[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 1/1] xen-netback: process malformed sk_buff correctly to avoid BUG_ON()
The "BUG_ON(!frag_iter)" in function xenvif_rx_next_chunk() is triggered if the received sk_buff is malformed, that is, when the sk_buff has pattern (skb->data_len && !skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags). Below is a sample call stack: [ 438.652658] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 438.652660] kernel BUG at drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c:325! [ 438.652714] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 438.652813] CPU: 0 PID: 2492 Comm: vif1.0-q0-guest Tainted: G O 4.16.0-rc6+ #1 [ 438.652896] RIP: e030:xenvif_rx_skb+0x3c2/0x5e0 [xen_netback] [ 438.652926] RSP: e02b:ffffc90040877dc8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 438.652956] RAX: 0000000000000160 RBX: 0000000000000022 RCX: 0000000000000001 [ 438.652993] RDX: ffffc900402890d0 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffc90040889000 [ 438.653029] RBP: ffff88002b460040 R08: ffffc90040877de0 R09: 0100000000000000 [ 438.653065] R10: 0000000000007ff0 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffffc90040889000 [ 438.653100] R13: ffffffff80000000 R14: 0000000000000022 R15: 0000000080000000 [ 438.653149] FS: 00007f15603778c0(0000) GS:ffff880030400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 438.653188] CS: e033 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 438.653219] CR2: 0000000001832a08 CR3: 0000000029c12000 CR4: 0000000000042660 [ 438.653262] Call Trace: [ 438.653284] ? xen_hypercall_event_channel_op+0xa/0x20 [ 438.653313] xenvif_rx_action+0x41/0x80 [xen_netback] [ 438.653341] xenvif_kthread_guest_rx+0xb2/0x2a8 [xen_netback] [ 438.653374] ? __schedule+0x352/0x700 [ 438.653398] ? wait_woken+0x80/0x80 [ 438.653421] kthread+0xf3/0x130 [ 438.653442] ? xenvif_rx_action+0x80/0x80 [xen_netback] [ 438.653470] ? kthread_destroy_worker+0x40/0x40 [ 438.653497] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 The issue is hit by xen-netback when there is bug with other networking interface (e.g., dom0 physical NIC), who has generated and forwarded malformed sk_buff to dom0 vifX.Y. It is possible to reproduce the issue on purpose with below sample code in a kernel module: skb->dev = dev; // dev of vifX.Y skb->len = 386; skb->data_len = 352; skb->tail = 98; skb->end = 384; skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags = 0; dev->netdev_ops->ndo_start_xmit(skb, dev); This patch stops processing sk_buff immediately if it is detected as malformed, that is, pkt->frag_iter is NULL but there is still remaining pkt->remaining_len. Signed-off-by: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@xxxxxxxxxx> --- Changed since v1: * return XEN_NETIF_RSP_ERROR in response to netfront drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c | 12 +++++++++++- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c index b1cf7c6..a3d8ee9 100644 --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c @@ -358,6 +358,7 @@ static void xenvif_rx_data_slot(struct xenvif_queue *queue, { unsigned int offset = 0; unsigned int flags; + bool err = false; do { size_t len; @@ -369,6 +370,15 @@ static void xenvif_rx_data_slot(struct xenvif_queue *queue, offset += len; pkt->remaining_len -= len; + if (unlikely(!pkt->frag_iter && pkt->remaining_len)) { + pkt->remaining_len = 0; + pkt->extra_count = 0; + err = true; + pr_err_ratelimited("malformed sk_buff at %s\n", + queue->name); + break; + } + } while (offset < XEN_PAGE_SIZE && pkt->remaining_len > 0); if (pkt->remaining_len > 0) @@ -392,7 +402,7 @@ static void xenvif_rx_data_slot(struct xenvif_queue *queue, rsp->offset = 0; rsp->flags = flags; rsp->id = req->id; - rsp->status = (s16)offset; + rsp->status = likely(!err) ? (s16)offset : XEN_NETIF_RSP_ERROR; } static void xenvif_rx_extra_slot(struct xenvif_queue *queue, -- 2.7.4 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |