[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH V5] x86/altp2m: Fix crash with INVALID_ALTP2M EPTP index
> From: Razvan Cojocaru [mailto:rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] > Sent: Wednesday, August 1, 2018 5:02 PM > > On 07/23/2018 01:29 PM, George Dunlap wrote: > > On 07/20/2018 07:02 PM, Razvan Cojocaru wrote: > >> On 07/20/2018 08:18 PM, George Dunlap wrote: > >>> Furthermore, imagine the following scenario: > >>> > >>> * dom0 enables altp2m on domain A > >>> * dom0 switches altp2m to view 1 on domain A > >>> * dom0 enables #VE on domain A > >>> * domain A has a vmexit > >>> -> At this point, EPTP_INDEX is 0, so the vmexit code will drop a > >>> reference on altp2m index 1 and increase the reference count on > altp2m > >>> index 0 # > >>> > >>> My patch fixes the above issue, but your patch doesn't (AFAICT). What > >>> altp2m_vcpu_destroy() did wasn't fundamentally buggy; it just > >>> highlighted the issue by doing the equivalent of putting 0xDEADBEEF in > >>> EPTP_INDEX; and what your patch did was to reverse that, by making > >>> EPTP_INDEX accidentally correct again the next time you ran your test. > >>> > >>> (Let me know if I'm wrong about that!) > >> > >> I do prefer your patch, but unless I'm missing something my patch is > >> doing the same thing (albeit in a slightly more convoluted manner): it's > >> calling altp2m_vcpu_update_p2m(v) _inside_ > >> altp2m_vcpu_update_vmfunc_ve(v). That's all it does, other than > removing > >> the (now redundant) explicit altp2m_vcpu_update_p2m(v) call from > >> altp2m_vcpu_destroy(): > >> > >> https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2018- > 06/msg01898.html > >> > >> So for every hvm_funcs.altp2m_vcpu_update_vmfunc_ve(v) (i.e. the > vmx.c > >> function) that gets called, I also call altp2m_vcpu_update_p2m(v), which > >> properly sets EPTP_INDEX (just as your patch does by __vmwrite()ing it > >> directly in vmx_vcpu_update_vmfunc_ve(), but in a roundabout > manner). > >> > >> Did I misunderstand something? > > > > No, you didn't -- sorry, I must have been quite tired at that point. :-) > > > > What I was actually thinking of was that in your patch, the update > > happens in different vmcs_enter/exit critical section, whereas in mine > > it's in the same section. > > > > Looking through the code, it seems that the vmcs_enter/exit acts as a > > lock, by pausing and unpausing the vcpu if it's not the one we're > > currently running on (as well as actually grabbing a lock to prevent > > concurrent modification). altp2m_vcpu_destroy() calls > > altp2m_vcpu_update_vmfunc_ve() with the vcpu paused, but the > > HVMOP_altp2m_vcpu_enable_notify hypercall doesn't seem to; which (I > > think) means there could still be a point between > > vmx_vcpu_update_vmfunc_ve() and vmx_vcpu_update_eptp() where a > vcpu > > could run and get the wrong EPTP_INDEX. > > > > It's possible my analysis is wrong there (I'm not intimately familiar > > with the code), but I think my patch is better anyway for a couple of > > reasons: > > > > * The logic to keep EPTP_INDEX in sync is explicit, and all in the same > > file. > > > > * It doesn't do unnecessary updates to other bits of state > > > > * If we ever have reason to call vmx_vcpu_update_vmfunc_ve() directly, > > we won't re-introduce this bug. (Or to put it a different way: We don't > > have to remember that we can't call it directly.) > > > > Now we just need to get the VMX maintainers to sign off on it. :-) Jun > > / Kevin, any thoughts? > > Ping for the VMX maintainers? > yes, it makes sense to me. Thanks Kevin _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |