[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 for-4.11] x86/pv: Hide more EFER bits from PV guests
On Mon, May 07, 2018 at 11:00:23AM +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote: > We don't advertise SVM in CPUID so a PV guest shouldn't be under the > impression that it can use SVM functionality, but despite this, it really > shouldn't see SVME set when reading EFER. > > On Intel processors, 32bit PV guests don't see, and can't use SYSCALL. > > Introduce EFER_KNOWN_MASK to whitelist the features Xen knows about, and use > this to clamp the guests view. > > Take the opportunity to reuse the mask to simplify svm_vmcb_isvalid(), and > change "undefined" to "unknown" in the print message, as there is at least > EFER.TCE (Translation Cache Extension) defined but unknown to Xen. > > Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> > Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx> > Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx> > --- > CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> > CC: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@xxxxxxx> > CC: Brian Woods <brian.woods@xxxxxxx> > > Arguably, this wants backporting to the stable trees, so should be considered > for 4.11 at this point. > --- > xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svmdebug.c | 5 ++--- > xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c | 11 +++++++++-- > xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h | 3 +++ > 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svmdebug.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svmdebug.c > index 6c215d1..d35e405 100644 > --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svmdebug.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svmdebug.c > @@ -133,9 +133,8 @@ bool svm_vmcb_isvalid(const char *from, const struct > vmcb_struct *vmcb, > PRINTF("DR7: bits [63:32] are not zero (%#"PRIx64")\n", > vmcb_get_dr7(vmcb)); > > - if ( efer & ~(EFER_SCE | EFER_LME | EFER_LMA | EFER_NX | EFER_SVME | > - EFER_LMSLE | EFER_FFXSE) ) > - PRINTF("EFER: undefined bits are not zero (%#"PRIx64")\n", efer); > + if ( efer & ~EFER_KNOWN_MASK ) > + PRINTF("EFER: unknown bits are not zero (%#"PRIx64")\n", efer); > > if ( hvm_efer_valid(v, efer, -1) ) > PRINTF("EFER: %s (%"PRIx64")\n", hvm_efer_valid(v, efer, -1), efer); > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c > index 15f42b3..ce2ec76 100644 > --- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c > @@ -867,9 +867,16 @@ static int read_msr(unsigned int reg, uint64_t *val, > return X86EMUL_OKAY; > > case MSR_EFER: > - *val = read_efer(); > + /* Hide unknown bits, and unconditionally hide SVME from guests. */ > + *val = read_efer() & EFER_KNOWN_MASK & ~EFER_SVME; > + /* > + * Hide the 64-bit features from 32-bit guests. SCE has > + * vendor-dependent behaviour. > + */ > if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) ) > - *val &= ~(EFER_LME | EFER_LMA | EFER_LMSLE); > + *val &= ~(EFER_LME | EFER_LMA | EFER_LMSLE | > + (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL > + ? EFER_SCE : 0)); > return X86EMUL_OKAY; > > case MSR_K7_FID_VID_CTL: > diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h > index c9f44eb..6d94d65 100644 > --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h > +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h > @@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ > #define EFER_LMSLE (1<<_EFER_LMSLE) > #define EFER_FFXSE (1<<_EFER_FFXSE) > > +#define EFER_KNOWN_MASK (EFER_SCE | EFER_LME | EFER_LMA | > EFER_NX | \ > + EFER_SVME | EFER_LMSLE | EFER_FFXSE) > + > /* Speculation Controls. */ > #define MSR_SPEC_CTRL 0x00000048 > #define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS (_AC(1, ULL) << 0) > -- > 2.1.4 > Reviewed-by: Brian Woods <brian.woods@xxxxxxx> -- Brian Woods _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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