[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 08/14] vtd: add lookup_page method to iommu_ops
>>> On 12.09.18 at 10:31, <Paul.Durrant@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> From: Jan Beulich [mailto:JBeulich@xxxxxxxx] >> Sent: 07 September 2018 12:11 >> >> >>> On 23.08.18 at 11:47, <paul.durrant@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> > This patch adds a new method to the VT-d IOMMU implementation to find >> the >> > MFN currently mapped by the specified BFN along with a wrapper function >> in >> > generic IOMMU code to call the implementation if it exists. >> >> For this to go in, I think the AMD side of it wants to also be implemented. >> >> > --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c >> > +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c >> > @@ -305,6 +305,17 @@ int iommu_unmap_page(struct domain *d, bfn_t >> bfn) >> > return rc; >> > } >> > >> > +int iommu_lookup_page(struct domain *d, bfn_t bfn, mfn_t *mfn, >> > + unsigned int *flags) >> > +{ >> > + const struct domain_iommu *hd = dom_iommu(d); >> > + >> > + if ( !iommu_enabled || !hd->platform_ops ) >> > + return -EOPNOTSUPP; >> > + >> > + return hd->platform_ops->lookup_page(d, bfn, mfn, flags); >> > +} >> >> Shouldn't this be restricted to PV guests? HVM ones aren't supposed >> to know about MFNs. > > Agreed, but I think this is the wrong level to be applying such a check: > iommu_map_page() is supplied an MFN regardless of whether the domain is PV or > HVM, so I think it is reasonable for a lookup function to work in terms of > MFNs. I don't mind much where the check sits, but ASSERT(!is_hvm_domain()), if placed here, should not trigger. Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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