[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 5/7] public / x86: introduce __HYPERCALL_iommu_op
> -----Original Message----- > From: Tian, Kevin [mailto:kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx] > Sent: 23 February 2018 05:17 > To: Paul Durrant <Paul.Durrant@xxxxxxxxxx>; xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>; Wei Liu > <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>; George Dunlap <George.Dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>; > Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>; Ian Jackson > <Ian.Jackson@xxxxxxxxxx>; Tim (Xen.org) <tim@xxxxxxx>; Jan Beulich > <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>; Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Subject: RE: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 5/7] public / x86: introduce > __HYPERCALL_iommu_op > > > From: Paul Durrant [mailto:Paul.Durrant@xxxxxxxxxx] > > Sent: Tuesday, February 13, 2018 5:23 PM > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: Tian, Kevin [mailto:kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx] > > > Sent: 13 February 2018 06:43 > > > To: Paul Durrant <Paul.Durrant@xxxxxxxxxx>; xen- > > devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > > > Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>; Wei Liu > > > <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>; George Dunlap <George.Dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>; > > > Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>; Ian Jackson > > > <Ian.Jackson@xxxxxxxxxx>; Tim (Xen.org) <tim@xxxxxxx>; Jan Beulich > > > <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>; Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > > Subject: RE: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 5/7] public / x86: introduce > > > __HYPERCALL_iommu_op > > > > > > > From: Paul Durrant > > > > Sent: Monday, February 12, 2018 6:47 PM > > > > > > > > This patch introduces the boilerplate for a new hypercall to allow a > > > > domain to control IOMMU mappings for its own pages. > > > > Whilst there is duplication of code between the native and compat > > entry > > > > points which appears ripe for some form of combination, I think it is > > > > better to maintain the separation as-is because the compat entry point > > > > will necessarily gain complexity in subsequent patches. > > > > > > > > NOTE: This hypercall is only implemented for x86 and is currently > > > > restricted by XSM to dom0 since it could be used to cause IOMMU > > > > faults which may bring down a host. > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@xxxxxxxxxx> > > > [...] > > > > + > > > > + > > > > +static bool can_control_iommu(void) > > > > +{ > > > > + struct domain *currd = current->domain; > > > > + > > > > + /* > > > > + * IOMMU mappings cannot be manipulated if: > > > > + * - the IOMMU is not enabled or, > > > > + * - the IOMMU is passed through or, > > > > + * - shared EPT configured or, > > > > + * - Xen is maintaining an identity map. > > > > > > "for dom0" > > > > > > > + */ > > > > + if ( !iommu_enabled || iommu_passthrough || > > > > + iommu_use_hap_pt(currd) || need_iommu(currd) ) > > > > > > I guess it's clearer to directly check iommu_dom0_strict here > > > > Well, the problem with that is that it totally ties this interface to dom0. > > Whilst, in practice, that is the case at the moment (because of the xsm > > check) I do want to leave the potential to allow other PV domains to control > > their IOMMU mappings, if that make sense in future. > > > > first it's inconsistent from the comments - "Xen is maintaining > an identity map" which only applies to dom0. That's not true. If I assign a PCI device to an HVM domain, for instance, then need_iommu() is true for that domain and indeed Xen maintains a 1:1 BFN:GFN map for that domain. > > second I'm afraid !need_iommu is not an accurate condition to represent > PV domain. what about iommu also enabled for future PV domains? > I don't quite follow... need_iommu is a per-domain flag, set for dom0 when in strict mode, set for others when passing through a device. Either way, if Xen is maintaining the IOMMU pagetables then it is clearly unsafe for the domain to also be messing with them. Cheers, Paul > Thanks > Kevin _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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