[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH v1] x86/mm: Supresses vm_events caused by page-walks
This patch is adding a way to enable/disable nested pagefault events. It introduces the xc_monitor_nested_pagefault function and adds the nested_pagefault_disabled in the monitor structure. This is needed by the introspection so it will only get gla faults and not get spammed with other faults. In p2m_set_ad_bits the v->arch.sse_pg_dirty.eip and v->arch.sse_pg_dirty.gla are used to mark that this is the second time a fault occurs and the dirty bit is set. Signed-off-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h | 2 ++ tools/libxc/xc_monitor.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ xen/arch/x86/monitor.c | 13 +++++++++++++ xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h | 6 ++++++ xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h | 3 ++- xen/include/public/domctl.h | 1 + 7 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h index 666db0b..8e70714 100644 --- a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h +++ b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h @@ -2056,6 +2056,8 @@ int xc_monitor_descriptor_access(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id, bool enable); int xc_monitor_guest_request(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id, bool enable, bool sync, bool allow_userspace); +int xc_monitor_nested_pagefault(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id, + bool disable); int xc_monitor_debug_exceptions(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id, bool enable, bool sync); int xc_monitor_cpuid(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id, bool enable); diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_monitor.c b/tools/libxc/xc_monitor.c index 2840f14..5aacaa8 100644 --- a/tools/libxc/xc_monitor.c +++ b/tools/libxc/xc_monitor.c @@ -162,6 +162,20 @@ int xc_monitor_guest_request(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id, bool enable, return do_domctl(xch, &domctl); } +int xc_monitor_nested_pagefault(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id, + bool disable) +{ + DECLARE_DOMCTL; + + domctl.cmd = XEN_DOMCTL_monitor_op; + domctl.domain = domain_id; + domctl.u.monitor_op.op = disable ? XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_OP_ENABLE + : XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_OP_DISABLE; + domctl.u.monitor_op.event = XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_NESTED_PAGEFAULT; + + return do_domctl(xch, &domctl); +} + int xc_monitor_emulate_each_rep(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id, bool enable) { diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c index c0cd017..07a334b 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c @@ -137,6 +137,23 @@ bool p2m_mem_access_emulate_check(struct vcpu *v, return violation; } +static void p2m_set_ad_bits(struct vcpu *v, paddr_t ga) +{ + struct hvm_hw_cpu ctxt; + uint32_t pfec = 0; + + hvm_funcs.save_cpu_ctxt(v, &ctxt); + + if ( guest_cpu_user_regs()->eip == v->arch.pg_dirty.eip + && ga == v->arch.pg_dirty.gla ) + pfec = PFEC_write_access; + + paging_ga_to_gfn_cr3(v, ctxt.cr3, ga, &pfec, NULL); + + v->arch.pg_dirty.eip = guest_cpu_user_regs()->eip; + v->arch.pg_dirty.gla = ga; +} + bool p2m_mem_access_check(paddr_t gpa, unsigned long gla, struct npfec npfec, vm_event_request_t **req_ptr) @@ -208,6 +225,16 @@ bool p2m_mem_access_check(paddr_t gpa, unsigned long gla, } } + if ( vm_event_check_ring(d->vm_event_monitor) && + d->arch.monitor.nested_pagefault_disabled && + npfec.kind != npfec_kind_with_gla ) /* don't send a mem_event */ + { + v->arch.vm_event->emulate_flags = 0; + p2m_set_ad_bits(v, gla); + + return true; + } + *req_ptr = NULL; req = xzalloc(vm_event_request_t); if ( req ) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c b/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c index e59f1f5..3916e76 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c @@ -220,6 +220,19 @@ int arch_monitor_domctl_event(struct domain *d, break; } + case XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_NESTED_PAGEFAULT: + { + bool old_status = ad->monitor.nested_pagefault_disabled; + + if ( unlikely(old_status == requested_status) ) + return -EEXIST; + + domain_pause(d); + ad->monitor.nested_pagefault_disabled = requested_status; + domain_unpause(d); + break; + } + case XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_DESC_ACCESS: { bool old_status = ad->monitor.descriptor_access_enabled; diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h index 4d0b77d..40a365f 100644 --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h @@ -408,6 +408,7 @@ struct arch_domain unsigned int descriptor_access_enabled : 1; unsigned int guest_request_userspace_enabled : 1; unsigned int emul_unimplemented_enabled : 1; + unsigned int nested_pagefault_disabled : 1; struct monitor_msr_bitmap *msr_bitmap; uint64_t write_ctrlreg_mask[4]; } monitor; @@ -575,6 +576,11 @@ struct arch_vcpu /* A secondary copy of the vcpu time info. */ XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(vcpu_time_info_t) time_info_guest; + struct { + unsigned long eip; + unsigned long gla; + } pg_dirty; + struct arch_vm_event *vm_event; struct msr_vcpu_policy *msr; diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h index 0ada970..6b6a146 100644 --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h @@ -84,7 +84,8 @@ static inline uint32_t arch_monitor_get_capabilities(struct domain *d) (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_DEBUG_EXCEPTION) | (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_CPUID) | (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_INTERRUPT) | - (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_EMUL_UNIMPLEMENTED); + (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_EMUL_UNIMPLEMENTED) | + (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_NESTED_PAGEFAULT); /* Since we know this is on VMX, we can just call the hvm func */ if ( hvm_is_singlestep_supported() ) diff --git a/xen/include/public/domctl.h b/xen/include/public/domctl.h index 70027ab..b5cf06c 100644 --- a/xen/include/public/domctl.h +++ b/xen/include/public/domctl.h @@ -1014,6 +1014,7 @@ struct xen_domctl_psr_cmt_op { #define XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_INTERRUPT 8 #define XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_DESC_ACCESS 9 #define XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_EMUL_UNIMPLEMENTED 10 +#define XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_NESTED_PAGEFAULT 11 struct xen_domctl_monitor_op { uint32_t op; /* XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_OP_* */ -- 2.7.4 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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