Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 0/1] drm/xen-zcopy: Add Xen zero-copy helper DRM driver

[Oleksandr Andrushchenko <andr2000@xxxxxxxxx>]

On 04/18/2018 01:18 PM, Paul Durrant wrote:
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Xen-devel [mailto:xen-devel-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf
> > Of Roger Pau Monné
> > Sent: 18 April 2018 11:11
> > To: Oleksandr Andrushchenko <andr2000@xxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: jgross@xxxxxxxx; Artem Mygaiev <Artem_Mygaiev@xxxxxxxx>;
> > Dongwon Kim <dongwon.kim@xxxxxxxxx>; airlied@xxxxxxxx;
> > Oleksandr_Andrushchenko@xxxxxxxx; linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; dri-
> > devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; Potrola, MateuszX
> > <mateuszx.potrola@xxxxxxxxx>; xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx;
> > daniel.vetter@xxxxxxxxx; boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx; Matt Roper
> > <matthew.d.roper@xxxxxxxxx>
> > Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 0/1] drm/xen-zcopy: Add Xen zero-copy
> > helper DRM driver
> >
> > On Wed, Apr 18, 2018 at 11:01:12AM +0300, Oleksandr Andrushchenko
> > wrote:
> > > On 04/18/2018 10:35 AM, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
> > > > On Wed, Apr 18, 2018 at 09:38:39AM +0300, Oleksandr Andrushchenko
> > wrote:
> > > > > On 04/17/2018 11:57 PM, Dongwon Kim wrote:
> > > > > > On Tue, Apr 17, 2018 at 09:59:28AM +0200, Daniel Vetter wrote:
> > > > > > > On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 12:29:05PM -0700, Dongwon Kim wrote:
> > > > > 3.2 Backend exports dma-buf to xen-front
> > > > >
> > > > > In this case Dom0 pages are shared with DomU. As before, DomU can
> > only write
> > > > > to these pages, not any other page from Dom0, so it can be still
> > considered
> > > > > safe.
> > > > > But, the following must be considered (highlighted in xen-front's Kernel
> > > > > documentation):
> > > > >    - If guest domain dies then pages/grants received from the backend
> > cannot
> > > > >      be claimed back - think of it as memory lost to Dom0 (won't be used
> > for
> > > > > any
> > > > >      other guest)
> > > > >    - Misbehaving guest may send too many requests to the backend
> > exhausting
> > > > >      its grant references and memory (consider this from security POV).
> > As the
> > > > >      backend runs in the trusted domain we also assume that it is trusted
> > as
> > > > > well,
> > > > >      e.g. must take measures to prevent DDoS attacks.
> > > > I cannot parse the above sentence:
> > > >
> > > > "As the backend runs in the trusted domain we also assume that it is
> > > > trusted as well, e.g. must take measures to prevent DDoS attacks."
> > > >
> > > > What's the relation between being trusted and protecting from DoS
> > > > attacks?
> > > I mean that we trust the backend that it can prevent Dom0
> > > from crashing in case DomU's frontend misbehaves, e.g.
> > > if the frontend sends too many memory requests etc.
> > > > In any case, all? PV protocols are implemented with the frontend
> > > > sharing pages to the backend, and I think there's a reason why this
> > > > model is used, and it should continue to be used.
> > > This is the first use-case above. But there are real-world
> > > use-cases (embedded in my case) when physically contiguous memory
> > > needs to be shared, one of the possible ways to achieve this is
> > > to share contiguous memory from Dom0 to DomU (the second use-case
> > above)
> > > > Having to add logic in the backend to prevent such attacks means
> > > > that:
> > > >
> > > >    - We need more code in the backend, which increases complexity and
> > > >      chances of bugs.
> > > >    - Such code/logic could be wrong, thus allowing DoS.
> > > You can live without this code at all, but this is then up to
> > > backend which may make Dom0 down because of DomU's frontend doing
> > evil
> > > things
> > IMO we should design protocols that do not allow such attacks instead
> > of having to defend against them.
> >
> > > > > 4. xen-front/backend/xen-zcopy synchronization
> > > > >
> > > > > 4.1. As I already said in 2) all the inter VM communication happens
> > between
> > > > > xen-front and the backend, xen-zcopy is NOT involved in that.
> > > > > When xen-front wants to destroy a display buffer (dumb/dma-buf) it
> > issues a
> > > > > XENDISPL_OP_DBUF_DESTROY command (opposite to
> > XENDISPL_OP_DBUF_CREATE).
> > > > > This call is synchronous, so xen-front expects that backend does free
> > the
> > > > > buffer pages on return.
> > > > >
> > > > > 4.2. Backend, on XENDISPL_OP_DBUF_DESTROY:
> > > > >     - closes all dumb handles/fd's of the buffer according to [3]
> > > > >     - issues DRM_IOCTL_XEN_ZCOPY_DUMB_WAIT_FREE IOCTL to xen-
> > zcopy to make
> > > > > sure
> > > > >       the buffer is freed (think of it as it waits for dma-buf->release
> > > > > callback)
> > > > So this zcopy thing keeps some kind of track of the memory usage? Why
> > > > can't the user-space backend keep track of the buffer usage?
> > > Because there is no dma-buf UAPI which allows to track the buffer life cycle
> > > (e.g. wait until dma-buf's .release callback is called)
