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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [xen-unstable baseline-only test] 72503: tolerable FAIL
This run is configured for baseline tests only. flight 72503 xen-unstable real [real] http://osstest.xs.citrite.net/~osstest/testlogs/logs/72503/ Failures :-/ but no regressions. Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking: test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win10-i386 10 windows-install fail like 72491 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win10-i386 10 windows-install fail like 72491 test-armhf-armhf-libvirt 14 saverestore-support-check fail like 72491 test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-xsm 14 saverestore-support-check fail like 72491 test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-raw 13 saverestore-support-check fail like 72491 test-amd64-amd64-qemuu-nested-intel 17 debian-hvm-install/l1/l2 fail like 72491 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 16 guest-localmigrate/x10 fail like 72491 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 17 guest-stop fail like 72491 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 17 guest-stop fail like 72491 test-amd64-amd64-examine 4 memdisk-try-append fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-pvhv2-intel 12 guest-start fail never pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-xsm 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-xsm 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-xsm 14 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-midway 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-midway 14 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu 14 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-rtds 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2 14 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-rtds 14 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-xsm 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl 14 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-pvhv2-amd 12 guest-start fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-xsm 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-ws16-amd64 10 windows-install fail never pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm 11 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-raw 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-qcow2 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm 11 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-vhd 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-vhd 13 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-qemuu-nested-amd 17 debian-hvm-install/l1/l2 fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-vhd 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win10-i386 17 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-ws16-amd64 17 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ws16-amd64 17 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 17 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-ws16-amd64 17 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win10-i386 17 guest-stop fail never pass version targeted for testing: xen 9976f3874d4cca829f2d2916feab18615337bb5c baseline version: xen bf87b7f7d91a25404216e0a0f3e628ce9bf1f82e Last test of basis 72491 2017-11-25 02:20:34 Z 5 days Testing same since 72503 2017-11-30 12:18:52 Z 0 days 1 attempts ------------------------------------------------------------ People who touched revisions under test: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> jobs: build-amd64-xsm pass build-armhf-xsm pass build-i386-xsm pass build-amd64-xtf pass build-amd64 pass build-armhf pass build-i386 pass build-amd64-libvirt pass build-armhf-libvirt pass build-i386-libvirt pass build-amd64-prev pass build-i386-prev pass build-amd64-pvops pass build-armhf-pvops pass build-i386-pvops pass build-amd64-rumprun pass build-i386-rumprun pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-1 pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-2 pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-3 pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-4 pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-5 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl pass test-armhf-armhf-xl pass test-amd64-i386-xl pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-stubdom-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-stubdom-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-xsm pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-xsm pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-xl-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-qemuu-nested-amd fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-pvhv2-amd fail test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-amd pass test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-amd pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64 pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64 pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64 pass test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-amd64 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 pass test-amd64-amd64-rumprun-amd64 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-ws16-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-ws16-amd64 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-ws16-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ws16-amd64 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-credit2 pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2 pass test-amd64-amd64-examine pass test-armhf-armhf-examine pass test-amd64-i386-examine pass test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-i386 pass test-amd64-i386-rumprun-i386 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win10-i386 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win10-i386 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win10-i386 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win10-i386 fail test-amd64-amd64-qemuu-nested-intel fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-pvhv2-intel fail test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-intel pass test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-intel pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt pass test-amd64-amd64-livepatch pass test-amd64-i386-livepatch pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-midway pass test-amd64-amd64-migrupgrade pass test-amd64-i386-migrupgrade pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-multivcpu pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu pass test-amd64-amd64-pair pass test-amd64-i386-pair pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-pair pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-pair pass test-amd64-amd64-amd64-pvgrub pass test-amd64-amd64-i386-pvgrub pass test-amd64-amd64-pygrub pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-qcow2 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qcow2 pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-raw pass test-amd64-i386-xl-raw pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-rtds pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-rtds pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-vhd pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-vhd pass ------------------------------------------------------------ sg-report-flight on osstest.xs.citrite.net logs: /home/osstest/logs images: /home/osstest/images Logs, config files, etc. are available at http://osstest.xs.citrite.net/~osstest/testlogs/logs Test harness code can be found at http://xenbits.xensource.com/gitweb?p=osstest.git;a=summary Push not applicable. ------------------------------------------------------------ commit 9976f3874d4cca829f2d2916feab18615337bb5c Author: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Date: Tue Nov 14 12:15:42 2017 +0000 tools: xentoolcore_restrict_all: Do deregistration before close Closing the fd before unhooking it from the list runs the risk that a concurrent thread calls xentoolcore_restrict_all will operate on the old fd value, which might refer to a new fd by then. So we need to do it in the other order. Sadly this weakens the guarantee provided by xentoolcore_restrict_all slightly, but not (I think) in a problematic way. It would be possible to implement the previous guarantee, but it would involve replacing all of the close() calls in all of the individual osdep parts of all of the individual libraries with calls to a new function which does dup2("/dev/null", thing->fd); pthread_mutex_lock(&handles_lock); thing->fd = -1; pthread_mutex_unlock(&handles_lock); close(fd); which would be terribly tedious. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@xxxxxxxxxx> Release-acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> commit 7f080956e9eed821fd42013bef11c1a2873fbeba Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Tue Nov 28 13:15:12 2017 +0100 improve XENMEM_add_to_physmap_batch address checking As a follow-up to XSA-212 we should have addressed a similar issue here: The handles being advanced at the top of xenmem_add_to_physmap_batch() means we allow hypervisor space accesses (in particular, for "errs", writes) with suitably crafted input arguments. This isn't a security issue in this case because of the limited width of struct xen_add_to_physmap_batch's size field: It being 16-bits wide, only the r/o M2P area can be accessed. Still we can and should do better. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Release-acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> commit f38f3dccf1e1a8aabcf57364326fc8f44cddc41a Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Tue Nov 28 13:14:43 2017 +0100 x86: check paging mode earlier in xenmem_add_to_physmap_one() There's no point in deferring this until after some initial processing, and it's actively wrong for the XENMAPSPACE_gmfn_foreign handling to not have such a check at all. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Release-acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> commit f33d653f46f5889db7be4fef31d71bc871834c10 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Tue Nov 28 13:14:10 2017 +0100 x86: replace bad ASSERT() in xenmem_add_to_physmap_one() There are no locks being held, i.e. it is possible to be triggered by racy hypercall invocations. Subsequent code doesn't really depend on the checked values, so this is not a security issue. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Release-acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> commit a3d64de8e86f5812917d2d0af28298f80debdf9a Author: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Tue Nov 28 13:13:26 2017 +0100 p2m: Check return value of p2m_set_entry() when decreasing reservation If the entire range specified to p2m_pod_decrease_reservation() is marked populate-on-demand, then it will make a single p2m_set_entry() call, reducing its PoD entry count. Unfortunately, in the right circumstances, this p2m_set_entry() call may fail. It that case, repeated calls to decrease_reservation() may cause p2m->pod.entry_count to fall below zero, potentially tripping over BUG_ON()s to the contrary. Instead, check to see if the entry succeeded, and return false if not. The caller will then call guest_remove_page() on the gfns, which will return -EINVAL upon finding no valid memory there to return. Unfortunately if the order > 0, the entry may have partially changed. A domain_crash() is probably the safest thing in that case. Other p2m_set_entry() calls in the same function should be fine, because they are writing the entry at its current order. Nonetheless, check the return value and crash if our assumption turns otu to be wrong. This is part of XSA-247. Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> commit 92790672dedf2eab042e04ecc277c19d40fd348a Author: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Tue Nov 28 13:13:03 2017 +0100 p2m: Always check to see if removing a p2m entry actually worked The PoD zero-check functions speculatively remove memory from the p2m, then check to see if it's completely zeroed, before putting it in the cache. Unfortunately, the p2m_set_entry() calls may fail if the underlying pagetable structure needs to change and the domain has exhausted its p2m memory pool: for instance, if we're removing a 2MiB region out of a 1GiB entry (in the p2m_pod_zero_check_superpage() case), or a 4k region out of a 2MiB or larger entry (in the p2m_pod_zero_check() case); and the return value is not checked. The underlying mfn will then be added into the PoD cache, and at some point mapped into another location in the p2m. If the guest afterwards ballons out this memory, it will be freed to the hypervisor and potentially reused by another domain, in spite of the fact that the original domain still has writable mappings to it. There are several places where p2m_set_entry() shouldn't be able to fail, as it is guaranteed to write an entry of the same order that succeeded before. Add a backstop of crashing the domain just in case, and an ASSERT_UNREACHABLE() to flag up the broken assumption on debug builds. While we're here, use PAGE_ORDER_2M rather than a magic constant. This is part of XSA-247. Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> commit a1c6c6768971ea387d7eba0803908ef0928b43ac Author: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Tue Nov 28 13:11:55 2017 +0100 x86/pod: prevent infinite loop when shattering large pages When populating pages, the PoD may need to split large ones using p2m_set_entry and request the caller to retry (see ept_get_entry for instance). p2m_set_entry may fail to shatter if it is not possible to allocate memory for the new page table. However, the error is not propagated resulting to the callers to retry infinitely the PoD. Prevent the infinite loop by return false when it is not possible to shatter the large mapping. This is XSA-246. Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> commit 345bb9cd634421f50b732d4f9c89a649a7a1d0db Author: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Wed Nov 22 19:19:04 2017 +0000 SUPPORT.md: Add statement on PCI passthrough Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> commit 9d9ebd792ee3c07affa0e7b2b3ad57e37893c490 Author: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Wed Nov 22 19:19:04 2017 +0000 SUPPORT.md: Add secondary memory management features Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> commit 6a14f082c46250977c926cee56dd2f1ba6cf72ae Author: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Wed Nov 22 19:19:03 2017 +0000 SUPPORT.md: Add Security-releated features With the exception of driver domains, which depend on PCI passthrough, and will be introduced later. Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx> commit fd92a62b488131ec29fc7d4df07419475268e585 Author: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Wed Nov 22 19:19:03 2017 +0000 SUPPORT.md: Add 'easy' HA / FT features Migration being one of the key 'non-easy' ones to be added later. Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> commit 389792060b54e7361a2b668028379877994dca8d Author: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Wed Nov 22 19:19:03 2017 +0000 SUPPORT.md: Add Debugging, analysis, crash post-portem Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> commit 065d586a96c3f0ee7c52038afd6a4b2fbf478500 Author: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Wed Nov 22 19:19:02 2017 +0000 SUPPORT.md: Add ARM-specific virtual hardware Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> commit 36716da2db52cdc03442af46a37e511543841057 Author: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Wed Nov 22 19:19:02 2017 +0000 SUPPORT.md: Add x86-specific virtual hardware x86-specific virtual hardware provided by the hypervisor, toolstack, or QEMU. Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx> commit a45c207e19c05d77c0056c6c0f3db32677ca2eb6 Author: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Wed Nov 22 19:19:02 2017 +0000 SUPPORT.md: Add virtual devices common to ARM and x86 Mostly PV protocols. Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> commit 535a819e5676b521d161d56fe54a565a11e21c97 Author: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Wed Nov 22 19:19:01 2017 +0000 SUPPORT.md: Toolstack core For now only include xl-specific features, or interaction with the system. Feature support matrix will be added when features are mentioned. Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> (qemu changes not included) _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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