[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 13/14] x86: add iommu_ops to modify and flush IOMMU mappings
> -----Original Message----- > From: Tian, Kevin [mailto:kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx] > Sent: 13 September 2018 07:41 > To: Paul Durrant <Paul.Durrant@xxxxxxxxxx>; 'Jan Beulich' > <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> > Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>; Wei Liu > <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>; Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx>; > Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>; Tim (Xen.org) > <tim@xxxxxxx>; George Dunlap <George.Dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>; Julien Grall > <julien.grall@xxxxxxx>; xen-devel <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>; Ian > Jackson <Ian.Jackson@xxxxxxxxxx> > Subject: RE: [PATCH v6 13/14] x86: add iommu_ops to modify and flush > IOMMU mappings > > > From: Paul Durrant > > Sent: Wednesday, September 12, 2018 4:02 PM > > > > > > > In order to avoid shooting down all pre-existing RAM mappings - is > > > there no way the page table entries could be marked to identify > > > their origin? > > > > > > > I don't know whether that is possible; I'll have to find specs for Intel and > > AMD IOMMUs and see if they have PTE bits available for such a use. > > there are ignored bits > > > > > > I also have another more general concern: Allowing the guest to > > > manipulate its IOMMU page tables means that it can deliberately > > > shatter large pages, growing the overall memory footprint of the > > > domain. I'm hesitant to say this, but I'm afraid that resource > > > tracking of such "behind the scenes" allocations might be a > > > necessary prereq for the PV IOMMU work. > > > > > > > Remember that PV-IOMMU is only available for dom0 as it stands (and that > > is the only use-case that XenServer currently has) so I think that, whilst > > the > > concern is valid, there is no need danger in putting the code without such > > tracking. Such work can be deferred to making PV-IOMMU for de- > privileged > > guests... if that facility is needed. > > > > I didn't get why this is PV-IOMMU specific. Guest can always manipulate > guest CPU page table to shatter large pages too... > At the moment that is true. I guess Jan doesn't want to introduce another way for a guest to cause Xen to consume large amounts of memory. Paul > Thanks > Kevin _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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