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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3 5/7] xen/x86: disable global pages for domains with XPTI active



On 22/03/18 17:30, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 21.03.18 at 13:51, <jgross@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> Instead of flushing the TLB from global pages when switching address
>> spaces with XPTI being active just disable global pages via %cr4
>> completely when a domain subject to XPTI is active. This avoids the
>> need for extra TLB flushes as loading %cr3 will remove all TLB
>> entries.
> 
> I continue to be not entirely convinced of this move. I had an
> alternative in mind: Since retaining global pages is particularly
> relevant for switches between guest user and guest kernel
> modes, what if we made a shortcut from e.g. lstar_enter through
> switch_to_kernel to restore_all_guest without ever switching to
> the full page Xen tables?
> 
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
>> @@ -508,18 +508,23 @@ void make_cr3(struct vcpu *v, mfn_t mfn)
>>  void write_ptbase(struct vcpu *v)
>>  {
>>      struct cpu_info *cpu_info = get_cpu_info();
>> +    unsigned long new_cr4;
>> +
>> +    new_cr4 = (is_pv_vcpu(v) && !is_idle_vcpu(v))
>> +              ? pv_guest_cr4_to_real_cr4(v) : mmu_cr4_features;
> 
> I'm not overly happy to see any new uses of mmu_cr4_features.
> This should really only be used for priming certain values imo,
> which isn't the case here (otoh pv_guest_cr4_to_real_cr4() does
> so too, and perhaps better wouldn't). Hence I wonder whether
> this shouldn't be read_cr4() | X86_CR4_PGE, not the least
> because we've just got rid of the blanket reversion to
> mmu_cr4_features in VMX code.

I just realized that using read_cr4() | X86_CR4_PGE is wrong. We would
keep bits switched on which a pv domain is allowed to modify (plus
CR4_TSD eventually).

Do we really want that?

We could mask away certain bits, of course, but in the end we'd just
have a default calculated cr4 value instead of having it just set
somewhere initially.


Juergen

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