[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH V2] x86/altp2m: clean up p2m_{get/set}_suppress_ve()
Move p2m_{get/set}_suppress_ve() to p2m.c, replace incorrect ASSERT() in p2m-pt.c (since a guest can run in shadow mode even on a system with virt exceptions, which would trigger the ASSERT()), move the VMX-isms (cpu_has_vmx_virt_exceptions checks) to p2m_ept_{get/set}_entry(), and fix locking code in p2m_get_suppress_ve(). Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- Changes since V1: - Did not add Tamas' ack because of the non-trivial V2 changes. - Removed the checks for #VE support / #VE active from ept_get_entry(). - Removed duplicate gfn_eq(vcpu_altp2m(current).veinfo_gfn, INVALID_GFN) check from p2m_get_suppress_ve(). - Fixed the locking code in p2m_get_suppress_ve(): previously the function was simply returning -ESRCH if !mfn_valid(mfn), which bypassed the unlocking at the end of the function. --- xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c | 102 ------------------------------------------- xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c | 11 +++++ xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pt.c | 3 +- xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c | 90 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 103 insertions(+), 103 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c index 826c35f..c980f17 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c @@ -501,108 +501,6 @@ void arch_p2m_set_access_required(struct domain *d, bool access_required) } } -#ifdef CONFIG_HVM -/* - * Set/clear the #VE suppress bit for a page. Only available on VMX. - */ -int p2m_set_suppress_ve(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, bool suppress_ve, - unsigned int altp2m_idx) -{ - struct p2m_domain *host_p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d); - struct p2m_domain *ap2m = NULL; - struct p2m_domain *p2m; - mfn_t mfn; - p2m_access_t a; - p2m_type_t t; - int rc; - - if ( !cpu_has_vmx_virt_exceptions ) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; - - /* #VE should be enabled for this vcpu. */ - if ( gfn_eq(vcpu_altp2m(current).veinfo_gfn, INVALID_GFN) ) - return -ENXIO; - - if ( altp2m_idx > 0 ) - { - if ( altp2m_idx >= MAX_ALTP2M || - d->arch.altp2m_eptp[altp2m_idx] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) ) - return -EINVAL; - - p2m = ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[altp2m_idx]; - } - else - p2m = host_p2m; - - gfn_lock(host_p2m, gfn, 0); - - if ( ap2m ) - p2m_lock(ap2m); - - mfn = p2m->get_entry(p2m, gfn, &t, &a, 0, NULL, NULL); - if ( !mfn_valid(mfn) ) - { - rc = -ESRCH; - goto out; - } - - rc = p2m->set_entry(p2m, gfn, mfn, PAGE_ORDER_4K, t, a, suppress_ve); - -out: - if ( ap2m ) - p2m_unlock(ap2m); - - gfn_unlock(host_p2m, gfn, 0); - - return rc; -} - -int p2m_get_suppress_ve(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, bool *suppress_ve, - unsigned int altp2m_idx) -{ - struct p2m_domain *host_p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d); - struct p2m_domain *ap2m = NULL; - struct p2m_domain *p2m; - mfn_t mfn; - p2m_access_t a; - p2m_type_t t; - - if ( !cpu_has_vmx_virt_exceptions ) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; - - /* #VE should be enabled for this vcpu. */ - if ( gfn_eq(vcpu_altp2m(current).veinfo_gfn, INVALID_GFN) ) - return -ENXIO; - - if ( altp2m_idx > 0 ) - { - if ( altp2m_idx >= MAX_ALTP2M || - d->arch.altp2m_eptp[altp2m_idx] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) ) - return -EINVAL; - - p2m = ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[altp2m_idx]; - } - else - p2m = host_p2m; - - gfn_lock(host_p2m, gfn, 0); - - if ( ap2m ) - p2m_lock(ap2m); - - mfn = p2m->get_entry(p2m, gfn, &t, &a, 0, NULL, suppress_ve); - if ( !mfn_valid(mfn) ) - return -ESRCH; - - if ( ap2m ) - p2m_unlock(ap2m); - - gfn_unlock(host_p2m, gfn, 0); - - return 0; -} -#endif - /* * Local variables: * mode: C diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c index 1ff4f14..d376966 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c @@ -697,6 +697,17 @@ ept_set_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m, gfn_t gfn_, mfn_t mfn, struct domain *d = p2m->domain; ASSERT(ept); + + if ( !sve ) + { + if ( !cpu_has_vmx_virt_exceptions ) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + /* #VE should be enabled for this vcpu. */ + if ( gfn_eq(vcpu_altp2m(current).veinfo_gfn, INVALID_GFN) ) + return -ENXIO; + } + /* * the caller must make sure: * 1. passing valid gfn and mfn at order boundary. diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pt.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pt.c index b8c5d2e..0a3464a 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pt.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pt.c @@ -501,7 +501,8 @@ p2m_pt_set_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m, gfn_t gfn_, mfn_t mfn, unsigned int flags, iommu_old_flags = 0; unsigned long old_mfn = mfn_x(INVALID_MFN); - ASSERT(sve != 0); + if ( !sve ) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; if ( tb_init_done ) { diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c index 6020553..de30603 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c @@ -2745,6 +2745,96 @@ out: rcu_unlock_domain(fdom); return rc; } + +#ifdef CONFIG_HVM +/* + * Set/clear the #VE suppress bit for a page. Only available on VMX. + */ +int p2m_set_suppress_ve(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, bool suppress_ve, + unsigned int altp2m_idx) +{ + struct p2m_domain *host_p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d); + struct p2m_domain *ap2m = NULL; + struct p2m_domain *p2m; + mfn_t mfn; + p2m_access_t a; + p2m_type_t t; + int rc; + + if ( altp2m_idx > 0 ) + { + if ( altp2m_idx >= MAX_ALTP2M || + d->arch.altp2m_eptp[altp2m_idx] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) ) + return -EINVAL; + + p2m = ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[altp2m_idx]; + } + else + p2m = host_p2m; + + gfn_lock(host_p2m, gfn, 0); + + if ( ap2m ) + p2m_lock(ap2m); + + mfn = p2m->get_entry(p2m, gfn, &t, &a, 0, NULL, NULL); + if ( !mfn_valid(mfn) ) + { + rc = -ESRCH; + goto out; + } + + rc = p2m->set_entry(p2m, gfn, mfn, PAGE_ORDER_4K, t, a, suppress_ve); + +out: + if ( ap2m ) + p2m_unlock(ap2m); + + gfn_unlock(host_p2m, gfn, 0); + + return rc; +} + +int p2m_get_suppress_ve(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, bool *suppress_ve, + unsigned int altp2m_idx) +{ + struct p2m_domain *host_p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d); + struct p2m_domain *ap2m = NULL; + struct p2m_domain *p2m; + mfn_t mfn; + p2m_access_t a; + p2m_type_t t; + int rc = 0; + + if ( altp2m_idx > 0 ) + { + if ( altp2m_idx >= MAX_ALTP2M || + d->arch.altp2m_eptp[altp2m_idx] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) ) + return -EINVAL; + + p2m = ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[altp2m_idx]; + } + else + p2m = host_p2m; + + gfn_lock(host_p2m, gfn, 0); + + if ( ap2m ) + p2m_lock(ap2m); + + mfn = p2m->get_entry(p2m, gfn, &t, &a, 0, NULL, suppress_ve); + if ( !mfn_valid(mfn) ) + rc = -ESRCH; + + if ( ap2m ) + p2m_unlock(ap2m); + + gfn_unlock(host_p2m, gfn, 0); + + return rc; +} +#endif + /* * Local variables: * mode: C -- 2.7.4 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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