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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 3/3] x86/p2m: force return value checking of p2m_set_entry()

To: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>, xen-devel <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Mon, 4 Dec 2017 16:03:04 +0000
Cc: George Dunlap <George.Dunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx>, Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@xxxxxxxxx>
Delivery-date: Mon, 04 Dec 2017 16:03:49 +0000
List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 04/12/17 11:07, Jan Beulich wrote:
> As XSAs 246 and 247 have shown, not doing so is rather dangerous.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>

Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>

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References:
- [Xen-devel] [PATCH 0/3] x86: XSA-246 / -247 follow-up
  - From: Jan Beulich
- [Xen-devel] [PATCH 3/3] x86/p2m: force return value checking of p2m_set_entry()
  - From: Jan Beulich

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