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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] xen: remove size limit of privcmd-buf mapping interface


  • To: linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • From: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2018 08:03:17 +0100
  • Autocrypt: addr=jgross@xxxxxxxx; prefer-encrypt=mutual; keydata= xsBNBFOMcBYBCACgGjqjoGvbEouQZw/ToiBg9W98AlM2QHV+iNHsEs7kxWhKMjrioyspZKOB ycWxw3ie3j9uvg9EOB3aN4xiTv4qbnGiTr3oJhkB1gsb6ToJQZ8uxGq2kaV2KL9650I1SJve dYm8Of8Zd621lSmoKOwlNClALZNew72NjJLEzTalU1OdT7/i1TXkH09XSSI8mEQ/ouNcMvIJ NwQpd369y9bfIhWUiVXEK7MlRgUG6MvIj6Y3Am/BBLUVbDa4+gmzDC9ezlZkTZG2t14zWPvx XP3FAp2pkW0xqG7/377qptDmrk42GlSKN4z76ELnLxussxc7I2hx18NUcbP8+uty4bMxABEB AAHNHkp1ZXJnZW4gR3Jvc3MgPGpncm9zc0BzdXNlLmRlPsLAeQQTAQIAIwUCU4xw6wIbAwcL CQgHAwIBBhUIAgkKCwQWAgMBAh4BAheAAAoJELDendYovxMvi4UH/Ri+OXlObzqMANruTd4N zmVBAZgx1VW6jLc8JZjQuJPSsd/a+bNr3BZeLV6lu4Pf1Yl2Log129EX1KWYiFFvPbIiq5M5 kOXTO8Eas4CaScCvAZ9jCMQCgK3pFqYgirwTgfwnPtxFxO/F3ZcS8jovza5khkSKL9JGq8Nk czDTruQ/oy0WUHdUr9uwEfiD9yPFOGqp4S6cISuzBMvaAiC5YGdUGXuPZKXLpnGSjkZswUzY d9BVSitRL5ldsQCg6GhDoEAeIhUC4SQnT9SOWkoDOSFRXZ+7+WIBGLiWMd+yKDdRG5RyP/8f 3tgGiB6cyuYfPDRGsELGjUaTUq3H2xZgIPfOwE0EU4xwFgEIAMsx+gDjgzAY4H1hPVXgoLK8 B93sTQFN9oC6tsb46VpxyLPfJ3T1A6Z6MVkLoCejKTJ3K9MUsBZhxIJ0hIyvzwI6aYJsnOew cCiCN7FeKJ/oA1RSUemPGUcIJwQuZlTOiY0OcQ5PFkV5YxMUX1F/aTYXROXgTmSaw0aC1Jpo w7Ss1mg4SIP/tR88/d1+HwkJDVW1RSxC1PWzGizwRv8eauImGdpNnseneO2BNWRXTJumAWDD pYxpGSsGHXuZXTPZqOOZpsHtInFyi5KRHSFyk2Xigzvh3b9WqhbgHHHE4PUVw0I5sIQt8hJq 5nH5dPqz4ITtCL9zjiJsExHuHKN3NZsAEQEAAcLAXwQYAQIACQUCU4xwFgIbDAAKCRCw3p3W KL8TL0P4B/9YWver5uD/y/m0KScK2f3Z3mXJhME23vGBbMNlfwbr+meDMrJZ950CuWWnQ+d+ Ahe0w1X7e3wuLVODzjcReQ/v7b4JD3wwHxe+88tgB9byc0NXzlPJWBaWV01yB2/uefVKryAf AHYEd0gCRhx7eESgNBe3+YqWAQawunMlycsqKa09dBDL1PFRosF708ic9346GLHRc6Vj5SRA UTHnQqLetIOXZm3a2eQ1gpQK9MmruO86Vo93p39bS1mqnLLspVrL4rhoyhsOyh0Hd28QCzpJ wKeHTd0MAWAirmewHXWPco8p1Wg+V+5xfZzuQY0f4tQxvOpXpt4gQ1817GQ5/Ed/wsDtBBgB CAAgFiEEhRJncuj2BJSl0Jf3sN6d1ii/Ey8FAlrd8NACGwIAgQkQsN6d1ii/Ey92IAQZFggA HRYhBFMtsHpB9jjzHji4HoBcYbtP2GO+BQJa3fDQAAoJEIBcYbtP2GO+TYsA/30H/0V6cr/W V+J/FCayg6uNtm3MJLo4rE+o4sdpjjsGAQCooqffpgA+luTT13YZNV62hAnCLKXH9n3+ZAgJ RtAyDWk1B/0SMDVs1wxufMkKC3Q/1D3BYIvBlrTVKdBYXPxngcRoqV2J77lscEvkLNUGsu/z W2pf7+P3mWWlrPMJdlbax00vevyBeqtqNKjHstHatgMZ2W0CFC4hJ3YEetuRBURYPiGzuJXU pAd7a7BdsqWC4o+GTm5tnGrCyD+4gfDSpkOT53S/GNO07YkPkm/8J4OBoFfgSaCnQ1izwgJQ jIpcG2fPCI2/hxf2oqXPYbKr1v4Z1wthmoyUgGN0LPTIm+B5vdY82wI5qe9uN6UOGyTH2B3p hRQUWqCwu2sqkI3LLbTdrnyDZaixT2T0f4tyF5Lfs+Ha8xVMhIyzNb1byDI5FKCb
  • Cc: boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx, sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx, stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Delivery-date: Fri, 09 Nov 2018 07:03:26 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>
  • Openpgp: preference=signencrypt

Ping?

Jan's remark regarding de-privileged qemu is no issue as the hypercall
node is being closed by the de-privilege library function.


Juergen

On 01/11/2018 13:33, Juergen Gross wrote:
> Currently the size of hypercall buffers allocated via
> /dev/xen/hypercall is limited to a default of 64 memory pages. For live
> migration of guests this might be too small as the page dirty bitmask
> needs to be sized according to the size of the guest. This means
> migrating a 8GB sized guest is already exhausting the default buffer
> size for the dirty bitmap.
> 
> There is no sensible way to set a sane limit, so just remove it
> completely. The device node's usage is limited to root anyway, so there
> is no additional DOS scenario added by allowing unlimited buffers.
> 
> While at it make the error path for the -ENOMEM case a little bit
> cleaner by setting n_pages to the number of successfully allocated
> pages instead of the target size.
> 
> Fixes: c51b3c639e01f2 ("xen: add new hypercall buffer mapping device")
> Cc: <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> #4.18
> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
> ---
>  drivers/xen/privcmd-buf.c | 22 ++++------------------
>  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/xen/privcmd-buf.c b/drivers/xen/privcmd-buf.c
> index df1ed37c3269..de01a6d0059d 100644
> --- a/drivers/xen/privcmd-buf.c
> +++ b/drivers/xen/privcmd-buf.c
> @@ -21,15 +21,9 @@
>  
>  MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
>  
> -static unsigned int limit = 64;
> -module_param(limit, uint, 0644);
> -MODULE_PARM_DESC(limit, "Maximum number of pages that may be allocated by "
> -                     "the privcmd-buf device per open file");
> -
>  struct privcmd_buf_private {
>       struct mutex lock;
>       struct list_head list;
> -     unsigned int allocated;
>  };
>  
>  struct privcmd_buf_vma_private {
> @@ -60,13 +54,10 @@ static void privcmd_buf_vmapriv_free(struct 
> privcmd_buf_vma_private *vma_priv)
>  {
>       unsigned int i;
>  
> -     vma_priv->file_priv->allocated -= vma_priv->n_pages;
> -
>       list_del(&vma_priv->list);
>  
>       for (i = 0; i < vma_priv->n_pages; i++)
> -             if (vma_priv->pages[i])
> -                     __free_page(vma_priv->pages[i]);
> +             __free_page(vma_priv->pages[i]);
>  
>       kfree(vma_priv);
>  }
> @@ -146,8 +137,7 @@ static int privcmd_buf_mmap(struct file *file, struct 
> vm_area_struct *vma)
>       unsigned int i;
>       int ret = 0;
>  
> -     if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) || count > limit ||
> -         file_priv->allocated + count > limit)
> +     if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED))
>               return -EINVAL;
>  
>       vma_priv = kzalloc(sizeof(*vma_priv) + count * sizeof(void *),
> @@ -155,19 +145,15 @@ static int privcmd_buf_mmap(struct file *file, struct 
> vm_area_struct *vma)
>       if (!vma_priv)
>               return -ENOMEM;
>  
> -     vma_priv->n_pages = count;
> -     count = 0;
> -     for (i = 0; i < vma_priv->n_pages; i++) {
> +     for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
>               vma_priv->pages[i] = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
>               if (!vma_priv->pages[i])
>                       break;
> -             count++;
> +             vma_priv->n_pages++;
>       }
>  
>       mutex_lock(&file_priv->lock);
>  
> -     file_priv->allocated += count;
> -
>       vma_priv->file_priv = file_priv;
>       vma_priv->users = 1;
>  
> 


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