[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 16/22] vixen: pass grant table operations through to the outer Xen



On 07/01/2018 15:42, Anthony Liguori wrote:
> On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 12:36 AM, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> On Sat, Jan 06, 2018 at 02:54:31PM -0800, Anthony Liguori wrote:
>>>  static long
>>> +vixen_gnttab_setup_table(
>>> +    XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(gnttab_setup_table_t) uop, unsigned int count)
>>> +{
>>> +    long rc;
>>> +
>>> +    struct gnttab_setup_table op;
>>> +    xen_pfn_t *frame_list = NULL;
>>> +    static void *grant_table;
>>> +    XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_pfn_t) old_frame_list;
>>> +
>>> +    if ( count != 1 )
>>> +        return -EINVAL;
>>> +
>>> +    if ( unlikely(copy_from_guest(&op, uop, 1) != 0) )
>>> +    {
>>> +        gdprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "Fault while reading 
>>> gnttab_setup_table_t.\n");
>>> +        return -EFAULT;
>>> +    }
>>> +
>>> +    if ( grant_table == NULL ) {
>>> +        struct xen_add_to_physmap xatp;
>>> +        struct domain *d;
>>> +        int i;
>>> +
>>> +        for ( i = 0; i < max_grant_frames; i++ )
>>> +        {
>>> +             grant_table = alloc_xenheap_page();
>> This is wasting one memory page, grant table frames don't need to be
>> populated.
> Well they have to have a valid struct page_info in order for the guest
> to map it within its address space.
>
> Or did you have something else in mind?

Mapping of L0 frames into L1 is a giant mess.

First of all, some technical facts:
1) Frames which we map from L0 into L1 do not need to replace existing
RAM.  We can use any GFNs up to maxphysaddr.
2) Mapped frames should not replace RAM, and particularly not frames in
.data or .bss, because of the performance hit from shattered host
superpages.
3) Ideally, we'd want to map into entirely unused GFNs, because then we
don't have to interfere with what was there before.

In Xen, to allow a frame to be used by a guest, we need to set up domain
ownership for it.  This requires a struct page_info to exist, which by
default only occurs for pages L1 Xen things is RAM.

There is a completely gross way of dealing with this by faking up L1's
E820 map to include a range as RAM, and adding every entry in that range
into the badpages list.  This causes L1 Xen to put together page_info's
for them, but otherwise ignore their existence.

Off the top of my head, frames needing special attention are:
* The special pages, including Xenstore and Console rings.  These are
real frames (as opposed to mappings), but live inside an E820 hole from
L1's point of view.
* Shared info
* Grant table/status frames
* Vcpuinfo frames
* Event_fifo (if we care to wire that up, but perhaps its not worth it).

What I started doing in PV-shim (before switching to the SP2 side of
things fully) was to hard code these mapping frames immediately after
the special pages, which is a horrible but safe (as far as I can tell)
way of doing things.

Ideally, L1 could work out a safe place to use for mappings (which
ideally, would be a block of GFNs immediately above the last used
frame), but this cannot be done with the toolstack-provided E820 alone,
because it is insufficiently descriptive as it deliberately omits
information which can be found in the DSDT (e.g. ACPI hotplug regions).

The only reasonable option is for L0 to fully understand the guest
physical address, and be able to report the details fully to L1,
probably in an E820-like way but with our own type identifiers to cover
the options which aren't in the E820 spec.

This allows L1 to be positively told information such as "This range is
safe for mapping into", without having to go and parse all the secondary
layout information which is derived from this information in the first
place.  Having said that, this will require hypervisor and toolstack
changes, so isn't reasonable to retrofit.

Overall I want to ensure that, whatever plan we come up with for the
shim, it doesn't further tangle things up and make them harder to untangle.

~Andrew

_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel

 


Rackspace

Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our
servers 24x7x365 and backed by RackSpace's Fanatical Support®.