[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH 4/4] x86/vvmx: Don't handle unknown nested vmexit reasons at L0
This is very dangerous from a security point of view, because a missing entry will cause L2's action to be interpreted as L1's action. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> --- CC: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@xxxxxxxxxx> CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> CC: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@xxxxxxxxx> CC: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx> --- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c index d1c8a41..817d85f 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c @@ -2609,8 +2609,9 @@ int nvmx_n2_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_regs *regs, nvcpu->nv_vmexit_pending = 1; break; default: - gprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "Unexpected nested vmexit: reason %u\n", + gprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "Unhandled nested vmexit: reason %u\n", exit_reason); + domain_crash(v->domain); } return ( nvcpu->nv_vmexit_pending == 1 ); -- 2.1.4 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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