[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/1] xen-netback: process malformed sk_buff correctly to avoid BUG_ON()
Below is the sample kernel module used to reproduce the issue on purpose with "vif1.0" hard coded: #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/skbuff.h> #include <linux/netdevice.h> static int __init test_skb_init(void) { struct sk_buff *skb; struct skb_shared_info *si; struct net_device *dev; dev = dev_get_by_name(&init_net, "vif1.0"); if (!dev) { pr_alert("failed to get net_device\n"); return 0; } skb = alloc_skb(2000, GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOWARN); if (!skb) { pr_alert("failed to allocate sk_buff\n"); return 0; } si = skb_shinfo(skb); skb_reserve(skb, NET_SKB_PAD + NET_IP_ALIGN); skb->dev = dev; skb->len = 386; skb->data_len = 352; skb->mac_len = 14; skb->pkt_type = 3; skb->protocol = 8; skb->transport_header = 98; skb->network_header = 78; skb->mac_header = 64; skb->tail = 98; skb->end = 384; pr_alert("skb->data = 0x%016llx\n", (u64) skb->data); dev->netdev_ops->ndo_start_xmit(skb, dev); return 0; } static void __exit test_skb_exit(void) { } MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); module_init(test_skb_init); module_exit(test_skb_exit); Dongli Zhang On 03/28/2018 07:42 AM, Dongli Zhang wrote: > The "BUG_ON(!frag_iter)" in function xenvif_rx_next_chunk() is triggered if > the received sk_buff is malformed, that is, when the sk_buff has pattern > (skb->data_len && !skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags). Below is a sample call > stack: > > [ 438.652658] ------------[ cut here ]------------ > [ 438.652660] kernel BUG at drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c:325! > [ 438.652714] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI > [ 438.652813] CPU: 0 PID: 2492 Comm: vif1.0-q0-guest Tainted: G O > 4.16.0-rc6+ #1 > [ 438.652896] RIP: e030:xenvif_rx_skb+0x3c2/0x5e0 [xen_netback] > [ 438.652926] RSP: e02b:ffffc90040877dc8 EFLAGS: 00010246 > [ 438.652956] RAX: 0000000000000160 RBX: 0000000000000022 RCX: > 0000000000000001 > [ 438.652993] RDX: ffffc900402890d0 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: > ffffc90040889000 > [ 438.653029] RBP: ffff88002b460040 R08: ffffc90040877de0 R09: > 0100000000000000 > [ 438.653065] R10: 0000000000007ff0 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: > ffffc90040889000 > [ 438.653100] R13: ffffffff80000000 R14: 0000000000000022 R15: > 0000000080000000 > [ 438.653149] FS: 00007f15603778c0(0000) GS:ffff880030400000(0000) > knlGS:0000000000000000 > [ 438.653188] CS: e033 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > [ 438.653219] CR2: 0000000001832a08 CR3: 0000000029c12000 CR4: > 0000000000042660 > [ 438.653262] Call Trace: > [ 438.653284] ? xen_hypercall_event_channel_op+0xa/0x20 > [ 438.653313] xenvif_rx_action+0x41/0x80 [xen_netback] > [ 438.653341] xenvif_kthread_guest_rx+0xb2/0x2a8 [xen_netback] > [ 438.653374] ? __schedule+0x352/0x700 > [ 438.653398] ? wait_woken+0x80/0x80 > [ 438.653421] kthread+0xf3/0x130 > [ 438.653442] ? xenvif_rx_action+0x80/0x80 [xen_netback] > [ 438.653470] ? kthread_destroy_worker+0x40/0x40 > [ 438.653497] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 > > The issue is hit by xen-netback when there is bug with other networking > interface (e.g., dom0 physical NIC), who has generated and forwarded > malformed sk_buff to dom0 vifX.Y. It is possible to reproduce the issue on > purpose with below sample code in a kernel module: > > skb->dev = dev; // dev of vifX.Y > skb->len = 386; > skb->data_len = 352; > skb->tail = 98; > skb->end = 384; > dev->netdev_ops->ndo_start_xmit(skb, dev); > > This patch stops processing sk_buff immediately if it is detected as > malformed, that is, pkt->frag_iter is NULL but there is still remaining > pkt->remaining_len. > > Signed-off-by: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@xxxxxxxxxx> > --- > drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c | 8 ++++++++ > 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c > index b1cf7c6..289cc82 100644 > --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c > +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c > @@ -369,6 +369,14 @@ static void xenvif_rx_data_slot(struct xenvif_queue > *queue, > offset += len; > pkt->remaining_len -= len; > > + if (unlikely(!pkt->frag_iter && pkt->remaining_len)) { > + pkt->remaining_len = 0; > + pkt->extra_count = 0; > + pr_err_ratelimited("malformed sk_buff at %s\n", > + queue->name); > + break; > + } > + > } while (offset < XEN_PAGE_SIZE && pkt->remaining_len > 0); > > if (pkt->remaining_len > 0) > _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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