[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4] x86/mm: Add mem access rights to NPT
On Mon, Jul 23, 2018 at 2:48 PM Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > From: Isaila Alexandru <aisaila@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > This patch adds access control for NPT mode. > > There aren’t enough extra bits to store the access rights in the NPT p2m > table, so we add a radix tree to store the rights. For efficiency, > remove entries which match the default permissions rather than > continuing to store them. > > Modify p2m-pt.c:p2m_type_to_flags() to mirror the ept version: taking an > access, and removing / adding RW or NX flags as appropriate. > > Note: It was tested with xen-access write > > Signed-off-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > --- > Changes since V3: > - Add p2m_pt_check_access() to filter n, w, wx, n2rwx from > supported page rights > - Add rights check for the default_access change in the > IVALID_GFN case > - Add blank lines > - Remove cpu_has_svm if from p2m_mem_access_check() > - Add xfree(msr_bitmap) in case of error on > xalloc(raxid_tree_root). > --- > xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c | 17 +++--- > xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c | 7 +++ > xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pt.c | 124 > ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- > xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c | 6 ++ > xen/arch/x86/monitor.c | 15 +++++ > xen/include/asm-x86/mem_access.h | 2 +- > xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h | 7 +++ > 7 files changed, 156 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c > index c0cd017..cab72bc 100644 > --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c > @@ -221,12 +221,12 @@ bool p2m_mem_access_check(paddr_t gpa, unsigned long > gla, > { > req->u.mem_access.flags |= MEM_ACCESS_GLA_VALID; > req->u.mem_access.gla = gla; > - > - if ( npfec.kind == npfec_kind_with_gla ) > - req->u.mem_access.flags |= MEM_ACCESS_FAULT_WITH_GLA; > - else if ( npfec.kind == npfec_kind_in_gpt ) > - req->u.mem_access.flags |= MEM_ACCESS_FAULT_IN_GPT; > } > + > + if ( npfec.kind == npfec_kind_with_gla ) > + req->u.mem_access.flags |= MEM_ACCESS_FAULT_WITH_GLA; > + else if ( npfec.kind == npfec_kind_in_gpt ) > + req->u.mem_access.flags |= MEM_ACCESS_FAULT_IN_GPT; > req->u.mem_access.flags |= npfec.read_access ? MEM_ACCESS_R : 0; > req->u.mem_access.flags |= npfec.write_access ? MEM_ACCESS_W : 0; > req->u.mem_access.flags |= npfec.insn_fetch ? MEM_ACCESS_X : 0; > @@ -366,8 +366,11 @@ long p2m_set_mem_access(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, > uint32_t nr, > /* If request to set default access. */ > if ( gfn_eq(gfn, INVALID_GFN) ) > { > - p2m->default_access = a; > - return 0; > + if ( (rc = p2m->check_access(a)) == 0 ) > + { > + p2m->default_access = a; > + return 0; > + } > } BTW this introduces a bug -- if the check fails, this will fall through into the gfn loop below, rather than returning the error. > @@ -87,23 +88,27 @@ static unsigned long p2m_type_to_flags(const struct > p2m_domain *p2m, > case p2m_ram_paged: > case p2m_ram_paging_in: > default: > - return flags | _PAGE_NX_BIT; > + flags |= P2M_BASE_FLAGS | _PAGE_NX_BIT; > + break; Why did you add in P2M_BASE_FLAGS here? > case p2m_grant_map_ro: > return flags | P2M_BASE_FLAGS | _PAGE_NX_BIT; And is this `return` left here on purpose, or was it missed? > /* Returns: 0 for success, -errno for failure */ > static int > p2m_next_level(struct p2m_domain *p2m, void **table, > @@ -201,6 +268,7 @@ p2m_next_level(struct p2m_domain *p2m, void **table, > new_entry = l1e_from_mfn(mfn, P2M_BASE_FLAGS | _PAGE_RW); > > p2m_add_iommu_flags(&new_entry, level, > IOMMUF_readable|IOMMUF_writable); > + p2m_set_access(p2m, gfn, p2m->default_access); This is clearly wrong -- this isn't a leaf node, it's an intermediate p2m table; and p2m_next_level() is just acting "under the covers", filling in missing bits of the p2m table or breaking down superpages. Since the access information is in a completely separate structure, it shouldn't need to be modified here at all (indeed, it would be a bug to do so). But that does bring up an important issue -- it would appear that this code is incorrect when setting superpages -- if we set a 2MiB page but then read a non-2MiB-aligned entry within that page, we'll get the default access rather than the one we set; same thing with splintering a superpage into smaller pages. There's a draft patch addressing this on the way. -George _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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