Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v10 09/11] x86/ctxt: Issue a speculation barrier between vcpu contexts

[David Woodhouse <dwmw2@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On Wed, 2018-01-24 at 13:49 +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 24/01/18 13:34, Woodhouse, David wrote:
> > I am loath to suggest *more* tweakables, but given the IBPB cost is
> > there any merit in having a mode which does it only if the *domain* is
> > different, regardless of vcpu_id?
>
> This would only be a win if you were regularly cross-scheduling vcpus
> from the same domain, which case you've probably other issues to be
> worried about.

Of course. If the guest *knows* about HT siblings that kind of implies
you've told it about the topology and thus you're pinning vCPU. I don't
think there *is* a world in which what I said makes sense.

> > 
> > If a given domain is running on HT siblings, it ought to be doing its
> > own mitigation — setting STIBP for userspace if it wants, ensuring its
> > own kernel is safe by having IBRS set or using retpoline, etc.
> ~Andrew
> 
> [1] Is this trying to be a subtle hint?

Heh, no. When I get to that bit, and the *reasons* we do that, it'll be
far from subtle. But as with so many other things, NOT THIS WEEK :)

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