[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2] xen-hvm: stop faking I/O to access PCI config space
>>> On 18.05.18 at 15:51, <Paul.Durrant@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> Sent: 18 May 2018 14:34 >> To: Paul Durrant <Paul.Durrant@xxxxxxxxxx> >> >>> On 18.05.18 at 15:00, <paul.durrant@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> > + QLIST_FOREACH(xendev, &state->dev_list, entry) { >> > + unsigned int i; >> > + uint32_t tmp; >> > + >> > + if (xendev->sbdf != sbdf) { >> > + continue; >> > + } >> > + >> > + if (!req->data_is_ptr) { >> > + if (req->dir == IOREQ_READ) { >> > + for (i = 0; i < req->count; i++) { >> > + rw_config_req_item(xendev, req, i, &tmp); >> > + req->data = tmp; >> > + } >> > + } else if (req->dir == IOREQ_WRITE) { >> > + for (i = 0; i < req->count; i++) { >> > + tmp = req->data; >> > + rw_config_req_item(xendev, req, i, &tmp); >> > + } >> > + } >> >> Wouldn't it be more sensible to fail req->count != 1 requests here? >> > > I'm wondering whether we'd want to handle count > 1 once we allow MMCONFIG > accesses though. I guess it would be easier just to defer that. For the data_is_ptr case - sure. But here? Or wait - are you thinking about REP STOS (and the relatively useless REP LODS)? Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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