[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH v7 04/17] x86/amd: Try to set lfence as being Dispatch Serialising
This property is required for the AMD's recommended mitigation for Branch Target Injection, but Xen needs to cope with being unable to detect or modify the MSR. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> --- xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h | 1 + xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h | 1 + xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c index 5f36ac7..40c0bac 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c @@ -558,8 +558,41 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) wrmsr_amd_safe(0xc001100d, l, h & ~1); } + /* + * Attempt to set lfence to be Dispatch Serialising. This MSR almost + * certainly isn't virtualised (and Xen at least will leak the real + * value in but silently discard writes), as well as being per-core + * rather than per-thread, so do a full safe read/write/readback cycle + * in the worst case. + */ + if (c->x86 == 0x0f || c->x86 == 0x11) + /* Always dispatch serialising on this hardare. */ + __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_DISPATCH, c->x86_capability); + else /* Implicily "== 0x10 || >= 0x12" by being 64bit. */ { + if (rdmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, value)) + /* Unable to read. Assume the safer default. */ + __clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_DISPATCH, + c->x86_capability); + else if (value & AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALISE) + /* Already dispatch serialising. */ + __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_DISPATCH, + c->x86_capability); + else if (wrmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, + value | AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALISE) || + rdmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, value) || + !(value & AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALISE)) + /* Attempt to set failed. Assume the safer default. */ + __clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_DISPATCH, + c->x86_capability); + else + /* Successfully enabled! */ + __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_DISPATCH, + c->x86_capability); + } + /* MFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */ - __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, c->x86_capability); + if (!cpu_has_lfence_dispatch) + __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, c->x86_capability); switch(c->x86) { diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h index 84cc51d..adc333f 100644 --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h @@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ #define cpu_has_arch_perfmon boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON) #define cpu_has_cpuid_faulting boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CPUID_FAULTING) #define cpu_has_aperfmperf boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF) +#define cpu_has_lfence_dispatch boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_DISPATCH) enum _cache_type { CACHE_TYPE_NULL = 0, diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h index bc98227..58b37d6 100644 --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h @@ -22,3 +22,4 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(APERFMPERF, (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+ 8) /* APERFMPERF */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(MFENCE_RDTSC, (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+ 9) /* MFENCE synchronizes RDTSC */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_SMEP, (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+10) /* SMEP gets used by Xen itself */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_SMAP, (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+11) /* SMAP gets used by Xen itself */ +XEN_CPUFEATURE(LFENCE_DISPATCH, (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+12) /* lfence set as Dispatch Serialising */ diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h index a834f3b..56f5359 100644 --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h @@ -207,6 +207,7 @@ #define MSR_AMD64_IC_CFG 0xc0011021 #define MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG 0xc0011022 #define MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG 0xc0011029 +#define AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALISE (_AC(1, ULL) << 1) #define MSR_AMD64_DR0_ADDRESS_MASK 0xc0011027 #define MSR_AMD64_DR1_ADDRESS_MASK 0xc0011019 -- 2.1.4 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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