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[Xen-devel] SVM NPT mem_access and npfec.insn_fetch



Hello,

We've been trying to enable mem_access events for SVM, and we do receive
some events with xen-access if we set the pages read-only. However, the
exec xen-access tests fails, because it appears that npfec.insn_fetch is
always 0 here (or at least we haven't seen it to be 1 in a lot of testing):

index 569b124..d518c94 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -1835,6 +1835,13 @@ int hvm_hap_nested_page_fault(paddr_t gpa,
unsigned long gla,
             break;
         }

+        printk("pae: %d, nx: %d, gfn: 0x%lx access %d violation %d read %d"
+               " write %d insn %d present %d glav %d kind %d \n",
+               !!(curr->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[4] & X86_CR4_PAE),
+               !!(curr->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_efer & EFER_NX), gfn,
+               p2ma, violation, npfec.read_access, npfec.write_access,
+               npfec.insn_fetch, npfec.present, npfec.gla_valid,
npfec.kind);
+
         if ( violation )
         {
             /* Should #VE be emulated for this fault? */

This patch does not require anything else, just start an HVM guest on an
AMD host. It outputs things like:

(XEN) pae: 1, nx: 1, gfn: 0xf0235 access 7 violation 0 read 1 write 1
insn 0 present 1 glav 0 kind 2

The dom0 CPU does list "pae" and "nx" among its capabilities:

# cat /proc/cpuinfo | grep nx
flags           : fpu de tsc msr *pae* mce cx8 apic mca cmov pat clflush mmx 
fxsr
sse sse2 ht syscall *nx* mmxext fxsr_opt lm constant_tsc rep_good nopl
nonstop_tsc extd_apicid eagerfpu pni pclmulqdq ssse3 fma cx16 sse4_1
sse4_2 movbe popcnt aes xsave avx f16c rdrand hypervisor lahf_lm
cmp_legacy abm sse4a misalignsse 3dnowprefetch bpext retpoline
retpoline_amd vmmcall fsgsbase bmi1 avx2 bmi2 rdseed adx clflushopt
sha_ni xsaveopt xsavec xgetbv1 clzero arat

In svm.c, this is what happens:

static void svm_do_nested_pgfault(struct vcpu *v,
    struct cpu_user_regs *regs, uint64_t pfec, paddr_t gpa)
{
    int ret;
    unsigned long gfn = gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT;
    mfn_t mfn;
    p2m_type_t p2mt;
    p2m_access_t p2ma;
    struct p2m_domain *p2m = NULL;

    /*
     * Since HW doesn't explicitly provide a read access bit and we need to
     * somehow describe read-modify-write instructions we will
conservatively
     * set read_access for all memory accesses that are not instruction
fetches.
     */
    struct npfec npfec = {
        .read_access = !(pfec & PFEC_insn_fetch),
        .write_access = !!(pfec & PFEC_write_access),
        .insn_fetch = !!(pfec & PFEC_insn_fetch),
        .present = !!(pfec & PFEC_page_present),
    };

    /* These bits are mutually exclusive */
    if ( pfec & NPT_PFEC_with_gla )
        npfec.kind = npfec_kind_with_gla;
    else if ( pfec & NPT_PFEC_in_gpt )
        npfec.kind = npfec_kind_in_gpt;

    ret = hvm_hap_nested_page_fault(gpa, ~0ul, npfec);

(One thing to notice here is that the gla is always invalid with SVM -
is there perhaps _some_ way of getting it in Xen even though the manual
says we only have the GPA and error code here?)

svm_do_nested_pgfault() is being called from the NPF VMEXIT code:

    case VMEXIT_NPF:
        perfc_incra(svmexits, VMEXIT_NPF_PERFC);
        if ( cpu_has_svm_decode )
            v->arch.hvm_svm.cached_insn_len = vmcb->guest_ins_len & 0xf;
        rc = vmcb->exitinfo1 & PFEC_page_present
             ? p2m_pt_handle_deferred_changes(vmcb->exitinfo2) : 0;
        if ( rc >= 0 )
            svm_do_nested_pgfault(v, regs, vmcb->exitinfo1,
vmcb->exitinfo2);
        else
        {
            printk(XENLOG_G_ERR
                   "%pv: Error %d handling NPF (gpa=%08lx ec=%04lx)\n",
                   v, rc, vmcb->exitinfo2, vmcb->exitinfo1);
            domain_crash(v->domain);
        }
        v->arch.hvm_svm.cached_insn_len = 0;
        break;

Surely with xen-access setting _all_ the guest's pages to
XENMEM_access_rw I should have at least seen one event coming from an
execute fault.

What are we missing?


Thanks,
Razvan

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