> > > > >     - replies to xen-front that the buffer can be destroyed.
> > > > > This way deletion of the buffer happens synchronously on both Dom0
> > and DomU
> > > > > sides. In case if DRM_IOCTL_XEN_ZCOPY_DUMB_WAIT_FREE returns
> > with time-out
> > > > > error
> > > > > (BTW, wait time is a parameter of this IOCTL), Xen will defer grant
> > > > > reference
> > > > > removal and will retry later until those are free.
> > > > >
> > > > > Hope this helps understand how buffers are synchronously deleted in
> > case
> > > > > of xen-zcopy with a single protocol command.
> > > > >
> > > > > I think the above logic can also be re-used by the hyper-dmabuf driver
> > with
> > > > > some additional work:
> > > > >
> > > > > 1. xen-zcopy can be split into 2 parts and extend:
> > > > > 1.1. Xen gntdev driver [4], [5] to allow creating dma-buf from grefs and
> > > > > vise versa,
> > > > I don't know much about the dma-buf implementation in Linux, but
> > > > gntdev is a user-space device, and AFAICT user-space applications
> > > > don't have any notion of dma buffers. How are such buffers useful for
> > > > user-space? Why can't this just be called memory?
> > > A dma-buf is seen by user-space as a file descriptor and you can
> > > pass it to different drivers then. For example, you can share a buffer
> > > used by a display driver for scanout with a GPU, to compose a picture
> > > into it:
> > > 1. User-space (US) allocates a display buffer from display driver
> > > 2. US asks display driver to export the dma-buf which backs up that buffer,
> > > US gets buffer's fd: dma_buf_fd
> > > 3. US asks GPU driver to import a buffer and provides it with dma_buf_fd
> > > 4. GPU renders contents into display buffer (dma_buf_fd)
> > After speaking with Oleksandr on IRC, I think the main usage of the
> > gntdev extension is to:
> >
> > 1. Create a dma-buf from a set of grant references.
> > 2. Share dma-buf and get a list of grant references.
> >
> > I think this set of operations could be broken into:
> >
> > 1.1 Map grant references into user-space using the gntdev.
> > 1.2 Create a dma-buf out of a set of user-space virtual addresses.
> >
> > 2.1 Map a dma-buf into user-space.
> > 2.2 Get grefs out of the user-space addresses where the dma-buf is
> >      mapped.
> >
> > So it seems like what's actually missing is a way to:
> >
> >   - Create a dma-buf from a list of user-space virtual addresses.
> >   - Allow to map a dma-buf into user-space, so it can then be used with
> >     the gntdev.
> >
> > I think this is generic enough that it could be implemented by a
> > device not tied to Xen. AFAICT the hyper_dma guys also wanted
> > something similar to this.
> >
> > > Finally, this is indeed some memory, but a bit more [1]
> > > > Also, (with my FreeBSD maintainer hat) how is this going to translate
> > > > to other OSes? So far the operations performed by the gntdev device
> > > > are mostly OS-agnostic because this just map/unmap memory, and in fact
> > > > they are implemented by Linux and FreeBSD.
> > > At the moment I can only see Linux implementation and it seems
> > > to be perfectly ok as we do not change Xen's APIs etc. and only
> > > use the existing ones (remember, we only extend gntdev/balloon
> > > drivers, all the changes in the Linux kernel)
> > > As the second note I can also think that we do not extend gntdev/balloon
> > > drivers and have re-worked xen-zcopy driver be a separate entity,
> > > say drivers/xen/dma-buf
> > > > > implement "wait" ioctl (wait for dma-buf->release): currently these are
> > > > > DRM_XEN_ZCOPY_DUMB_FROM_REFS,
> > DRM_XEN_ZCOPY_DUMB_TO_REFS and
> > > > > DRM_XEN_ZCOPY_DUMB_WAIT_FREE
> > > > > 1.2. Xen balloon driver [6] to allow allocating contiguous buffers (not
> > > > > needed
> > > > > by current hyper-dmabuf, but is a must for xen-zcopy use-cases)
> > > > I think this needs clarifying. In which memory space do you need those
> > > > regions to be contiguous?
> > > Use-case: Dom0 has a HW driver which only works with contig memory
> > > and I want DomU to be able to directly write into that memory, thus
> > > implementing zero copying
> > > > Do they need to be contiguous in host physical memory, or guest
> > > > physical memory?
> > > Host
> > > > If it's in guest memory space, isn't there any generic interface that
> > > > you can use?
> > > >
> > > > If it's in host physical memory space, why do you need this buffer to
> > > > be contiguous in host physical memory space? The IOMMU should hide
> > all
> > > > this.
> > > There are drivers/HW which can only work with contig memory and
> > > if it is backed by an IOMMU then still it has to be contig in IPA
> > > space (real device doesn't know that it is actually IPA contig, not PA)
> > What's IPA contig?
> I assume 'IPA' means 'IOMMU Physical Address'. I wonder whether this means what 
> I've termed 'Bus Address' elsewhere?
sorry for not being clear here: I mean that the device sees contiguous 
range of
Intermediate Phys Addresses
>    Paul
>
> > Thanks, Roger.
> >
> > _______________________________________________
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> > Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel

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