[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v9 07/11] x86/boot: Calculate the most appropriate BTI mitigation to use
>>> On 18.01.18 at 16:46, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > @@ -124,7 +186,21 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) > */ > if ( cpu_has_lfence_dispatch ) > thunk = THUNK_LFENCE; > + /* > + * On Intel hardware, we'd like to use retpoline in preference to > + * IBRS, but only if it is safe on this hardware. > + */ > + else if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) ) > + { > + if ( retpoline_safe() ) > + thunk = THUNK_RETPOLINE; > + else > + ibrs = true; > + } I think I had asked about this piece of code before, but maybe not the same I'm noticing now: Why is using retpoline dependent upon IBRSB? I.e. why not else if ( retpoline_safe() ) thunk = THUNK_RETPOLINE; else if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) ) ibrs = true; ? Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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