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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 04/13] optee: add OP-TEE mediator skeleton





On 09/03/2018 06:55 PM, Volodymyr Babchuk wrote:
Hi Julien,

Hi Volodymyr,

On 03.09.18 20:38, Julien Grall wrote:
Hi Volodymyr,

On 03/09/18 17:54, Volodymyr Babchuk wrote:
Add very basic OP-TEE mediator. It can probe for OP-TEE presence,
tell it about domain creation/destuction and forward all known

s/destuction/destruction/

calls.

This is all what is needed for Dom0 to work with OP-TEE as long
as Dom0 shares 1:1 mapped pages with OP-TEE. Any attempt to call
OP-TEE from DomU will fail and can lead to spectacular results.

Shall we expect fireworks? :).
I tried couple of time, but with no success :)

Anyway, I think this is a call for forbidding DomU access until it is supported. This also has the benefits to allow merging Dom0 support for OP-TEE without the rest.
Some time ago you said that I can't be sure that Dom0 is 1:1 mapped, because of grant refs. So, actually, any access should be forbidden. I can omit

Oh right. I that case, make it clear in the commit message because there are nothing in Dom0 preventing to share page that are not direct mapped.

This will make easier for the commiter (either Stefano or I) to know this can't go without the rest of the series.

[...]

+static void forward_call(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
+{
+    struct arm_smccc_res resp;
+
+    arm_smccc_smc(get_user_reg(regs, 0),
+                  get_user_reg(regs, 1),
+                  get_user_reg(regs, 2),
+                  get_user_reg(regs, 3),
+                  get_user_reg(regs, 4),
+                  get_user_reg(regs, 5),
+                  get_user_reg(regs, 6),
+                  /* client id 0 is reserved for hypervisor itself */
+                  current->domain->domain_id + 1,

I would prefer if the client ID is encoded in a macro. So this could be re-used

Something like

  #define OPTEE_CLIENT_ID(domain) (domain->domain_id + 1)

?

This sounds good.

[...]



+                  &resp);
+
+    set_user_reg(regs, 0, resp.a0);
+    set_user_reg(regs, 1, resp.a1);
+    set_user_reg(regs, 2, resp.a2);
+    set_user_reg(regs, 3, resp.a3);
+    set_user_reg(regs, 4, 0);
+    set_user_reg(regs, 5, 0);
+    set_user_reg(regs, 6, 0);
+    set_user_reg(regs, 7, 0);
+}
+
+static void optee_domain_destroy(struct domain *d)
+{
+    struct arm_smccc_res resp;
+
+    /* At this time all domain VCPUs should be stopped */
+
+    /* Inform OP-TEE that domain is shutting down */
+    arm_smccc_smc(OPTEE_SMC_VM_DESTROYED, d->domain_id + 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+                  &resp);

So this SMC should never fail or even get preempted? I was kind of expecting that it may time some time to destroy a domain.

It is the fast SMCCC call, so it can't be preempted. And it is really fast, at lest in OP-TEE case.

Without number, I can't really know what fast means here. Do you have a rough idea?

Basically, OP-TEE just removes some entries from the list and frees some memory. And yes, it can't fail.

Cheers,

--
Julien Grall

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