[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v8 13/17] x86/boot: Calculate the most appropriate BTI mitigation to use
On 01/16/2018 09:13 AM, Andrew Cooper wrote: > On 16/01/18 14:10, Boris Ostrovsky wrote: >> On 01/12/2018 01:01 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote: >>> >>> + if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) ) >>> + { >>> + /* >>> + * Even if we've chosen to not have IBRS set in Xen context, we >>> still >>> + * need the IBRS entry/exit logic to virtualise IBRS support for >>> + * guests. >>> + */ >>> + if ( ibrs ) >>> + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XEN_IBRS_SET); >>> + else >>> + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XEN_IBRS_CLEAR); >>> + } >>> >> Are you going to add support for Intel's "Enhanced IBRS" (I think that's >> what they call the "always on" mode")? > I'm not going to touch IBRS_ATT mode until I've got an SDP to develop > against. > > Given how many times the IBRS_ATT spec has changed already, I have > little confidence that it will remain unchanged right to the eventual > hardware arrives. I don't know if you are aware of it (I learned about this doc on Sunday) but https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/c5/63/336996-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf (Not part of the SDM but still, an official specification. For a change.) -boris -boris _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |