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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [xen-4.10-testing baseline-only test] 74723: regressions - FAIL
This run is configured for baseline tests only. flight 74723 xen-4.10-testing real [real] http://osstest.xs.citrite.net/~osstest/testlogs/logs/74723/ Regressions :-( Tests which did not succeed and are blocking, including tests which could not be run: test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64 15 guest-saverestore.2 fail REGR. vs. 74649 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64 16 guest-localmigrate/x10 fail REGR. vs. 74649 test-amd64-amd64-qemuu-nested-intel 14 xen-boot/l1 fail REGR. vs. 74649 Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking: test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win10-i386 10 windows-install fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win10-i386 10 windows-install fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-xsm 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-ws16-amd64 10 windows-install fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-ws16-amd64 10 windows-install fail never pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-xsm 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-xsm 12 guest-start fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-xsm 12 guest-start fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-midway 12 guest-start fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-pvhv2-intel 12 guest-start fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl 12 guest-start fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu 12 guest-start fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-rtds 12 guest-start fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2 12 guest-start fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt 12 guest-start fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-pvhv2-amd 12 guest-start fail never pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm 11 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt 13 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm 11 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-qemuu-nested-amd 17 debian-hvm-install/l1/l2 fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-vhd 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 17 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win10-i386 17 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win10-i386 17 guest-stop fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-vhd 10 debian-di-install fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 17 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 17 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 17 guest-stop fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-raw 10 debian-di-install fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ws16-amd64 17 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-ws16-amd64 17 guest-stop fail never pass version targeted for testing: xen 25e0657ed49e4febfb6fce729adb00a8d7b87042 baseline version: xen c30ab3d97c8ff0d2ed8948dd013737befc7a2223 Last test of basis 74649 2018-04-30 02:16:41 Z 18 days Testing same since 74723 2018-05-17 17:50:37 Z 0 days 1 attempts ------------------------------------------------------------ People who touched revisions under test: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> Xen Project Security Team <security@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> jobs: build-amd64-xsm pass build-armhf-xsm pass build-i386-xsm pass build-amd64-xtf pass build-amd64 pass build-armhf pass build-i386 pass build-amd64-libvirt pass build-armhf-libvirt pass build-i386-libvirt pass build-amd64-prev pass build-i386-prev pass build-amd64-pvops pass build-armhf-pvops pass build-i386-pvops pass build-amd64-rumprun pass build-i386-rumprun pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-1 pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-2 pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-3 pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-4 pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-5 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl pass test-armhf-armhf-xl fail test-amd64-i386-xl pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-stubdom-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-stubdom-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-xsm pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-xsm fail test-amd64-i386-libvirt-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-xsm pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-xsm fail test-amd64-i386-xl-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-qemuu-nested-amd fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-pvhv2-amd fail test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-amd pass test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-amd pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64 pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-amd64 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 pass test-amd64-amd64-rumprun-amd64 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-ws16-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-ws16-amd64 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-ws16-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ws16-amd64 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-credit2 pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2 fail test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-i386 pass test-amd64-i386-rumprun-i386 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win10-i386 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win10-i386 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win10-i386 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win10-i386 fail test-amd64-amd64-qemuu-nested-intel fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-pvhv2-intel fail test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-intel pass test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-intel pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt fail test-amd64-i386-libvirt pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-midway fail test-amd64-amd64-migrupgrade pass test-amd64-i386-migrupgrade pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-multivcpu pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu fail test-amd64-amd64-pair pass test-amd64-i386-pair pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-pair pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-pair pass test-amd64-amd64-amd64-pvgrub pass test-amd64-amd64-i386-pvgrub pass test-amd64-amd64-pygrub pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qcow2 pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-raw fail test-amd64-i386-xl-raw pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-rtds pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-rtds fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-shadow pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-shadow pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-shadow pass test-amd64-i386-xl-shadow pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-vhd pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-vhd fail ------------------------------------------------------------ sg-report-flight on osstest.xs.citrite.net logs: /home/osstest/logs images: /home/osstest/images Logs, config files, etc. are available at http://osstest.xs.citrite.net/~osstest/testlogs/logs Test harness code can be found at http://xenbits.xensource.com/gitweb?p=osstest.git;a=summary Push not applicable. ------------------------------------------------------------ commit 25e0657ed49e4febfb6fce729adb00a8d7b87042 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Tue May 8 18:14:59 2018 +0100 x86/HVM: guard against emulator driving ioreq state in weird ways In the case where hvm_wait_for_io() calls wait_on_xen_event_channel(), p->state ends up being read twice in succession: once to determine that state != p->state, and then again at the top of the loop. This gives a compromised emulator a chance to change the state back between the two reads, potentially keeping Xen in a loop indefinitely. Instead: * Read p->state once in each of the wait_on_xen_event_channel() tests, * re-use that value the next time around, * and insist that the states continue to transition "forward" (with the exception of the transition to STATE_IOREQ_NONE). This is XSA-262. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> commit 31c78e9ca3c427948b68ba21ea9c18bd007eeec8 Author: Xen Project Security Team <security@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Date: Tue May 8 18:14:42 2018 +0100 x86/vpt: add support for IO-APIC routed interrupts And modify the HPET code to make use of it. Currently HPET interrupts are always treated as ISA and thus injected through the vPIC. This is wrong because HPET interrupts when not in legacy mode should be injected from the IO-APIC. To make things worse, the supported interrupt routing values are set to [20..23], which clearly falls outside of the ISA range, thus leading to an ASSERT in debug builds or memory corruption in non-debug builds because the interrupt injection code will write out of the bounds of the arch.hvm_domain.vpic array. Since the HPET interrupt source can change between ISA and IO-APIC always destroy the timer before changing the mode, or else Xen risks changing it while the timer is active. Note that vpt interrupt injection is racy in the sense that the vIO-APIC RTE entry can be written by the guest in between the call to pt_irq_masked and hvm_ioapic_assert, or the call to pt_update_irq and pt_intr_post. Those are not deemed to be security issues, but rather quirks of the current implementation. In the worse case the guest might lose interrupts or get multiple interrupt vectors injected for the same timer source. This is part of XSA-261. Address actual and potential compiler warnings. Fix formatting. Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> commit 07b6f426233fc75c299feb138284ac8f0d881d36 Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Tue May 8 18:14:35 2018 +0100 x86/traps: Fix handling of #DB exceptions in hypervisor context The WARN_ON() can be triggered by guest activities, and emits a full stack trace without rate limiting. Swap it out for a ratelimited printk with just enough information to work out what is going on. Not all #DB exceptions are traps, so blindly continuing is not a safe action to take. We don't let PV guests select these settings in the real %dr7 to begin with, but for added safety against unexpected situations, detect the fault cases and crash in an obvious manner. This is part of XSA-260 / CVE-2018-8897. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> commit 373d49693a6c9145ac191cfad3078c23e36fe20b Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Tue May 8 18:14:35 2018 +0100 x86/traps: Use an Interrupt Stack Table for #DB PV guests can use architectural corner cases to cause #DB to be raised after transitioning into supervisor mode. Use an interrupt stack table for #DB to prevent the exception being taken with a guest controlled stack pointer. This is part of XSA-260 / CVE-2018-8897. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> commit 9abae6f7a867d3437141f95cbb030c1841ca97e6 Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Tue May 8 18:14:35 2018 +0100 x86/pv: Move exception injection into {,compat_}test_all_events() This allows paths to jump straight to {,compat_}test_all_events() and have injection of pending exceptions happen automatically, rather than requiring all calling paths to handle exceptions themselves. The normal exception path is simplified as a result, and compat_post_handle_exception() is removed entirely. This is part of XSA-260 / CVE-2018-8897. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> commit abe5fb92183c8cd97ef0e79afb5ff46b8ad02f38 Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Tue May 8 18:14:35 2018 +0100 x86/traps: Fix %dr6 handing in #DB handler Most bits in %dr6 accumulate, rather than being set directly based on the current source of #DB. Have the handler follow the manuals guidance, which avoids leaking hypervisor debugging activities into guest context. This is part of XSA-260 / CVE-2018-8897. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> commit 99e50001bea6f3d777b86bbb9bb41ef66ba47974 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Wed May 2 12:01:19 2018 +0200 update Xen version to 4.10.1 (qemu changes not included) _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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