[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86/xpti: really hide almost all of Xen image
>>> On 02.03.18 at 13:16, <jgross@xxxxxxxx> wrote: > On 02/03/18 12:23, Jan Beulich wrote: >> Commit 422588e885 ("x86/xpti: Hide almost all of .text and all >> .data/.rodata/.bss mappings") carefully limited the Xen image cloning to >> just entry code, but then overwrote the just allocated and populated L3 >> entry with the normal one again covering both Xen image and stubs. >> >> Drop the respective code in favor of an explicit clone_mapping() >> invocation. This in turn now requires setup_cpu_root_pgt() to run after >> stub setup in all cases. Additionally, with (almost) no unintended >> mappings left, the BSP's IDT now also needs to be page aligned. >> >> Note that the removed BUILD_BUG_ON()s don't get replaced by anything - >> there already is a suitable ASSERT() in xen.lds.S. >> >> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> > > Tested-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx> > Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx> Thanks, but I'm afraid there's a minor bug in that change: I need to free the page tables that the new clone_mapping() may have produced, but I need to do that without affecting common_pgt. It may therefore be worthwhile considering to retain the original approach instead, just doing the changes at L2 rather than L3. Andrew, do you have a preference either way? >> --- >> What should we do with the TSS? Currently together with it we expose >> almost a full page of other per-CPU data. A simple (but slightly >> hackish) option would be to use one of the two unused stack slots. > > Either one of the unused stack pages or directly after the GDT (we could > then drop NR_RESERVED_GDT_PAGES and reduce NR_RESERVED_GDT_ENTRIES to > a lower value, e.g. 16 or 32). I dislike moving the TSS into per-domain space. There shouldn't be anything there that isn't per-domain. Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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