[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 5/7] xen/arm32: Invalidate BTB on guest exit for Cortex A17 and 12
In order to avoid aliasing attackes agains the branch predictor, let's invalidate the BTB on guest exist. This is made complicated by the fact that we cannot take a branch invalidating the BTB. This is based on the fourth version posted by Marc Zyngier on Linux-arm mailing list (see [1]). This is part of XSA-254. [1] https://www.spinics.net/lists/arm-kernel/msg632062.html Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@xxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> --- Changes in v3: - Drop Stefano's reviewed-by - Use the latest version of the Linux patch. This will improve code readability. Changes in v2: - Add Stefano's reviewed-by --- xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ xen/arch/arm/cpuerrata.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 57 insertions(+) diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S b/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S index 828e52c25c..1ebbe4b065 100644 --- a/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S +++ b/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S @@ -160,6 +160,44 @@ GLOBAL(hyp_traps_vector) b trap_irq /* 0x18 - IRQ */ b trap_fiq /* 0x1c - FIQ */ +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR + + .align 5 +GLOBAL(hyp_traps_vector_bp_inv) + /* + * We encode the exception entry in the bottom 3 bits of + * SP, and we have to guarantee to be 8 bytes aligned. + */ + add sp, sp, #1 /* Reset 7 */ + add sp, sp, #1 /* Undef 6 */ + add sp, sp, #1 /* Hypervisor Call 5 */ + add sp, sp, #1 /* Prefetch abort 4 */ + add sp, sp, #1 /* Data abort 3 */ + add sp, sp, #1 /* Hypervisor 2 */ + add sp, sp, #1 /* IRQ 1 */ + nop /* FIQ 0 */ + + mcr p15, 0, r0, c7, c5, 6 /* BPIALL */ + isb + +.macro vect_br val, targ + eor sp, sp, #\val + tst sp, #7 + eorne sp, sp, #\val + beq \targ +.endm + + vect_br 0, trap_fiq + vect_br 1, trap_irq + vect_br 2, trap_guest_sync + vect_br 3, trap_data_abort + vect_br 4, trap_prefetch_abort + vect_br 5, trap_hypervisor_call + vect_br 6, trap_undefined_instruction + vect_br 7, trap_reset + +#endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */ + DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(reset) DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(undefined_instruction) DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(hypervisor_call) diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/cpuerrata.c b/xen/arch/arm/cpuerrata.c index 0a138fa735..c79e6d65d3 100644 --- a/xen/arch/arm/cpuerrata.c +++ b/xen/arch/arm/cpuerrata.c @@ -198,6 +198,13 @@ install_bp_hardening_vecs(const struct arm_cpu_capabilities *entry, this_cpu(bp_harden_vecs) = hyp_vecs; } +static int enable_bp_inv_hardening(void *data) +{ + install_bp_hardening_vecs(data, hyp_traps_vector_bp_inv, + "execute BPIALL"); + return 0; +} + #endif #define MIDR_RANGE(model, min, max) \ @@ -284,6 +291,18 @@ static const struct arm_cpu_capabilities arm_errata[] = { .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening, }, #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM32_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR + { + .capability = ARM_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A12), + .enable = enable_bp_inv_hardening, + }, + { + .capability = ARM_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A17), + .enable = enable_bp_inv_hardening, + }, +#endif {}, }; -- 2.11.0 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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