|
[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [xen-4.8-testing baseline-only test] 72248: regressions - trouble: blocked/broken/fail/pass
This run is configured for baseline tests only. flight 72248 xen-4.8-testing real [real] http://osstest.xs.citrite.net/~osstest/testlogs/logs/72248/ Regressions :-( Tests which did not succeed and are blocking, including tests which could not be run: test-amd64-amd64-qemuu-nested-intel 13 xen-install/l1 fail REGR. vs. 72222 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win10-i386 16 guest-localmigrate/x10 fail REGR. vs. 72222 Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking: test-arm64-arm64-libvirt-xsm 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-arm64-arm64-xl 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a build-arm64-libvirt 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-arm64-arm64-xl-credit2 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-arm64-arm64-xl-xsm 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a build-arm64 2 hosts-allocate broken never pass build-arm64-pvops 2 hosts-allocate broken never pass build-arm64-xsm 2 hosts-allocate broken never pass build-arm64 3 capture-logs broken never pass build-arm64-pvops 3 capture-logs broken never pass build-arm64-xsm 3 capture-logs broken never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 17 guest-stop fail like 72222 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 17 guest-stop fail like 72222 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 17 guest-stop fail like 72222 build-amd64-prev 7 xen-build/dist-test fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win10-i386 10 windows-install fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-pvh-intel 12 guest-start fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-xsm 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-xsm 14 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2 14 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt 14 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ws16-amd64 10 windows-install fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl 14 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-midway 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-midway 14 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu 14 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-xsm 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-xsm 14 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-pvh-amd 12 guest-start fail never pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-xsm 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-ws16-amd64 10 windows-install fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-ws16-amd64 10 windows-install fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-rtds 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-rtds 14 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-xsm 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-raw 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-raw 13 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm 11 migrate-support-check fail never pass build-i386-prev 7 xen-build/dist-test fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-vhd 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-vhd 13 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-qemuu-nested-amd 17 debian-hvm-install/l1/l2 fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-ws16-amd64 13 guest-saverestore fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm 11 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-vhd 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 17 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win10-i386 17 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win10-i386 17 guest-stop fail never pass version targeted for testing: xen bdc2ae68e2ecba1c3f55ad953189fe33362d1c51 baseline version: xen 667f70e658c4c382672056ebaf1505b4c5cdb0aa Last test of basis 72222 2017-10-09 19:17:59 Z 7 days Testing same since 72248 2017-10-16 13:44:59 Z 0 days 1 attempts ------------------------------------------------------------ People who touched revisions under test: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx> Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@xxxxxxxxxx> jobs: build-amd64-xsm pass build-arm64-xsm broken build-armhf-xsm pass build-i386-xsm pass build-amd64-xtf pass build-amd64 pass build-arm64 broken build-armhf pass build-i386 pass build-amd64-libvirt pass build-arm64-libvirt blocked build-armhf-libvirt pass build-i386-libvirt pass build-amd64-prev pass build-i386-prev pass build-amd64-pvops pass build-arm64-pvops broken build-armhf-pvops pass build-i386-pvops pass build-amd64-rumprun pass build-i386-rumprun pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-1 pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-2 pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-3 pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-4 pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-5 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl pass test-arm64-arm64-xl blocked test-armhf-armhf-xl pass test-amd64-i386-xl pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-stubdom-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-stubdom-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-xsm pass test-arm64-arm64-libvirt-xsm blocked test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-xsm pass test-arm64-arm64-xl-xsm blocked test-armhf-armhf-xl-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-xl-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-qemuu-nested-amd fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-pvh-amd fail test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-amd pass test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-amd pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64 pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64 pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64 pass test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-amd64 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 pass test-amd64-amd64-rumprun-amd64 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-ws16-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-ws16-amd64 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-ws16-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ws16-amd64 