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Re: [Xen-devel] Patch "x86/entry/64: Remove %ebx handling from error_entry/exit" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

> On Dec 6, 2018, at 9:36 AM, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> On 06/12/2018 17:10, David Woodhouse wrote:
>> On Wed, 2018-11-28 at 08:44 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>>> Can we assume it's always from kernel? The Xen code definitely seems to
>>>> handle invoking this from both kernel and userspace contexts.
>>> I learned that my comment here was wrong shortly after the patch landed :(
>> Turns out the only place I see it getting called from is under
>> __context_switch().
>> #7 [ffff8801144a7cf0] new_xen_failsafe_callback at ffffffffa028028a 
>> [kmod_ebxfix]
>> #8 [ffff8801144a7d90] xen_hypercall_update_descriptor at ffffffff8100114a
>> #9 [ffff8801144a7db8] xen_hypercall_update_descriptor at ffffffff8100114a
>> #10 [ffff8801144a7df0] xen_mc_flush at ffffffff81006ab9
>> #11 [ffff8801144a7e30] xen_end_context_switch at ffffffff81004e12
>> #12 [ffff8801144a7e48] __switch_to at ffffffff81016582
>> #13 [ffff8801144a7ea0] __schedule at ffffffff815d2b37
>> That …114a in xen_hypercall_update_descriptor is the 'pop' instruction
>> right after the syscall; it's happening when Xen is preempting the
>> domain in the hypercall and then reloads the segment registers to run
>> that vCPU again later.
>> [  44185.225289]   WARN: RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 
>> 0000000abbd76060
>> The update_descriptor hypercall args (rdi, rsi) were 0xabbd76060 and 0
>> respectively — it was setting a descriptor at that address, to zero.
>> Xen then failed to load the selector 0x63 into the %gs register (since
>> that descriptor has just been wiped?), leaving it zero.
>> [  44185.225256]   WARN: xen_failsafe_callback from 
>> xen_hypercall_update_descriptor+0xa/0x40
>> [  44185.225263]   WARN: DS: 2b/2b ES: 2b/2b FS: 0/0 GS:0/63
>> This is on context switch from a 32-bit task to idle. So
>> xen_failsafe_callback is returning to the "faulting" instruction, with
>> a comment saying "Retry the IRET", but in fact is just continuing on
>> its merry way with %gs unexpectedly set to zero.
>> In fact I think this is probably fine in practice, since it's about to
>> get explicitly set a few lines further down in __context_switch(). But
>> it's odd enough, and far enough away from what's actually said by the
>> comments, that I'm utterly unsure.
>> In xen_load_tls() we explicitly only do the lazy_load_gs(0) for the
>> 32-bit kernel. Is that really right?
> Basically - what is happening is that xen_load_tls() is invalidating the
> %gs selector while %gs is still non-NUL.
> If this happens to intersect with a vcpu reschedule, %gs (being non-NUL)
> takes precedence over KERNGSBASE, and faults when Xen tries to reload
> it.  This results in the failsafe callback being invoked.
> I think the correct course of action is to use xen_load_gs_index(0)
> (poorly named - it is a hypercall which does swapgs; mov to %gs; swapgs)
> before using update_descriptor() to invalidate the segment.
> That will reset %gs to 0 without touching KERNGSBASE, and can be queued
> in the same multicall as the update_descriptor() hypercall.

Sounds good to me as long as we skip it on native.

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