[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 13/14] x86: add iommu_ops to modify and flush IOMMU mappings
>>> On 12.09.18 at 10:02, <Paul.Durrant@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> From: Jan Beulich [mailto:JBeulich@xxxxxxxx] >> Sent: 12 September 2018 08:04 >> >> >>> On 23.08.18 at 11:47, <paul.durrant@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> > +static int iommuop_map(struct xen_iommu_op_map *op) >> > +{ >> > + struct domain *d, *currd = current->domain; >> > + struct domain_iommu *iommu = dom_iommu(currd); >> > + bool readonly = op->flags & XEN_IOMMUOP_map_readonly; >> > + bfn_t bfn = _bfn(op->bfn); >> > + struct page_info *page; >> > + unsigned int prot; >> > + int rc, ignore; >> > + >> > + if ( op->pad || >> > + (op->flags & ~(XEN_IOMMUOP_map_all | >> > + XEN_IOMMUOP_map_readonly)) ) >> > + return -EINVAL; >> > + >> > + if ( !iommu->iommu_op_ranges ) >> > + return -EOPNOTSUPP; >> > + >> > + /* Per-device mapping not yet supported */ >> > + if ( !(op->flags & XEN_IOMMUOP_map_all) ) >> > + return -EINVAL; >> > + >> > + /* Check whether the specified BFN falls in a reserved region */ >> > + if ( rangeset_contains_singleton(iommu->reserved_ranges, >> bfn_x(bfn)) ) >> > + return -EINVAL; >> > + >> > + d = rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id(op->domid); >> > + if ( !d ) >> > + return -ESRCH; >> > + >> > + rc = get_paged_gfn(d, _gfn(op->gfn), readonly, NULL, &page); >> > + if ( rc ) >> > + goto unlock; >> > + >> > + rc = -EINVAL; >> > + if ( !readonly && !get_page_type(page, PGT_writable_page) ) >> > + { >> > + put_page(page); >> > + goto unlock; >> > + } >> > + >> > + prot = IOMMUF_readable; >> > + if ( !readonly ) >> > + prot |= IOMMUF_writable; >> > + >> > + rc = -EIO; >> > + if ( iommu_map_page(currd, bfn, page_to_mfn(page), prot) ) >> > + goto release; >> > + >> > + rc = rangeset_add_singleton(iommu->iommu_op_ranges, bfn_x(bfn)); >> > + if ( rc ) >> > + goto unmap; >> >> When a mapping is requested for the same BFN that a prior mapping >> was already established for, the page refs of that prior mapping get >> leaked here. I don't think you want to require an intermediate unmap, >> so checking the rangeset first is not an option. Hence I think you >> need to look up the translation anyway, which may mean that the >> rangeset's usefulness is quite limited (relevant with the additional >> context of my question regarding it perhaps requiring a pretty much >> unbounded amount of memory). >> > > Yes, that's a good point. I could do a lookup to check whether the B[D]FN is > already there though. Agreed that the memory is unounded unless the number of > ranges is limited, which there is already a facility for. It is not ideal > though. > >> In order to avoid shooting down all pre-existing RAM mappings - is >> there no way the page table entries could be marked to identify >> their origin? >> > > I don't know whether that is possible; I'll have to find specs for Intel and > AMD IOMMUs and see if they have PTE bits available for such a use. I seem to vaguely recall the AMD side lacking any suitable bits. >> I also have another more general concern: Allowing the guest to >> manipulate its IOMMU page tables means that it can deliberately >> shatter large pages, growing the overall memory footprint of the >> domain. I'm hesitant to say this, but I'm afraid that resource >> tracking of such "behind the scenes" allocations might be a >> necessary prereq for the PV IOMMU work. > > Remember that PV-IOMMU is only available for dom0 as it stands (and that is > the only use-case that XenServer currently has) so I think that, whilst the > concern is valid, there is no need danger in putting the code without such > tracking. Such work can be deferred to making PV-IOMMU for de-privileged > guests... if that facility is needed. Good point, but perhaps worth a prominent fixme note at a suitable place in code, like iirc Roger has done in a number of places for his vPCI work (which eventually we will want to extend to support DomU too). Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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