fd08f1719 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:36:21 2017 +0200 x86/IRQ: conditionally preserve irq <-> pirq mapping on map error paths Mappings that had been set up before should not be torn down when handling unrelated errors. This is part of XSA-237. Reported-by: HW42 <hw42@xxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> master commit: 573ac7b22aba9e5b8d40d9cdccd744af57cd5928 master date: 2017-10-12 14:37:26 +0200 commit 913d4f80c86ae14996b347d2f491769e345ca583 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:35:58 2017 +0200 x86/MSI: disallow redundant enabling At the moment, Xen attempts to allow redundant enabling of MSI by having pci_enable_msi() return 0, and point to the existing MSI descriptor, when the msi already exists. Unfortunately, if subsequent errors are encountered, the cleanup paths assume pci_enable_msi() had done full initialization, and hence undo everything that was assumed to be done by that function without also undoing other setup that would normally occur only after that function was called (in map_domain_pirq() itself). Rather than try to make the redundant enabling case work properly, just forbid it entirely by having pci_enable_msi() return -EEXIST when MSI is already set up. This is part of XSA-237. Reported-by: HW42 <hw42@xxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> master commit: a46126fec20e0cf4f5442352ef45efaea8c89646 master date: 2017-10-12 14:36:58 +0200 commit c5881c540fd27e12de2a2ac27504550527de6dde Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:35:30 2017 +0200 x86: enforce proper privilege when (un)mapping pIRQ-s (Un)mapping of IRQs, just like other RESOURCE__ADD* / RESOURCE__REMOVE* actions (in FLASK terms) should be XSM_DM_PRIV rather than XSM_TARGET. This in turn requires bypassing the XSM check in physdev_unmap_pirq() for the HVM emuirq case just like is being done in physdev_map_pirq(). The primary goal security wise, however, is to no longer allow HVM guests, by specifying their own domain ID instead of DOMID_SELF, to enter code paths intended for PV guest and the control domains of HVM guests only. This is part of XSA-237. Reported-by: HW42 <hw42@xxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> master commit: db72faf69c94513e180568006a9d899ed422ff90 master date: 2017-10-12 14:36:30 +0200 commit b0239cd7269da15027971b5cf2e2a94d4b871876 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:34:58 2017 +0200 x86: don't allow MSI pIRQ mapping on unowned device MSI setup should be permitted only for existing devices owned by the respective guest (the operation may still be carried out by the domain controlling that guest). This is part of XSA-237. Reported-by: HW42 <hw42@xxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> master commit: 3308374b1be7d43e23bd2e9eaf23ec06d7959882 master date: 2017-10-12 14:35:14 +0200 (qemu changes not included) _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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