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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [xen-unstable-smoke test] 122662: regressions - FAIL
flight 122662 xen-unstable-smoke real [real] http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/122662/ Regressions :-( Tests which did not succeed and are blocking, including tests which could not be run: test-amd64-amd64-libvirt 18 guest-start/debian.repeat fail REGR. vs. 122642 Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking: test-amd64-amd64-libvirt 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-arm64-arm64-xl-xsm 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-arm64-arm64-xl-xsm 14 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl 14 saverestore-support-check fail never pass version targeted for testing: xen 92938e5d149669033aecdfb3d1396948d49d1887 baseline version: xen f78c8322850dbe3dbe9cd828ee00767190529100 Last test of basis 122642 2018-05-07 16:00:38 Z 1 days Failing since 122654 2018-05-08 17:00:50 Z 0 days 2 attempts Testing same since 122662 2018-05-08 19:00:37 Z 0 days 1 attempts ------------------------------------------------------------ People who touched revisions under test: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> Xen Project Security Team <security@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> jobs: build-arm64-xsm pass build-amd64 pass build-armhf pass build-amd64-libvirt pass test-armhf-armhf-xl pass test-arm64-arm64-xl-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-i386 pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt fail ------------------------------------------------------------ sg-report-flight on osstest.test-lab.xenproject.org logs: /home/logs/logs images: /home/logs/images Logs, config files, etc. are available at http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs Explanation of these reports, and of osstest in general, is at http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=osstest.git;a=blob;f=README.email;hb=master http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=osstest.git;a=blob;f=README;hb=master Test harness code can be found at http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb?p=osstest.git;a=summary Not pushing. ------------------------------------------------------------ commit 92938e5d149669033aecdfb3d1396948d49d1887 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Tue May 8 18:12:56 2018 +0100 x86/HVM: guard against emulator driving ioreq state in weird ways In the case where hvm_wait_for_io() calls wait_on_xen_event_channel(), p->state ends up being read twice in succession: once to determine that state != p->state, and then again at the top of the loop. This gives a compromised emulator a chance to change the state back between the two reads, potentially keeping Xen in a loop indefinitely. Instead: * Read p->state once in each of the wait_on_xen_event_channel() tests, * re-use that value the next time around, * and insist that the states continue to transition "forward" (with the exception of the transition to STATE_IOREQ_NONE). This is XSA-262. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> commit 14c3f68a57361f20be33ec3848f83d8636a0d34e Author: Xen Project Security Team <security@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Date: Tue May 8 18:12:10 2018 +0100 x86/vpt: add support for IO-APIC routed interrupts And modify the HPET code to make use of it. Currently HPET interrupts are always treated as ISA and thus injected through the vPIC. This is wrong because HPET interrupts when not in legacy mode should be injected from the IO-APIC. To make things worse, the supported interrupt routing values are set to [20..23], which clearly falls outside of the ISA range, thus leading to an ASSERT in debug builds or memory corruption in non-debug builds because the interrupt injection code will write out of the bounds of the arch.hvm_domain.vpic array. Since the HPET interrupt source can change between ISA and IO-APIC always destroy the timer before changing the mode, or else Xen risks changing it while the timer is active. Note that vpt interrupt injection is racy in the sense that the vIO-APIC RTE entry can be written by the guest in between the call to pt_irq_masked and hvm_ioapic_assert, or the call to pt_update_irq and pt_intr_post. Those are not deemed to be security issues, but rather quirks of the current implementation. In the worse case the guest might lose interrupts or get multiple interrupt vectors injected for the same timer source. This is part of XSA-261. Address actual and potential compiler warnings. Fix formatting. Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> commit 75d6828bc2146d0eea16adc92376951a310d94a7 Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Fri Mar 23 17:03:42 2018 +0000 x86/traps: Fix handling of #DB exceptions in hypervisor context The WARN_ON() can be triggered by guest activities, and emits a full stack trace without rate limiting. Swap it out for a ratelimited printk with just enough information to work out what is going on. Not all #DB exceptions are traps, so blindly continuing is not a safe action to take. We don't let PV guests select these settings in the real %dr7 to begin with, but for added safety against unexpected situations, detect the fault cases and crash in an obvious manner. This is part of XSA-260 / CVE-2018-8897 Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> commit 5d37af364dc158aa387f7c8b2a05c90325c63dce Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Mar 22 11:27:03 2018 +0000 x86/traps: Use an Interrupt Stack Table for #DB PV guests can use architectural corner cases to cause #DB to be raised after transitioning into supervisor mode. Use an interrupt stack table for #DB to prevent the exception being taken with a guest controlled stack pointer. This is part of XSA-260 / CVE-2018-8897 Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> commit 0c6c2b1428658687b8f603bf248dec5bdcd882a9 Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Mar 22 11:27:03 2018 +0000 x86/pv: Move exception injection into {,compat_}test_all_events() This allows paths to jump straight to {,compat_}test_all_events() and have injection of pending exceptions happen automatically, rather than requiring all calling paths to handle exceptions themselves. The normal exception path is simplified as a result, and compat_post_handle_exception() is removed entirely. This is part of XSA-260 / CVE-2018-8897 Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> commit f7d457524c7d4fbf8fba635452e12c057fe71e60 Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Mon Mar 26 09:02:34 2018 +0100 x86/traps: Fix %dr6 handing in #DB handler Most bits in %dr6 accumulate, rather than being set directly based on the current source of #DB. Have the handler follow the manuals guidance, which avoids leaking hypervisor debugging activities into guest context. This is part of XSA-260 / CVE-2018-8897 Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> commit b190f0c0c1dff13ce92c5f056a87d6c81d3ee8f9 Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Tue May 8 13:45:45 2018 +0100 x86/domain: Drop the only-written smap_check_policy infrastructure c/s 4c5d78a10d "x86/pagewalk: Re-implement the pagetable walker" dropped the consumer of smap_policy. Looking at c/s 31ae587e6f which introduced the smap_check logic, it exists only to work around a bug in guest_walk_tables() was resolved by the aformentioned commit. Remove the unused variables and associated infrastructure. Reported-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@xxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx> (qemu changes not included) _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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