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-credit2 pass test-arm64-arm64-xl-credit2 blocked test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2 pass test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-i386 pass test-amd64-i386-rumprun-i386 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win10-i386 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win10-i386 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win10-i386 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win10-i386 fail test-amd64-amd64-qemuu-nested-intel fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-pvh-intel fail test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-intel pass test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-intel pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt pass test-amd64-amd64-livepatch pass test-amd64-i386-livepatch pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-midway pass test-amd64-amd64-migrupgrade pass test-amd64-i386-migrupgrade pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-multivcpu pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu pass test-amd64-amd64-pair pass test-amd64-i386-pair pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-pair pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-pair pass test-amd64-amd64-amd64-pvgrub pass test-amd64-amd64-i386-pvgrub pass test-amd64-amd64-pygrub pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qcow2 pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-raw pass test-amd64-i386-xl-raw pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-rtds pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-rtds pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-vhd pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-vhd pass ------------------------------------------------------------ sg-report-flight on osstest.xs.citrite.net logs: /home/osstest/logs images: /home/osstest/images Logs, config files, etc. are available at http://osstest.xs.citrite.net/~osstest/testlogs/logs Test harness code can be found at http://xenbits.xensource.com/gitweb?p=osstest.git;a=summary broken-step build-arm64 hosts-allocate broken-step build-arm64-pvops hosts-allocate broken-step build-arm64-xsm hosts-allocate broken-step build-arm64 capture-logs broken-step build-arm64-pvops capture-logs broken-step build-arm64-xsm capture-logs Push not applicable. ------------------------------------------------------------ commit bdc2ae68e2ecba1c3f55ad953189fe33362d1c51 Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:20:20 2017 +0200 x86/cpu: Fix IST handling during PCPU bringup Clear IST references in newly allocated IDTs. Nothing good will come of having them set before the TSS is suitably constructed (although the chances of the CPU surviving such an IST interrupt/exception is extremely slim). Uniformly set the IST references after the TSS is in place. This fixes an issue on AMD hardware, where onlining a PCPU while PCPU0 is in HVM context will cause IST_NONE to be copied into the new IDT, making that PCPU vulnerable to privilege escalation from PV guests until it subsequently schedules an HVM guest. This is XSA-244. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> master commit: cc08c73c8c1f5ba5ed0f8274548db6725e1c3157 master date: 2017-10-12 14:50:31 +0200 commit 96e6364b5f64cc8b1210a8ab5cb7801162833ebb Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:19:40 2017 +0200 x86/shadow: Don't create self-linear shadow mappings for 4-level translated guests When initially creating a monitor table for 4-level translated guests, don't install a shadow-linear mapping. This mapping is actually self-linear, and trips up the writeable heuristic logic into following Xen's mappings, not the guests' shadows it was expecting to follow. A consequence of this is that sh_guess_wrmap() needs to cope with there being no shadow-linear mapping present, which in practice occurs once each time a vcpu switches to 4-level paging from a different paging mode. An appropriate shadow-linear slot will be inserted into the monitor table either while constructing lower level monitor tables, or by sh_update_cr3(). While fixing this, clarify the safety of the other mappings. Despite appearing unsafe, it is correct to create a guest-linear mapping for translated domains; this is self-linear and doesn't point into the translated domain. Drop a dead clause for translate != external guests. This is XSA-243. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx> master commit: bf2b4eadcf379d0361b38de9725ea5f7a18a5205 master date: 2017-10-12 14:50:07 +0200 commit 1a8ad09dd1e13894773944fc2de36d37f14faa68 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:19:12 2017 +0200 x86: don't allow page_unlock() to drop the last type reference Only _put_page_type() does the necessary cleanup, and hence not all domain pages can be released during guest cleanup (leaving around zombie domains) if we get this wrong. This is XSA-242. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> master commit: 6410733a8a0dff2fe581338ff631670cf91889db master date: 2017-10-12 14:49:46 +0200 commit df8919786f4781139cbd1be7340dd93f3408edee Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:18:33 2017 +0200 x86: don't store possibly stale TLB flush time stamp While the timing window is extremely narrow, it is theoretically possible for an update to the TLB flush clock and a subsequent flush IPI to happen between the read and write parts of the update of the per-page stamp. Exclude this possibility by disabling interrupts across the update, preventing the IPI to be serviced in the middle. This is XSA-241. Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx> Suggested-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> master commit: 23a183607a427572185fc51c76cc5ab11c00c4cc master date: 2017-10-12 14:48:25 +0200 commit c4f969d25463586103a70f2bc36624e2287b880c Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:17:20 2017 +0200 x86: limit linear page table use to a single level That's the only way that they're meant to be used. Without such a restriction arbitrarily long chains of same-level page tables can be built, tearing down of which may then cause arbitrarily deep recursion, causing a stack overflow. To facilitate this restriction, a counter is being introduced to track both the number of same-level entries in a page table as well as the number of uses of a page table in another same-level one (counting into positive and negative direction respectively, utilizing the fact that both counts can't be non-zero at the same time). Note that the added accounting introduces a restriction on the number of times a page can be used in other same-level page tables - more than 32k of such uses are no longer possible. Note also that some put_page_and_type[_preemptible]() calls are replaced with open-coded equivalents. This seemed preferrable to adding "parent_table" to the matrix of functions. Note further that cross-domain same-level page table references are no longer permitted (they probably never should have been). This is XSA-240. Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> master commit: 6987fc7558bdbab8119eabf026e3cdad1053f0e5 master date: 2017-10-12 14:44:34 +0200 commit b1f3f1dde1b904160d3ce895a2fbccab21706214 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:16:54 2017 +0200 x86/HVM: prefill partially used variable on emulation paths Certain handlers ignore the access size (vioapic_write() being the example this was found with), perhaps leading to subsequent reads seeing data that wasn't actually written by the guest. For consistency and extra safety also do this on the read path of hvm_process_io_intercept(), even if this doesn't directly affect what guests get to see, as we've supposedly already dealt with read handlers leaving data completely unitialized. This is XSA-239. Reported-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> master commit: 0d4732ac29b63063764c29fa3bd8946daf67d6f3 master date: 2017-10-12 14:43:26 +0200 commit 7251c0654004ecfb2c1f831564a95113b97ee51a Author: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:16:18 2017 +0200 x86/ioreq server: correctly handle bogus XEN_DMOP_{,un}map_io_range_to_ioreq_server arguments Misbehaving device model can pass incorrect XEN_DMOP_map/ unmap_io_range_to_ioreq_server arguments, namely end < start when specifying address range. When this happens we hit ASSERT(s <= e) in rangeset_contains_range()/rangeset_overlaps_range() with debug builds. Production builds will not trap right away but may misbehave later while handling such bogus ranges. This is XSA-238. Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> master commit: d59e55b018cfb79d0c4f794041aff4fe1cd0d570 master date: 2017-10-12 14:43:02 +0200 commit 1960ca822091d6c956349f8534f19a6d072a2ece Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:15:40 2017 +0200 x86/FLASK: fix unmap-domain-IRQ XSM hook The caller and the FLASK implementation of xsm_unmap_domain_irq() disagreed about what the "data" argument points to in the MSI case: Change both sides to pass/take a PCI device. This is part of XSA-237. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> master commit: 6f17f5c43a3bd28d27ed8133b2bf513e2eab7d59 master date: 2017-10-12 14:37:56 +0200 commit 866cfa15751edb9c5cd1d2ad78671a16c31b6316 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:15:07 2017 +0200 x86/IRQ: conditionally preserve irq <-> pirq mapping on map error paths Mappings that had been set up before should not be torn down when handling unrelated errors. This is part of XSA-237. Reported-by: HW42 <hw42@xxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> master commit: 573ac7b22aba9e5b8d40d9cdccd744af57cd5928 master date: 2017-10-12 14:37:26 +0200 commit ddd6e415b11f41ad9a5ca6f919a294205360fe74 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:14:42 2017 +0200 x86/MSI: disallow redundant enabling At the moment, Xen attempts to allow redundant enabling of MSI by having pci_enable_msi() return 0, and point to the existing MSI descriptor, when the msi already exists. Unfortunately, if subsequent errors are encountered, the cleanup paths assume pci_enable_msi() had done full initialization, and hence undo everything that was assumed to be done by that function without also undoing other setup that would normally occur only after that function was called (in map_domain_pirq() itself). Rather than try to make the redundant enabling case work properly, just forbid it entirely by having pci_enable_msi() return -EEXIST when MSI is already set up. This is part of XSA-237. Reported-by: HW42 <hw42@xxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> master commit: a46126fec20e0cf4f5442352ef45efaea8c89646 master date: 2017-10-12 14:36:58 +0200 commit 370cc9aa4901a1646e6fbbfe009a09ba7aaddb15 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:14:14 2017 +0200 x86: enforce proper privilege when (un)mapping pIRQ-s (Un)mapping of IRQs, just like other RESOURCE__ADD* / RESOURCE__REMOVE* actions (in FLASK terms) should be XSM_DM_PRIV rather than XSM_TARGET. This in turn requires bypassing the XSM check in physdev_unmap_pirq() for the HVM emuirq case just like is being done in physdev_map_pirq(). The primary goal security wise, however, is to no longer allow HVM guests, by specifying their own domain ID instead of DOMID_SELF, to enter code paths intended for PV guest and the control domains of HVM guests only. This is part of XSA-237. Reported-by: HW42 <hw42@xxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> master commit: db72faf69c94513e180568006a9d899ed422ff90 master date: 2017-10-12 14:36:30 +0200 commit 39e3024360a4c09205b9b85002f68ed9aa6cc034 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 12 15:13:36 2017 +0200 x86: don't allow MSI pIRQ mapping on unowned device MSI setup should be permitted only for existing devices owned by the respective guest (the operation may still be carried out by the domain controlling that guest). This is part of XSA-237. Reported-by: HW42 <hw42@xxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> master commit: 3308374b1be7d43e23bd2e9eaf23ec06d7959882 master date: 2017-10-12 14:35:14 +0200 commit 9f092f57d2829a271233aef1d1df0bff84275122 Author: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> Date: Thu Sep 14 16:39:01 2017 +0100 xen/arm: p2m: Read *_mapped_gfn with the p2m lock taken *_mapped_gfn are currently read before acquiring the lock. However, they may be modified by the p2m code before the lock was acquired. This means we will use the wrong values. Fix it by moving the read inside the section protected by the p2m lock. Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> (cherry picked from commit 2c2ae1976da06283e923d97720c0bdcbebf04515) (qemu changes not included) _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
|
 |
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |